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This thesis is a contribution to the formalisation of the notion of an agent
within the class of finite multivariate Markov chains. In accordance with
the literature agents are are seen as entities that act, perceive, and are goal-
directed. We present a new measure that can be used to identify entities
(called ι-entities). The intuition behind this is that entities are spatiotemporal
patterns for which every part makes every other part more probable. The
measure, complete local integration (CLI), is formally investigated within the
more general setting of Bayesian networks. It is based on the specific local
integration (SLI) which is measured with respect to a partition. CLI is the
minimum value of SLI over all partitions. Upper bounds are constructively
proven and a possible lower bound is proposed. We also prove a theorem
that shows that completely locally integrated spatiotemporal patterns occur
as blocks in specific partitions of the global trajectory. Conversely we can
identify partitions of global trajectories for which every block is completely
locally integrated. These global partitions are the finest partitions that achieve
a SLI less or equal to their own SLI. We also establish the transformation be-
haviour of SLI under permutations of the nodes in the Bayesian network.
We then go on to present three conditions on general definitions of entities.
These are most prominently not fulfilled by sets of random variables i.e. the
perception-action loop, which is often used to model agents, is too restrictive a
setting. We instead propose that any general entity definition should in effect
specify a subset of the set of all spatiotemporal patterns of a given multivariate
Markov chain. Any such definition will then define what we call an entity set.
The set of all completely locally integrated spatiotemporal patterns is one
example of such a set. Importantly the perception-action loop also naturally
induces such an entity set. We then propose formal definitions of actions and
perceptions for arbitrary entity sets. We show that these are generalisations of
notions defined for the perception-action loop by plugging the entity-set of the
perception-action loop into our definitions. We also clearly state the properties
that general entity-sets have but the perception-action loop entity set does not.
This elucidates in what way we are generalising the perception-action loop.
Finally we look at some very simple examples of bivariate Markov chains.
We present the disintegration hierarchy, explain it via symmetries, and calcu-
late the ι-entities. Then we apply our definitions of perception and action to
these ι-entities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On the most general level this thesis is a contribution to existing research
that tries to reconcile a physicalist worldview with the notion of agents. The
physicalist worldview holds that the laws of physics determine (whether in
any way stochastically or not) everything that happens in the universe. The
notion of an agent relies fundamentally on the agent’s capacity to act. This,
however, means that the agent can make something happen and that there are
not only things happening to it (Wilson and Shpall, 2012; McGregor, 2016). It
seems that if the agent can make something happen then there must be some-
thing that is not determined by the laws of physics. Conversely, if the laws
of physics determine everything that happens then the agent did not make it
happen. So either the laws of physics do not determine everything or agents
do not exist. Let us assume the laws of physics determine everything. We do
not know the actual laws of physics but let us also assume that the laws of
physics are the same everywhere (in every inertial frame of reference). Then
wherever there is a human (the primary example of an agent) and wherever
there is no human the laws of physics are the same. These laws of physics do
not care about what is happening, they just make it happen. The question re-
mains whether there are agents. Even if humans (or animals, bacteria, plants)
cannot really make things happen, our intuition tells us that there is a dif-
ference between the volumes of space that contain humans and the volumes
of space that do not. The ones that do not contain humans (or other agents)
usually are vastly less dangerous for example.
The question is still open what the difference is or even how a differ-
ence in danger between volumes of (physically identical) space can arise. In
other words it is still an open question (McGregor, 2016) what it is that makes
some volumes of space (and their time evolution) agents. Specifically human
characteristics are not the focus of this research, simple living organisms are
sufficient from this point of view.
We want to ascertain that we do not fall prey to our own imagination and
give an account of agents that only seems compatible with laws of physics.
Therefore we choose a completely formal setting. This means we choose a
well defined class of “universes” that have laws which are equal basically
everywhere. We do not choose the leading theories of physics. Our target here
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is the seeming incompatibility between lawfulness and agent containment of
a system/universe. There is no need to use complicated systems if we are not
sure that the simple ones are not sufficient. We also do not want to assume a
priori the existence of notions from physics; most prominently the notion of
energy, which gives rise to the notion of work. If it turns out that we need
such a concept for agents to exist within a lawful universe then even better. In
summary we are firmly in the field of artificial life with its intention to study
“life as it could be” (Langton, 1989). More precisely, we study agents as they
could be.
The literature (Barandiaran et al., 2009) tells us that agents are entities
that act, perceive, and pursue goals. Accordingly, we should try to define
each of these notions for a universe governed by (basically everywhere equal)
laws of physics. This thesis, building on previous research, proposes formal
definitions for entities, action, and perception in such systems. A definition of
what it means to pursue goals for entities (that may perceive and act) is not
part of this thesis.
As the setting for the formal definitions we choose (possibly driven) mul-
tivariate Markov chains. As they include cellular automata, these are suited
to model universes with basically everywhere equal laws of physics (Toffoli,
1984). They also include the famous game of life cellular automaton. This
is the setting for one of the most complete attempts at a formal definition
of agents to date by Beer (2014b). Driven multivariate Markov chains are
important because they contain computer implementations of (also continu-
ous) reaction-diffusion systems that exhibit life-like phenomena (Virgo, 2011;
Froese et al., 2014; Bartlett and Bullock, 2015, 2016).
Within this setting this thesis splits up into two parts. The first part is the
introduction and formal investigation of a newly conceived measure of inte-
gration, complete local integration. The second then contains four smaller
contributions, a proposition of three requirements for entity definitions, a
proposal and motivation of using complete local integration as a definition
of entities, a formal definition of actions for arbitrary entities, and a formal
definition of perceptions for arbitrary entities.
Apart from Barandiaran et al. (2009) which contains a review of agent def-
initions we ignore in this thesis all work on agents that is not formal. This
means we will not discuss the historical background and philosophical con-
siderations that enable us to even try and formalise agents. We highlight,
however, that the formal approaches we are building on are almost all in turn
strongly influenced by the work of Maturana and Varela (1980) . This is true
for Barandiaran et al. (2009) themselves but equally so for Bertschinger et al.
(2006, 2008); Beer (2014a,b). Our work can be seen to a certain extend as a
synthesis of these publications.
Recently Beer (2014a,b) has thoroughly investigated the application of the
ideas of Maturana and Varela (1980) to the glider in the game of life. In Beer
(2014a) he informally introduces criteria for the organisational closure of spa-
tiotemporally extended structures in the game of life (the block, blinker, and
glider). From the organisational closure he derives the boundary of the struc-
tures and thereby arrives at a definition of entities. It seems to us that this
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approach can be further formalised. However, as Beer notes for a formali-
sation that also accounts for edge cases where closure is temporarily lost, or
transformation into other closure regimes further decisions have to be taken.
In the end probably for this reason no formal definition of which structures
in general constitute entities is given. In Beer (2014b) the glider is then in-
vestigated in more detail with respect to its cognitive domain. The cognitive
domain contains a notion of perception that we generalise in this thesis and an
implicit notion of action which is also similar to the notion of action we pro-
pose here. Ignoring goal-directedness this work represents a significant step
to a formal definition of agents as it is well defined in a cellular automaton
with the same dynamical/physical law at every cell.
A fully formal definition of entities is still missing, however, and the ac-
count of perception is also specific to deterministic systems. Furthermore the
account of perception (or cognitive domain) may seem peculiar and unrelated
to concepts outside the theory of Maturana and Varela (1980).
If we look for formal concepts that can be used as entity definitions outside
of Beer’s work we find that most candidate notions also have problems dis-
cerning entities in edge cases. Such edge cases occur where multiple entities
collide, appear or disappear. A common reason for this is that many notions
that discern “important” structures/patterns from “less important” structures
or more generally just some structures from other structures do so by evaluat-
ing structures only spatially. This means they discern among different struc-
tures that exist at a single time-step t. Then at the next time-step t  1 they
again discern between structures at that time-step. The question then remains
how to identify which of the structures at t match up with which structures at
t  1 to form spatiotemporal structures. Often this is unambiguous but when
similar structures (like multiple gliders) collide or even overlap then this ap-
proach usually fails. An example of such notions are the spatiotemporal filters
(Shalizi et al., 2006; Lizier et al., 2008; Flecker et al., 2011) developed for cel-
lular automata. These can highlight gliders, but if two gliders collide they
make no claim about the identity of a possibly ensuing glider. Note that these
structures were also not conceived for the purpose of detecting entities. The
same problem occurs however for the Markov blanket entity underlying the
“living organism” of Friston (2013) at least in its current formulation.
An obvious solution to this problem is to directly evaluate spatiotemporal
structures for their identity. Then no matching up of time-slices is needed any-
more. The existing work identifying such spatiotemporal structures is limited.
Balduzzi (2011) detects spatiotemporal coarse-grainings in cellular automata
(and multivariate Markov chains in general). This approach may be an alter-
native to our proposal. It has never been used even for small systems how-
ever. Our proposal seems much simpler to express but computationally both
are unfeasible for large systems without significant approximations. Another
similar work also resulting in a spatiotemporal coarse-graining is the work
by Hoel et al. (2013) which identifies causally efficient macrostates. These
are however random variables themselves and not spatiotemporal structures
like gliders as we will argue. The latter work can be combined with Oizumi
et al. (2014), according to the authors, to get spatiotemporal structures more
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similar to gliders. In this case after the spatiotemporal coarse-graining of
Hoel et al. (2013) the approach of Oizumi et al. (2014) is used to detect spatial
structures on top. This looses some flexibility compared to our approach since
the coarse-graining does not allow arbitrary combinations of fine-grained spa-
tiotemporal structures anymore. It also does not treat the spatial and temporal
dimension on equal footing which is a desirable theoretical property consid-
ering the success of relativity theory. These spatiotemporal coarse-grainings
have not been specifically proposed as definitions of entities and and do not
come with definitions of perception and action. The work by Oizumi et al.
(2014) (and predecessors Tononi, 2001; Tononi and Sporns, 2003; Tononi, 2004;
Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008) are somewhat related to agents since they try to
formally define consciousness. However, for the same reason they identify a
single entity (the main complex) in the systems they are used for. These sys-
tems are also conceptualised to be applied to neural networks i.e. the “inside”
of agents and not to universes to detect the agents. However, investigating the
relations of our measure to these will be interesting work for the future.
In summary, currently there is no formally defined and accepted way of
identifying entities in multivariate Markov chains. In this thesis we contribute
a new measure for this purpose. this measure is called complete local integra-
tion (CLI) and we denote the resulting entities as ι-entities. Identifying entities
is important for our general research project because it allows to unambigu-
ously and consistently attribute sequences of actions and perceptions over the
course of time. This seems to be needed in order to reveal any goal-directed
behaviour. This in turn is a defining feature of agents.
The underlying idea of complete local integration is quite simple. We
require that every part of an entity makes all other parts of it more proba-
ble. Intuitively this can be related to the fact that partial living organisms
are extremely rare or at least much rarer than whole living organisms. Not
all entities are agents, however, since for example soap-bubbles also have this
property1.
In Chapter 4 we analyse the notion of complete local integration formally.
This is done in the general setting of Bayesian networks. These are a gener-
alisation of multivariate Markov chains to cases where notions of time and
space are irrelevant or not so simple. This is done since SLI and CLI may be
of interest in different contexts as well. First we define the more basic no-
tion of specific local integration with respect to a particular partition. For SLI
we constructively prove upper bounds and construct an example of a pattern
with strongly negative SLI. These results are of general technical interest and
also provide examples. Then we introduce CLI which is the minimum value
of SLI with respect to any partition. We then introduce the disintegration hi-
erarchy and the refinement-free disintegration hierarchy. These constructions
help reveal the structure of the completely locally integrated patterns and un-
derlie the main formal contribution of this thesis, which is the disintegration
theorem (Theorem 22). The disintegration theorem connects the SLI of an en-
tire trajectory (time-evolution) with respect to a partition with the CLI of the
blocks of that partition. More precisely for a given trajectory the blocks of the
1The author thanks Eric Smith for pointing out this example.
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finest partitions among those leading to a particular value of SLI consists only
of completely locally integrated blocks. Conversely each completely locally
integrated pattern is a block in such a finest partition among those leading to
a particular value of SLI. This connection is new. This theorem may lead to
further theoretical results and suggests an additional interpretation of com-
pletely integrated patterns as independently encoded parts in a code adapted
to the specific trajectory (see Section 5.3.5.3). We then go on and investigate
the symmetry properties of SLI. We establish its transformation under permu-
tations of the nodes in the Bayesian network in the SLI symmetry theorem and
its corollary (Theorems 30 and 31). This can be used to explain the structure
of the disintegration hierarchy as we will see in Chapter 6 where we present
simple examples. Symmetry properties are also expected to be important for
further formal analysis of SLI/CLI. For convenient reference we also show
how symmetries spread in multivariate Markov chains, our main application
here.
We then come to the second part of this thesis. We have already stated that
the notion of perception (part of the cognitive domain) in Beer (2014b) may
seem idiosyncratic. However, it turns out to be closely related to the notion of
perception that is formalised in the perception-action loop. The perception-
action loop is a model of agent-environment interaction that goes back at least
to Von Uexküll (1920). Renewed interest possibly started with Beer (1995) and
the dynamical systems view of cognition. Later it was formally captured as a
Bayesian network by Klyubin et al. (2004) and has been used extensively since
then for information theoretic investigations into the interaction of agents and
environments (Klyubin et al., 2005; Bertschinger et al., 2006, 2008; Salge et al.,
2014; Ay et al., 2012; Zahedi and Ay, 2013).
It is therefore safe to say that the perception-action loop is a powerful tool
to investigate such interactions. However, it makes some assumptions that
make it unsuitable as a tool for investigating entities. The reason for this is
that it models agents as random variables/processes.
We argue in Section 5.3 that a formal notion of entities in multivariate
Markov chains should satisfy three criteria. These are compositionality, degree
of freedom traversal, and counterfactual variation. It becomes clear in the course
of this argument that subsets of the set of random variables in the multivariate
Markov chain are not suitable for agent definitions. This includes in particular
the perception-action loop since there the agent is just a sequence of random
variables.
The three criteria are derived by using what we call the non-preclusion ar-
gument. Definitions of entities must allow every phenomenon that is known
to be exhibited by any agent (since all agents are entities). For example, if we
know that there is a green agent somewhere then an entity definition which
says all entities are blue must be wrong. So greenness must not be precluded
by the entity definition. We argue that, because the glider and other life-like
structures in known simulations (Virgo, 2011; Froese et al., 2014; Bartlett and
Bullock, 2015; Schmickl et al., 2016) exhibit compositionality, degree of free-
dom traversal, and counterfactuality both in value and in extent, entity defini-
tions must not preclude these phenomena. Roughly, compositionality means
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that it must be possible that entities have spatial and temporal extension. De-
gree of freedom traversal (in the game of life for example) means that over
time the cells that the entity occupies can change. Counterfactual variation
means that entities can be different from one trajectory or time-evolution to
another depending on the initial condition for example. Counterfactual varia-
tion in value means that there are entities in both trajectories and they occupy
exactly the same cells but the occupied cells have different values (e.g. some
black ones are white). Counterfactual variation in extent means that the entity
in the first trajectory and possibly an entity in the second trajectory occupy
different cells. If there is no entity in the second trajectory this is a special
kind of counterfactual variation in extent. Apart from ruling out the defini-
tion of entities as sets of random variables these three phenomena can help
guide future entity definitions. We also believe the non-preclusion argument
can be extended to further phenomena such as growth or replication.
The three requirements then convince us that subset of random variables
are unsuitable for a general entity definition. We then propose to define en-
tities in general as subsets of the set of spatiotemporal patterns. These are
formally defined in Chapter 3 but are basically just subset of the cells with
fixed values. Importantly the fixed cells are not limited to one time-step but
can spread across arbitrary times. We then call any chosen subset of all spa-
tiotemporal patterns an entity-set. How to arrive at the entity-set is a matter
of choice. We propose to use the completely locally integrated spatiotemporal
patterns, the ι-entities but our definitions of entity action and entity perception
are for arbitrary entity-sets.
These definitions of entity actions and entity perceptions combine ideas
from Bertschinger et al. (2008) and Beer (2014b). Let us first come back to the
initial problem since we are about to define actions in a lawful system. In
a multivariate Markov chain only the transition matrix makes things happen
and since all entities are within the chain they cannot possibly make anything
happen. Furthermore for each entity in the entity set we are given the full
spatiotemporal extension of the entity at once. There is no choice for these
entities they are completely determined for their entire lifetime. The trick we
use to define actions in such a system is to rely on counterfactual entities. That
is we use entities that are indistinguishable for the environment. We then say
that an entity performs an action at time t if it has a co-action entity that cannot
be distinguished from the original one by any observer in the system. This
is ensured if there is a single environment at t that can occur together with
both entities. Since the environment is identical nothing in it and therefore no
observer can know what the next configuration or time-slice of the entity is.
At least if the next time-slices of the co-action entities are actually different.
This is another requirement we make of co-action entities. Since the two co-
action entities can differ in value or extent at the next time-step we also can
differentiate between value and extent actions.
We show that this definition of entity action implies the notion of non-
heteronomy due to Bertschinger et al. (2008) in the special case where the
entities are the perception-action loop entities. It is possible to show this
formally because the perception-loop can be seen as consisting of a special
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case of an entity set. This entity set is not composite in space, not degree of
freedom traversing, and only counterfactual in value but it is still an entity
set (it is also exhaustive which means there is an entity in every trajectory).
Due to the generality of the entity set we can therefore treat the perception-
action loop as a test case for our definitions. This will also be useful in future
research since we can rely on the existing body of work in the perception
action-loop and generalise it. The entity set can then serve as a bridge between
the perception-action loop and a more general theory of agents in multivariate
Markov chains (or even more general Bayesian networks in the future).
We then come to our definition of perception for entity-sets. The basic idea
behind entity perception is to capture all influences from the environment on
an entity. For the perception-action loop there is a well defined procedure for
doing this and we will show this in Section 3.3.6. There we show that we can
capture the influence from the environment by a partition of the environment
states into states that have the same influence on the agent process. This kind
of construction is known in the literature and has been used for example by
Balduzzi (2011) in basically the same way. This is also related to the older
notion of causal states (Shalizi, 2001). In this thesis we generalise this con-
struction for entity sets. It turns out that the result is also a generalisation
of the cognitive domain (more precisely the macroperturbations) defined in
Beer (2014b)2. So how does this generalisation work? This is formally more
involved then we originally envisioned. Again we are forced to deal with the
fact that the entities are already defined for their entire lifetimes. So we actu-
ally cannot “test” influences on them. Again we rely on other, similar entities
to formally capture perception. For a given entity, we take the set of entities
that has identical pasts up to some time t. We also make sure that those en-
tities still all exist at t   1. These entities are the co-perception entities. We
then classify the environments that can occur with at least one of these enti-
ties. These are the co-perception environments. Since the multivariate Markov
chains can be stochastic we cannot identify which environment leads to which
future (as in Beer, 2014b) we have to do this probabilistically. For this we have
to define a probability distribution over the futures of the co-perception en-
tities. In the perception-action loop setting this is straightforward since the
futures of the co-perception entities are just the possible values of a random
variable3. For arbitrary entity sets, the co-perception entities can have unde-
sirable properties. One such property is that they may not exhaustive. This
means that the sum of their probabilities does not sum to one as is needed for
probability distributions. This can be dealt with in a standard way if the the
co-perception entities are mutually exclusive. However, for arbitrary entity
sets this is not the case. We then have two options.
• Either we take a subset of the co-perception entities that is mutually ex-
clusive and define the probability distribution over this set. Due to the
arbitrary choice of the subset however this leads to a non-unique per-
ceptions; another choice of a subset produce another set of perceptions.
2We do not prove this. But we are quite sure.
3Due to the special case of the entity-set in the perception-action loop, which consists of all
possible combinations of all agent random variables.
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• Or we find that the entity set is non-interpenetrating. In that case we
can use the whole set of co-perception entities for the definition of the
probability distribution. This ensures a uniquely defined set of percep-
tions. Non-interpenetration is the assumption that two (different) en-
tities with identical pasts cannot occur together. Note that this is not
something akin to cell division. Cell division corresponds to a single
entity that just becomes two separate spatial patterns. Two non-identical
entities with the same past that occur together would be more akin to
two aligned light beams projected onto a wall unaligning.
In both cases we then arrive at a probability distribution which allows us to
classify the co-perception environments. However, this probability distribu-
tion is over the entire futures of the co-perception entities. Say there are only
two co-perception entities. These may not only be identical up to time t they
may be identical up to some arbitrary time t  r in the future. It then seems
wrong to interpret the classification of the environments based on the differ-
ence in the far future between the two co-perception entities as a perception
at time t. To solve this problem we introduce the branching partition. This
partitions the co-perception entities according to their next configuration or
time-slice. Co-perception entities with equal next configurations are consid-
ered as equivalent and part of the same future branch. We can then easily
derive the probability distribution over these branches by summing over the
probabilities in the branch. We call this probability distribution the branch-
morph.
We then go on to show explicitly that in the special case of the perception-
action loop the branch-morph specialises to the standard construction we used
to define perceptions in the perception-action loop. We therefore successfully
generalise this construction to the case of arbitrary entity sets. In particular
these entity sets can be non-exhaustive, degree of freedom traversing, and
counterfactual in extent (not only in value). We establish that the branch
morph is uniquely defined if the entity-set is non-interpenetrating. This is sig-
nificant since non-interpenetration then seems like a possible axiom for entity-
sets. The branch-morph itself and possibly similar constructions can be used
to carry over information theoretic notions from the perception-action loop to
entity-sets. This may lead to a definition of goal-directedness. We note here
already that the entity set of ι-entities does not satisfy non-interpenetration.
On the technical side we also show how the assumption that all co-perception
environments must occur with at least one of the co-perception entities trans-
lates to a seemingly weaker requirement in case of the perception-action loop
and related cases. This shows conversely that this requirement on the co-
perception environments is not stronger than the assumptions made in the
perception-action loop case. This is important because we want to generalise
the perception-action loop without making extra assumptions.
We then come to the final chapter which presents two extremely simple bi-
variate Markov chains that have three time-steps. We calculate and visualise
the disintegration hierarchy for the first and explain its structure using the SLI
symmetry theorems. We also calculate the ι-entities for both chains. We then
verify that ι-entities indeed satisfy the three criteria of compositionality, degree
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of freedom traversal, and counterfactual variation (in value and extent). We
also find some counter intuitive examples of ι-entities.
Then we apply our definitions of action and perception to the calculated
ι-entities. We find actions in value and extent. One of the actions we find
however seems to question the motivation of our construction this will need
further investigation. We also find that ι-entities are generally interpenetrat-
ing. We nonetheless construct two branch-morphs based on two different mu-
tually exclusive subsets of the co-perception entities and find that they differ
slightly. This is expected.
Finally we discuss the results and give some outlook for future work.
1.1 Original contributions
In summary the original contributions are:
Chapter 4
• Definition of specific local integration (SLI).
• Constructive proof of upper bound of SLI.
• Construction of negative SLI example.
• Definition of complete local integration (CLI).
• Definition of disintegration hierarchy and refinement-free disintegration
hierarchy.
• Proof of the disintegration theorem.
• Proof of the SLI symmetry theorems.
Chapter 5
• An argument (via compositionality, degree of freedom traversal, and
counterfactual variation) for a spatiotemporal pattern-based definition
of entities.
• The abstraction of entity-sets which enables the formal connection to
perception-action loop.
• A tentative4 formal definition of entities as completely locally integrated
spatiotemporal patterns.
• A tentative formal definition of action for arbitrary entity-sets.
• A classification of actions into value actions and extent actions.
• A tentative formal definition of perception for arbitrary entity-sets.
4For some context on what we mean by “tentative” see Chapter 5.
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• An exposition of the role of non-interpenetration of entity-sets in per-
ception. Namely, it makes perception naturally unique.
• The formal exposition of the connection of the action definition to non-
heteronomy of Bertschinger et al. (2008) in the perception-action loop.
• The formal exposition of the way the perception definition specialises to
the perception-action loop.
• A construction of a conditional probability distribution (the branch-
morph, including branching partition) over the futures of entities which
allows the definition of perception.
• Proof that the condition on co-perception environments is not stronger
than the assumptions about environment states inherent in the perception-
action loop.
Chapter 6
• Computation and presentation of disintegration and refinement-free dis-
integration hierarchies for two simple systems.
• Explanation of the occurrence of multiple disconnected components in
the partially ordered disintegration levels via the SLI symmetry theo-
rems.
• Computation and presentation of the completely locally integrated spa-
tiotemporal patterns of two simple systems.
• Examples of ι-entities that exhibit the three phenomena compositional-
ity, degree of freedom traversal, and counterfactual variation that we
argued for in Section 5.3.
• Examples of entity actions of ι-entities.
• Example of interpenetrating ι-entities showing that they do not neces-
sarily obey non-interpenetration.
• Example of an entity perception and a branch-morph using a proxy for
a co-perception partition.
• Example of an entity action and entity perception of the same ι-entity at
the same time-step.





Here we discuss closely related work in the literature. First we point to the
formal origin of the new measures of specific local integration and complete
local integration. Then we discuss work that is related to our notion of entities.
In cases where the entities are part of conceptions of agents we also discuss
perception and action. We have tried to write this chapter without relying too
much on our own formalism for accessibility. It might also serve as a further
introduction into the field which is why we have left it in front of the technical
part of the thesis. Nonetheless, after reading this thesis some arguments will
be easier to understand.
2.1 Formally related work
2.1.1 Specific local integration and complete local integration
In Chapter 4 we define specific local integration (SLI). This is a local mea-
sure in the sense of the measures of local information dynamics proposed by
Lizier (2012). We use the same method of localization presented there only on
a different original measure namely multi-information (McGill, 1954; Tononi
et al., 1994; Amari, 2001). The method of localising information-theoretic no-
tions like mutual-information and transfer entropy was developed to measure
information of specific realisations x, y of random variables X, Y. This is in
contrast to the original measures which are averages of the local versions.
We argue in Section 5.3.3 that entities should be trajectory dependent. This
is equivalent to saying that entities are composed of specific realisations of
random variables. Therefore we follow Lizier in using a localised measure.
In contrast to the work by Lizier we are not trying to reveal information
storage, transfer and processing to characterise computation within a dynam-
ical system but instead we are trying to find entities and agents within such
a system. While the dynamics of information are certainly relevant for agents
in dynamical systems we focus here directly on the identification of spatially
and temporally composite structures. The measures discussed by Lizier are
not designed for the purpose of identifying spatially composite structures (see
also Section 2.2.1).
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The measure of complete local integration (CLI), which we define in Sec-
tion 4.3 builds on the notion of SLI. The measure of SLI is defined with respect
to a particular partition of a set of random variables. In order to get CLI we
evaluate SLI with respect to every possible partition of the set of random
variables. We then take the minimum of all the values found in this way to
be the value of CLI. A spatiotemporal pattern that has positive CLI value is
then defined as an ι-entity. The procedure of passing through all partitions
has been used for measures similar (and originally equal (Tononi et al., 1994))
to multi-information in Tononi (2001, 2004); Balduzzi and Tononi (2008); Bal-
duzzi (2011); Oizumi et al. (2014). We have adopted it from these publications.
Apart from Balduzzi (2011) these publications are part of the integrated infor-
mation theory approach which we will discuss further below.
It is worth mentioning that our choice of taking the minimum value of SLI
found when evaluating all possible partitions of a set of random variables is
not without alternatives. Another approach would be to take the (possibly
weighted) average of all these values. This has been proposed by Ay (2015)
for the non-local multi-information.
In summary the measures of SLI and CLI which we introduce in this thesis
are a combination of the idea of localisation of information theoretic measures
by Lizier and the origins of integrated information theory by Tononi.
2.2 Work related to our notion of entities
2.2.1 Spatiotemporal filtering and entities
A basic notion in this thesis is that of an entity. At the most basic level the
intuition behind this notion is that some spatiotemporal patterns are more
important than others. This is also the problem of spatiotemporal filtering.
We here discuss work that is similar on this most basic level and then indicate
how ι-entities essentially differ due to the problem of identity over time.
Defining (and usually finding) more important spatiotemporal patterns
or structures (also called coherent structures) has a long history in the the-
ory of cellular automata and distributed dynamical systems. As Shalizi et al.
(2006) have argued most of the earlier definitions and methods (Wolfram,
1984; Grassberger, 1984; Hanson and Crutchfield, 1992; Pivato, 2007) require
previous knowledge about the patterns being looked for. They are therefor
not suitable for a general definition of what entities are. More recent defi-
nitions based on information theory (Shalizi et al., 2006; Lizier et al., 2008;
Flecker et al., 2011) do not have this limitation anymore. As argued above
our method of identifying ι-entities is also based on information theoretic no-
tions similar to those used by Lizier et al. (2008). Like the information based
definitions in the literature it also requires no knowledge about the system
or the patterns that are supposedly interesting. The main difference of our
approach is again that it directly results in spatiotemporal patterns and does
not go via an intermediate step of evaluating a measure / criterion time-step
by time-step. This has certain advantages for our particular purpose.
Applying any one of the definitions (or associated methods) proposed by
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(Shalizi et al., 2006; Lizier et al., 2008; Flecker et al., 2011) to the time-evolution
(what we call a trajectory) of a cellular automaton assigns each cell (or group
of cells) j at each time t a value (usually a real number, but can be discrete
as for local statistical complexity in Shalizi et al. (2006)) that measures an im-
portant property of the current state of pj, tq 1. The result is then a “filtered”
time evolution of the cells (or groups of cells) in the cellular automaton where
each cell j at time t now takes its value of the measured property. These fil-
tered time evolutions then highlight the important spatiotemporally extended
structures like gliders and domains. However these methods make no claim
about the identity of the revealed patterns. This means that there is no crite-
rion given that tells us which cells and their values at time t1 and which cells
and their values at time t2 are part of the same entity or object. For isolated
gliders this may not seem like a problem but whenever gliders collide it is not
clear whether they both loose their identity and become a new thing (or no
thing) or whether one of them survived the collision and maybe just changed
direction. These questions are not addressed by these publications since the
problem of identity over time (or identity of entities in general) is not the fo-
cus of these publications. The goal of these publications is to quantify and
identify emergent computation and coherent structures and not resolving the
identity of entities that may be agents. In order to assign sequences of action
and perceptions to entities (or structures) we have to be able to identify them
over time. Our approach assigns a measure of integration (CLI) directly to
groups of cells that are not only spatially but also temporally extended. We
then select the spatiotemporal patterns that have a value above zero as the
ι-entities in a given time evolution. If gliders are such ι-entities our approach
could make clear whether and which gliders survive collisions.
Note that it could be possible introduce criteria for identity over time via
the measured values of the above publications. An example criterion would
be to define a threshold and say that all cells whose measured values are
above this threshold belong to one entity. However this would often lead to
all highlighted structures to be identified as one entity and it is not directly
obvious how to define a more detailed entity criterion.
With respect to the criteria for entities we propose in this thesis we find
the following
Compositionality Both spatial (e.g. in Shalizi et al. (2006)) and temporal com-
positionality can occur.
Degree of freedom traversal Degree of freedom traversal can occur. The high-
lighted spatiotemporal patterns cross from one degree of freedom at one
time to another degree of freedom at the next. Just like the gliders they
capture.
Counterfactual variation Counterfactual variation can occur. The highlighted
spatiotemporal patterns depend on the particular time-evolution (trajec-
tory) of the system.
1In the case of local statistic complexity, the value is the causal state not only of the state at pj, tq
but of the state of the entire past light-cone. This makes no difference to the following argument
however as the result is still just a (discrete) value at pj, tq.
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Identity Only spatial identity is defined e.g. in Shalizi et al. (2006). Identity
over time is not addressed.
Perception, action, goal-directedness There is no intention to define these.
2.2.2 Emergent coarse-graining
The approach most closely related to our own approach and an important
inspiration for our work is that of Balduzzi (2011). It proposes a method
for coarse-graining the time evolutions (trajectories) of multivariate Markov
chains. Using a cellular automaton as an example, the value xj,t of a cell j
at each time t is represented by a random variable Xj,t. This is a common
practice in information theoretic/stochastic conceptions of such systems (e.g.
Shalizi et al., 2006; Lizier, 2012), which we follow as well. Then, for a given
time evolution (xout for Balduzzi and xV in our formalism), spatiotemporally
extended groups of the random variables are combined to form units Ui of
the coarse-graining K. The coarse graining K is formed not only of units
but also of ground G and channel C. The ground can be related to driving
variables (cf. the driven multivariate Markov chain Definition 41) in our case
whereas the channel has no analogue in our approach. Ignoring the chan-
nel, the coarse-graining is equivalent to a partition of the time evolution like
those we investigate in Chapter 4. This means that the units resulting from
the coarse-graining method can (by design) be spatiotemporally extended and
could correspond to spatiotemporally extended entities that require no addi-
tional concept of identity over time. One difference is that the units are also
random variables with an associated state space (the coarse-grained alphabet).
In our case the ι-entities have a fixed state for all random variables they oc-
cupy. They are not random variables themselves. We note that the approach
of Balduzzi is then peculiar in the sense that it generates spatiotemporally
extended and located coarse-grained random variables that depend on the
particular time evolution of a system. This means that our argument against
using sets of random variables as agents / entities (see Sections 2.3.1 and 5.3)
does not apply to this approach.
The coarse-graining EXpxoutq that best describes the particular time evo-
lution xout for a given system X is also chosen in a way that exhibits some
similarities with our approach. First, only emergent coarse-grainings are con-
sidered. Emergent coarse-grainings satisfy two properties which are too in-
volved to state concisely but which essentially ensure the following:
1. Emergent coarse-grainings are special among the coarse-grainings with
equal cardinality. This is makes them similar to refinement-free parti-
tions at a particular disintegration level (see Definition 56).
2. Every unit in these coarse-grainings satisfies a particular condition with
respect to its refinements. More precisely, it has more “excess informa-
tion” than its refinements with respect to the units it is connected to.
This is similar to the blocks of the refinement-free partitions at a disin-
tegration level. These are locally integrated with respect to each of their
refinements i.e. they have a positive CLI value.
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The emergent coarse-grainings are then conceptually somewhat related to the
partitions in the refinement-free disintegration hierarchy. One difference is
that the units are obtained by looking at how they are connected to other units.
In our case we focus only on the internal connection of ι-entities. It would
therefore be surprising if the two approaches were measuring the same thing.
At the same time it should be noted that excess information as defined by
Balduzzi is a partially localised2 information theoretic measure that considers
all possible partitions of the inputs of a set of random variables. It is therefore
closely related to CLI, which we use. The difference is that CLI partitions the
random variables in a group/block/unit directly and not the input variables.
The best coarse-graining EXpxoutq is the one that maximises the “excess
information” among all emergent coarse-grainings. A similar requirement
could be made in our case by selecting the partition at the lowest level of the
refinement-free disintegration hierarchy. We make no such final selection in
this thesis but plan to investigate this further in the future.
In summary the approach of Balduzzi has many parallels to our notion of
entities (agent properties like actions, perception, or goal-directedness are not
treated) and it would be interesting to investigate how the two approaches are
related in detail. This will be future work.
With respect to the criteria for entities we propose in this thesis we find
the following
Compositionality Both spatial and temporal compositionality can occur. The
units are spatiotemporally defined.
Degree of freedom traversal Degree of freedom traversal can occur. Units
can cross arbitrarily from one degree of freedom at one time to another
degree of freedom at the next.
Counterfactual variation Counterfactual variation can occur. The units de-
pend on the particular time-evolution (trajectory) of the system.
Identity Both spatial and temporal identity are defined in a unified way.
Perception, action, goal-directedness There is no intention to define these.
2.2.3 Integrated information theory
Integrated information theory Tononi (2001); Tononi and Sporns (2003); Tononi
(2004); Balduzzi and Tononi (2008); Oizumi et al. (2014) is an attempt to de-
velop a measure of consciousness of physical configurations. Similar to our
setting it is defined for the setting of multivariate Markov chains. While the
main focus of this theory is consciousness it becomes conceptually related to
our work if it is slightly reinterpreted. One of its main goals is to quantify the
unity of conscious experiences. In Tononi (2004) the authors also mention that
informationally integrated sets form “entities” (also called complexes) that
have “ports-in” and “ports-out” to connect to parts that are not within the
2Partially localised refers to measure where the averages over some of the random variables in
an information theoretic measure are omitted but others are still taken (see Lizier, 2012).
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entity. This is very similar to the program of this thesis which is to establish
a formal definition of acting and perceiving entities. As far as we know there
is no formal definition of these ports-in and ports-out and what constitutes
perceptions and actions of them. In its modern formulation (Oizumi et al.,
2014) IIT measures the IIT-integration of all spatial patterns xAt : pxj,tqpj,tqPAt
with At  Vt 3 at some time-step t. For this all possible partitions of the
parent and child nodes in the multivariate Markov chain are evaluated and
the minimal value is used to define the IIT-integration of the spatial pattern.
This leads to the most integrated patterns which are called complexes. Like in
the case of spatiotemporal filtering, no criterion is given as to what patterns
at t1 and what patterns at t2 belong to the same spatiotemporally extended
pattern (or complex). The problem of identity over time is then not solved in
this publication. However, the authors refer to Hoel et al. (2013) when men-
tioning that the spatial patterns should be evaluated over optimal “grains”.
In Hoel et al. (2013) a method is presented which coarse-grains multivariate
Markov chains spatiotemporally. This means that multiple random variables
at multiple times are grouped together to form new coarser random variables.
Unlike in Balduzzi (2011) these coarse-grainings are not dependent on the par-
ticular time-evolution of the chain. They do, however, create also temporally
extended structures (random variables) and can therefore be seen to solve the
problem of identity over time. If IIT is now used on these coarse-grained
random variables we again find the IIT-integrated spatial patterns which are
now also temporally extended since the coarse-grained variables are them-
selves temporally extended on the underlying (not coarse-grained) level. This
would lead us to a notion of entity where each entity is a coarse-grained “spa-
tial” pattern that is based on temporally extended underlying patterns. Each
such entity / coarse pattern would then correspond to a set of underlying
spatiotemporal patterns.
With respect to the criteria for entities we propose in this thesis we find
the following
Compositionality Both spatial and temporal compositionality can occur.
Degree of freedom traversal Degree of freedom traversal can occur. The method
by Hoel et al. (2013) can create coarse-grained random variables lumping
together variables at different times and that belong to different degrees
of freedom.
Counterfactual variation A restricted kind of counterfactual variation can oc-
cur. IIT evaluates spatial patterns which are values of random variables
and therefore change from one time evolution to another. However, we
cannot have both degree of freedom traversal and counterfactual varia-
tion of the degree of freedom traversal. This means we cannot have full
counterfactual variation in extent. More precisely, assume we have two
binary degrees of freedom and look at two time steps. Then we have the
random variables tX1,t1 , X2,t1 , X1,t2 , X2,t2u. Say the coarse-graining selects
the two variables X1,t1 , X2,t2 at different times to form a coarse-grained
3We write Vt for all random variables in the system at time t.
16
variable Y then the underlying spatiotemporal patterns exhibit degree
of freedom traversal (they switch from the first to the second degree of
freedom). These can be identified as IIT integrated if Y is integrated by
itself (this is possible). However, now that Y is fixed there can be no
entity that does not traverse the degrees of freedom e.g. one occupying
only X1,t1 and X1,t2 since these are not together part of a coarse-grained
variable and if they are joined via IIT then they must always include all
of Y since X1,t1 is part of Y. This means that the coarse-graining restricts
the possible counterfactual variation in extent.
Identity Spatial identity is realised by IIT. The coarse graining realises both
spatial and temporal identity. The two kinds of identity are therefore
not treated in the same way.
Perception, action, goal-directedness There are no formal definitions for these.
Parts of the investigated network are sometimes defined as sensor and
actuator variables (Albantakis et al., 2014) but in that case the whole net-
work is the “brain” of a animat and not a general universe or biosphere
like system.
2.2.4 Kolmogorov complexity of patterns
Recently Zenil et al. (2015) have proposed a method of evaluating spatiotem-
poral patterns directly (instead of concatenating spatial patterns) by approxi-
mating the Kolmogorov complexity. They evaluate 2D patterns (one time and
one space dimension) according to the (algorithmic) probability that they are
generated by a 2D Turing machine.
The algorithmic probability of one of the patterns is the number of 2D Tur-
ing machines that generate the pattern divided by all halting 2D Turing ma-
chines. The (Kolmogorov) complexity is then estimated as the self-information
(negative logarithm) of this probability. This results in a very general measure
for the complexity of patterns. For the purpose of this thesis this approach is
too general. We want to explicitly evaluate patterns according to the dynam-
ical laws that generate them i.e. we want to find the spatiotemporal patterns
that can be agents within particular multivariate Markov chains. From our
point of view some patterns that are agents in one multivariate Markov chain
could well be an arbitrary pattern in another chain. If the patterns look the
same however the approach of Zenil et al. will ascribe the same value to them
independent of the underlying dynamics of the system. It is therefore not
applicable to our problem.
With respect to the criteria for entities we propose in this thesis we find
the following
Compositionality Both spatial and temporal compositionality can occur.
Degree of freedom traversal Degree of freedom traversal can in principle be
evaluated. In the present version however only rectangular patterns are
treated this is means there are no degree of freedom traversals.
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Counterfactual variation Counterfactual variation can occur. All occurring
patterns in a trajectory can be evaluated and these differ in general from
trajectory to trajectory. The problem is that all patterns have the same
value across all systems/multivariate Markov chains.
Identity Both spatial and temporal identity are defined in a unified way.
Perception, action, goal-directedness There is no intention to define these.
2.3 Work related to our definition of agents (and
entities)
2.3.1 Interacting stochastic processes as agents or entities
In the literature it is common to model agents as stochastic (including de-
terministic) processes interacting with an environment. In its most general
formulation this view assumes that at each time t there is a random variable
Mt that represents the agent (or its “memory”) and a random variable Et that
represents the environment. Interactions can then be modelled via conditional
probabilities (see Section 3.3.6). This is also a discretised version of interacting
dynamical systems as proposed by Beer (1995) to model agent and environ-
ment. Furthermore, this model includes as an important subclass the Markov
decision problems and partially observable Markov decision problems Tishby
and Polani (2011). Note that in cases of the Markov decision problems the
agent memory Mt is often not explicitly modelled but is implicitly assumed
to be a part of the system. In the perception-action loop setting various fea-
tures of agents have been formally investigated. Examples include learning
(e.g. reinforcement learning) (Sutton and Barto, 1998), empowerment (Klyu-
bin et al., 2005; Anthony et al., 2009), informational closure (Bertschinger et al.,
2006), autonomy (Bertschinger et al., 2008; Seth, 2010), digested information
(Salge and Polani, 2011), self-organisation (Ay et al., 2012), thermodynamics of
prediction (Still et al., 2012), morphological computation (Zahedi et al., 2010;
Zahedi and Ay, 2013), and individuality (Krakauer et al., 2014).
In this thesis we deliberately do not assume that there is a random variable
Mt at each time t which corresponds to an agent. Neither do we assume that
there is an environment random variable at each time t. We take a multivariate
Markov chain whose state at each point in time t is represented by a (finite)
set of random variables tXj,tujPJ . Whether there exists an agent (or even an
entity) at that time is left open. Furthermore, even if there exists an agent at
time t it may only exist at time t in one particular time-evolution or trajectory
of the system. In another trajectory there might again be no agent at time t
or there might be one occupying a different subset of the random variables
than in the first case. These situations are not modelled by the perception-
action loop framework. They have been ignored or modelled away in order
to focus on different aspects of agents. The success of this approach justifies
this choice. Since we are interested in a fundamental and general definition
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of agents in multivariate Markov chains we cannot follow this choice. We will
argue this in more detail in Section 5.3.
Since our definitions also accommodate systems where there is an agent
and environment at every time step we will also connect our approach to
the perception-action loop after we have defined actions and perception in
Section 5.6. In the future we hope that our work contributes to the extension
of the work cited above to the more general setting treated here. We take some
steps in this direction by generalising perception and action but more detailed
investigations are needed to see whether these notions are sufficient.
Among the work cited above we will make use of and are also generally
inspired by the fundamental work on the autonomy of agents in perception-
action loops by Bertschinger et al. (2008). This work has more recently been
extended in (Krakauer et al., 2014) where it is proposed as the basis of a
method to detect the random variables that represent a biological individual
at some time t. Note that also in this newer work, unlike in our case, the indi-
vidual/agent is assumed to be represented by a set of random variables (not
their values) and it is assumed that it is represented by the same set of ran-
dom variables in every time-evolution. Nonetheless, the underlying ideas of
Bertschinger et al. autonomy namely non-heteronomy and self-determination
both reappear in our conception of agents. The role of self-determination
which refers to the influence of the agent’s state at one time on its state at a
subsequent time is played by the requirement of integration of the ι-entities.
We only consider patterns as candidates for agents if their parts are inter-
related according to complete local integration. The role of non-heteronomy,
which requires that the environment state does not determine the agent’s next
state is played by our notion of entity action. We relate this notion of action to
Bertschinger et al.’s measure of non-heteronomy in Section 5.6.
We also note here that within the formalism of reinforcement learning
and in response to the definition of universal intelligence by Legg and Hutter
(2007) Orseau and Ring (2012) have argued against the assumption that the
agent’s random variable Mt (which in this case is seen as the memory/tape
of a Turing machine) is guaranteed to exist. The idea there is that in a more
realistic setting the environment can also overwrite the agent’s memory. They
conclude that in the most realistic case there only ever is one memory that
the agent’s data is embedded in. These arguments for a single system and a
blurred boundary between agent and environment then lead to similar con-
clusions as our arguments for spatiotemporal patterns as entities (that can be
agents) in Chapter 5.
Speculating at the end Orseau and Ring propose (also in the setting of cel-
lular automata) to define a utility function which is 1 as long as some chosen
“heart” pattern exists and 0 otherwise. The agent is then not further specified
but supposed to protect the heart pattern against destructive influence and
accordingly regarded the longer it succeeds. The only choice possible is that
of the initial condition. We agree that the only choice is the initial condition
but a prior choice of a pattern that must be maintained does not seem in ac-
cordance with our viewpoint here. Here the kinds of patterns that constitute
agents depend on the dynamics of the system / multivariate Markov chain. It
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is possible that in some systems having some form of “heart” pattern (a better
analogy might be a “gene” pattern) turns out to be just what agents need to
persist. This, however, would be a consequence of the dynamics of the chain
again and the gene pattern would be the gene pattern under those dynamics
and not one that can be chosen externally. The only way we see to make sense
of using a “heart” pattern is in a setting where finding the dynamics of the
system that preserve it for the maximum amount of time is the goal. This
however seems trivial to achieve with dynamics that leave every cell fixed. So
for an definition of agents in our setting this approach does not seem to work.
Orseau and Ring then also pose it as open questions in the “one memory”
setting what part of the system the agent is and what an agent is (where the
boundaries between agent and environment are). This thesis is also an attempt
to contribute to the answers to these questions.
With respect to the criteria for entities we propose in this thesis we find
the following
Compositionality Both spatial and temporal compositionality can occur. The
random variable Mt can be composed out of multiple random variables
and it has multiple time-steps.
Degree of freedom traversal Degree of freedom traversal is possible. The
random variable Mt can be defined to correspond to a different set of
random variables at each time Krakauer et al. (e.g. 2014).
Counterfactual variation Counterfactual variation cannot occur. If the entity
is a set of random variables then it is always the same set and only the
values change.
Identity Usually in the perception-action loop both spatial and temporal iden-
tity are given without any justification. Krakauer et al. (2014) have
dropped the spatial assumption and search for the right spatial com-
position of the individual. Both, spatial and temporal identity could
be defined via the coarse-graining method by Hoel et al. (2013). How-
ever, no claims have been made that these coarse-grained variables have
anything to do with agents.
Perception, action Perception and action are implicitly defined as the inter-
actions between the agent and the environment.
Goal-directedness Goal-directedness is ongoing research. Bertschinger et al.
(2008) note that their notion of non-trivial informational closure indi-
cates that the agent has some information about the environment or even
models it. This may be related to-goal directedness. Another route is to
take cues from inverse reinforcement learning (Ng and Russell, 2000) or
work on inferring intentions (e.g. Pantelis et al., 2014).
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2.3.2 Autopoiesis and cognition in the game of life
2.3.2.1 Autopoiesis and entities
In Beer (2014a) the author constructs an account of spatiotemporal patterns in
the game of life cellular automaton based on the ideas of Maturana and Varela
(Varela, 1979; Maturana and Varela, 1980). This can be seen as a definition of
entities. Moreover it defines entities as spatiotemporal patterns and therefore
the set of all such entities may constitute an entity-set in the sense of our
Definition 65. This would make it a direct alternative to our own notion of
ι-entities.
The construction of the entities proceeds roughly as follows. First the maps
from the Moore neighbourhood to the next state of a cell are classified into five
classes of local processes. Then these are used to reveal the dynamical struc-
ture in the transitions from one time-slice of a spatiotemporal pattern to the
next. The used example patterns are the famous block, blinker, and glider and
are considered including their temporal extension. Using both the processes
and the spatial patterns/values/components (the black and white values of
cells are called components) networks characterising the organisation of the
spatiotemporally extended patterns are constructed. These can then be inves-
tigated for their organisational closure. This is defined to occurs if the same
process component relations as before reoccur at a later time. Boundaries
of the spatiotemporal patterns are identified by determining the conditions
necessary for the reoccurence of the organisation.
Beer mentions that the current version of this method of identifying entities
has its limitations. If the closure is perturbed or delayed and then recovered
the entity still looses its identity according to this definition. Two possible
alternatives are also suggested. The first is to define the potential for closure
as enough for the ascription of identity. This is questioned as well since a
sequence of perturbations can take the entity further and further away from
its “defining” organisation and make it hard to still speak of a defining organ-
isation at all. The second alternative is to define that the persistence of any
organisational closure indicates identity. It is suggested that this would allow
blinkers to transform to gliders.
We note that our definition of ι-entities does not need similar choices to
be made since it is not based on the reocurrence of any organisation. As
mentioned before, it takes entire spatiotemporal patterns and evaluates their
integration. It is then possible that later time-slices of ι-entities have no organ-
isational similarity to earlier ones. This is most similar to the latter proposal
where blinkers can transform to gliders. However, in our case not even the
blinker or the glider would necessarily need to exhibit a reoccurring organi-
sation explicitly.
It still seems to us that any of the choices proposed by Beer may be used
to construct an automatic way to identify autopoietic patterns as a kind of
special patterns or entities. By automatic we mean that no knowledge of
the structures we are looking for is necessary. Ignoring computational issues
again it may be possible to search through all spatiotemporal patterns and
look for closures. Once we find a closure we could try to reconstruct the
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associated boundaries and thereby obtain complete entities. It is not stated
in the paper whether this is possible in principle. If we assume it is then the
resulting set of entities is a set of spatiotemporal patterns and therefore an
entity-set according to our Definition 65. This means our own definitions of
action and perception could be applied to these autopoietic entities. This is
not surprising since Beer (2014b) defines a closely related notion of perception
himself. This will be discussed next.
2.3.2.2 Cognitive domain and perception
In Beer (2014b) the author constructs (again following Varela, 1979; Maturana
and Varela, 1980) the cognitive domain of the glider in the game of life. Our
concept of perception can be seen as a generalisation not only of perception in
the perception-action loop but also as a generalisation of the cognitive domain
in this publication.
To get the cognitive domain Beer (2014b) employs a series of concepts that
have analogues in our definition of perception. The glider is defined as an
autopoietic entity in the sense of Beer (2014a). This is also a spatiotemporally
extended entity xA in accordance with our definition. First he defines the
microperturbations P of the glider. These are the possible states of the bound-
ary around the glider. The set of microperturbations can also be restricted to
the nondestructive perturbations. This means those were the glider does not
die at the next time-step. The role of the nondestructive microperturbations
that preserve the glider identity is played in our case by the co-perception
environments SpxA, tq of entity xA at time t. The set of microperturbations
are then classified according to the induced next state of the glider (includ-
ing its death state if destructive perturbations are allowed4). This results in
a set of equivalence classes called the macroperturbations. In our case these
equivalence classes are the perceptions of the entity xA which are the blocks
of the co-perception partition piSpxA, tq. In Beer (2014b) the cognitive domain C
is the collection of all macroperturbations of all possible glider states. In our
formalism the cognitive domain CpxAq of an entity xA would be the set of all
perceptions that occur along the the time-slices of a given entity xA:
CpxAq : tb P piSpxA, tq : At, At 1  Hu (2.1)
where the condition At, At 1  H just picks the times where the entity exists
at t and t  1. If it doesn’t exist at t  1 then it cannot perceive anything about
the environment at t.
The cognitive domain in Beer (2014b) is defined for the autopoietic entities
Beer (2014a). Via its macroperturbations it contains a notion of perceptions
which is suitable for systems/entity sets that do not contain agents in every
trajectory. Recall that this was not the case for perception in the perception ac-
tion loop. In this thesis we present a generalisation of Beer (2014b)’s macroper-
turbations to arbitrary entity sets in arbitrary (possibly stochastic) multivariate
Markov chains. This reveals the requirement of non-interpenetration for entity
4We do not use the death state since we don’t allow destructive environments.
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sets, which allows uniquely defined perception and, accordingly, uniquely de-
fined cognitive domains. Finally we connect the general notion of perception
to the perception-action loop setting. This means we also expose a connection
between Beer (2014b) and the perception-action loop.
Our work on perception can therefore be regarded as an extension of the
cognitive domain notion proposed in Beer (2014b).
2.3.2.3 Summary
With respect to the criteria for entities we propose in this thesis as well as
action, perception and goal-directedness we find the following:
Compositionality Both spatial and temporal compositionality can occur (see
the glider).
Degree of freedom traversal Degree of freedom traversal is possible (see the
glider).
Counterfactual variation Counterfactual variation can occur (see different glid-
ers in different time-evolutions / trajectories).
Identity Temporal identity is defined via the closure condition. Spatial iden-
tity is then derived from there. There are some choices left to make. So
the notion is not yet unique.
Perception Perception is defined via the macroperturbations. Our notion is a
generalisation to arbitrary entities and stochastic settings.
Action There is no explicit definition of action in this work. However, it
is mentioned that the sequence of the entity’s time-slices i.e. its “be-
havioural trajectory” would be interpreted as actions by an observer.
This is compatible with our notion even if we make an additional ex-
plicit requirement. Beer does not require that there must be different
possible next time-slices given the same environment. Without this re-
quirement the connection of actions to autonomy that we obtain in this
thesis is lost. We note that the glider according to our definition can
perform an action.
Goal-directedness There is no notion of goal-directedness defined.
2.3.3 Life as we know it
Friston (2013) argues that life is an emergent property of some dynamical
systems and that the emergent living organisms are characterised by Markov
blankets. Since living organisms are the primary examples of agents we can
focus on implicit properties of agents. The Markov blankets define the en-
tities in this publication. This works in the following way. We are given a
particle like system 5 with (each two dimensional) position ppiq and velocity
5Particles are referred to as subsystems in the original, we deviate from this terminology here.
The notation is the original however.
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p
1piq for each particle i. The particles also have inner degrees of freedom q˜piq
but they play no role in the entity definition (they do in persistence etc.). The
particles positions and velocities obey some equations of motion that involve
the inner degrees of freedom q˜ but apart from this model particles with some
friction term in a potential well. The particles only ever interact if they are
closer to each other than some threshold (which happens to be equal to 1).
From the position of these particles a time dependent adjacency matrix Aptq
is derived. The matrix entry Aijptq is set to 1 if the particles i and j were closer
than the threshold within a time-window (of length 256 seconds) preceding t.
The matrix Aptq is then used to find the Markov blanket. This is done by con-
structing the Markov blanket matrix Bptq : Aptq   AptqT   AptqT Aptq where
CT denotes the transpose of C. At each point in time t the eigenvectors of
the Markov blanket matrix Bptq are then calculated. The eigenvector with the
largest eigenvalue then contains positive real numbers and indicates in how
far the according particle is part of the most interconnected cluster. The par-
ticles with the largest k  8 values were then picked to be the internal states
i.e. the inside of the entity. So setting k  8 is arbitrary. If we now construct
the vector χ  pχ1, ...,χ128q such that χi  1 if i is one of the internal particles
(and χi  0 otherwise) the matrix product Aptqχ will indicate the children,
AptqTχ the parents, and AptqT Aptqχ the parents of the children of the internal
particles according to the adjacency matrix Aptq.
Now let us define:
• Λptq  t1, ..., 128u as the set of internal particles at time t,
• Bptq  t1, ..., 128u as the set of children of the internal particles, the
particles of the “active states”6,
• Sptq  t1, ..., 128u as the set of parents of the internal particles, the parti-
cles of the “sensory states”,
• Ψptq  t1, ..., 128u as the rest, the particles of the “external states”.7
Let us consider position and velocity p˜piq  pppiq, p
1piqq and internal degrees
of freedom q˜piq of each particle i together as one variable xi : pp˜piq, q˜piqq and
let us define for each time t the random variable Xi,t to represent the value of
xi at time t. Then an entity is defined at each time t by:
• the internal states xΛptq,t : pxi,tqiPΛptq,
• the active states xBptq,t : pxi,tqiPBptq,
• the sensory states xSptq,t : pxi,tqiPSptq.
Together these form a spatiotemporal pattern pxΛptq,t, xBptq,t, xSptq,tq in accor-
dance with our definition.
6In the original these are denoted by A but this would be confusing here.
7It is not clear to us which set the parents of the children AptqT Aptqχ are supposed to belong
to. It is probably either the action states or the sensory states. We ignore them as where they
belong to does not affect the reasoning here.
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This results in temporally changing entities that can be different from time-
evolution to time-evolution. Note that, since k  8 particles are always chosen
as the internal states there is always exactly one entity at each time t. If no
particles interacted with these k  8 particles in the current time window
then there are no active or sensory states. So an entity is an agent if such
interactions happen.
Importantly, the problem of identity over time is not addressed. A sin-
gle Markov blanket is calculated at each time-step this of course leads to a
uniquely defined next Markov blanket but why the two share some identity
is not argued. In cases where the interconnections between one set of k  8
particles weakens while those of another set of external particles strengthens
there can be a discontinuous jump of all internal states at some point. This
would still be seen as the time-evolution of the one Markov blanket in the
system. Even if multiple Markov blankets were defined there is no proposed
method of discerning what would happen in edge cases where Markov blan-
kets collide for example.
In summary this means that the entities of this approach can vary counter-
factually (they can occupy different random variables from one trajectory to
another Definition 71) can traverse degrees of freedom but do not solve the
problem of identity over time. They are therefore entities that are more general
than the ones in the perception-action loop but less general than some spa-
tiotemporal pattern based entities like the autopoietic entities of Beer (2014a)
or our ι-entities.
So much for the entities of this approach. We now discuss perception and
action. The condition that interactions have to occur between internal states
and other states for there to perception is also contained in our own notion of
perception. In our definition whenever there is an influence by the environ-
ment on an entity the entity perceives something. This is also the case here. If
there is influence by some non-internal states on the internal states these states
are defined to be sensory states. This happens since the adjacency matrix will
indicate this interaction. Then the set of sensory states becomes non-empty.
However, the notion of perception in Friston (2013) includes more than just
the existence of sensory states. If the active states are also non-empty then
it is argued that the internal states will “appear to solve Bayesian inference
about the external states”. This is the notion of perception in this publication.
It is a more ambitious and higher-level notion of perception than the merely
influenced based notion we propose. We note that our notion of perception
is not necessarily carried by a set of sensory states (we would say sensory
random variables) i.e. in our case there are no random variables that explicitly
represent the sensor values/perceptions. Perceptions are a classification of the
environment which may or may not be explicitly represented in the system by
random variables.
The action states of Friston also have no direct analogue in our concept of
action. Our concept of action is deliberately weak and does not even require
an influence on the environment. It only requires that the environment does
not determine the next state of the entity (non-heteronomy). This condition
is also met by Friston’s concept of action states as he states that the “flow
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of action states does not depend on external states”. So if we consider the
action states as part of the entity (which is also done by Friston) our notion
of actions is exhibited by such entities. Conversely, our entities can exhibit
actions without having action-states such that our notion of action is weaker
than Friston’s.
In contrast to this thesis Friston also argues that the Markov blanket enti-
ties if they have sensory and action states exhibit a kind of goal-directedness.
He states that “action will appear to conserve the structural and dynamical
integrity” of the Markov blanket. If this is true then we have entities, per-
ception, action, and even goal-directedness (the conservation of integrity) and
therefore a complete agent definition.
Evaluating these claims is still an open research question.
With respect to the criteria for entities we propose in this thesis as well as
action, perception and goal-directedness we find the following:
Compositionality Both spatial and temporal compositionality can occur for
the Markov blanket entities.
Degree of freedom traversal Degree of freedom traversal can occur (and does
so in the paper). The Markov blanket contains different particles at dif-
ferent times.
Counterfactual variation Counterfactual variation can occur but is restricted.
The Markov blankets change from trajectory to trajectory. In the current
version, there is always exactly one such entity however. For agents we
can say that there is no agent if the internal states of the k  8 internal
particles don’t interact with any other particles. More than one agent is
not defined currently.
Identity Only spatial identity is treated by the Markov blanket. The identity
over time is not addressed.
Perception Perception is defined as Bayesian inference about the external
states. According to the author it occurs whenever there is a Markov
blanket with active states and sensory states.
Action Action is defined via the active states which flow independently of
the external states.
Goal-directedness Goal-directedness is emergent since the actions “appear to




In this section the formal background that will be used throughout the thesis
is presented. It is assumed the reader is at least vaguely familiar with
• elementary probability theory of discrete random variables, and
• Bayesian networks.
We will nonetheless present many basic definitions for quick reference and to
clarify our notation. For the most part we tried to stick to standard notation of
probabilities. However the section on symmetries of spatiotemporal patterns
(Section 4.5) requires a more elaborate, if more basic, notation than usual. This
will be introduced in Section 3.2 and related to more standard notation.
In Section 3.1 we first recall the definitions of partially ordered sets (posets)
and special posets called lattices. Then we look at partitions and the partition
lattices they form. Partitions will be used in multiple ways in this thesis. They
are a basic concept in our definitions of specific local interaction in Chap-
ter 4, of ι-entities in Section 5.3.4 and of entity perception in Section 5.5. The
partition lattice is also needed for the definition of ι-entities and forms the
underlying structure of the disintegration theorem (Theorem 22) which is one
of the main contributions of this thesis.
In Section 3.2 we introduce our notation for random variables and proba-
bility distributions. We also introduce the notion of patterns which is equiva-
lent to the notion of spatiotemporal patterns1. This simple notion is fundamental
to this thesis. Under the name of cylinder sets it is a well known notion that
usually does not play a dominant role. In this thesis it is the basis for the
formal as well as the conceptual part.
In Section 3.3 we define Bayesian networks which are a generalisation of
multivariate Markov chains. Most of the theorems (including the disintegration
theorem and the SLI symmetry theorem) in Chapter 4 hold for Bayesian net-
works in general and not only for multivariate Markov chains. Multivariate
Markov chains are the systems used in the conceptual part of this thesis. There
they represent universes or geospheres that may contain agents. A special
1Spatiotemporal patterns are just patterns in systems where notions of time and space are
defined.
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kind of multivariate Markov chains are the driven multivariate Markov chains
which are relevant for some applications that involve external influences on
a system (e.g. heat baths). In Chapter 4 we prove Theorem 34, which can be
used to relate the symmetries of such a driven multivariate Markov chain to
the transformation of specific local integration. Section 3.3 also presents the
definition of the perception-action loop and the extended perception-action loop.
We will frequently refer to the perception-action loop in the conceptual part
since it is a common way to model agents formally. Furthermore, the method
of extracting of perceptions from the perception-action loop to get to the ex-
tended version is the starting point for our own definition of entity perception
in Section 5.5. The proof we present there that the extracted perceptions (or
sensor-values) and actions capture all interactions between agent and envi-
ronment process also supports the interpretation of perception as the total of
all influences of the environment on the agent.
This chapter contains no original contributions and only provides the vo-
cabulary and notation for the following. We are not aware of a reference for
the proof of Theorem 10 concerning the extraction of perceptions and actions
from the perception-action loop. However, we are sure that it is well known
among researchers in the field.
3.1 Posets, lattices, and partitions
Here we introduce the terminology of partially ordered sets (short: posets)
and state some facts without proofs. We also present the definition of a lattice
as a special poset. For a more thorough treatment as well as proofs we refer
to Grätzer (2011).
In this thesis, we will mostly use the partial order of “refinement” to relate
“set partitions” to each other. These will be defined in Section 3.1.2. All set
partitions of a set will turn out to form a lattice. However, we will sometimes
look at a subsets of all set partitions and the posets they form. For this reason
we start with the more general notion of posets.
3.1.1 Partially ordered sets and lattices
Definition 1 (Partial orders and posets). A partial order ¨ on a set A is a binary
relation that is
(i) reflexive: @a P A:a ¨ a,
(ii) antisymmetric: @a, b P A: if a ¨ b and b ¨ a then a  b, and
(iii) transitive: @a, b, c P A: if a ¨ b and b ¨ c then a ¨ c.
A together with the partial order ¨ forms a partially ordered set or shorter a poset.
Remarks:
• Technically, a poset is a tuple xA,¨y where the partial order is explicitly
specified. We will usually call A a poset and imply the partial order if it
is clear from context.
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• A partial order is partial in the sense that there may be elements a, b P A
such that neither a ¨ b nor b ¨ a. In the total order defined next this
possibility is excluded.
Definition 2. A total order on a set A is a partial order on A such that for all a, b P A
either a ¨ b or b ¨ a.
A together with a total order ¨ forms a totally ordered set.
• The natural numbers together with the usual less or equal relation ¤ are
a totally ordered set.
Definition 3 (Minimal and maximal elements). A minimal element of a poset A
with partial order ¨ is an element a P A such that if for any b P A we have b ¨ a
then b  a. Conversely, a maximal element is an element c P A such that if for any
b P A we have c ¨ b then b  c.
Remarks:
• A minimal element then has no lesser element within the poset and a
maximal element has no greater element within it.
• There can be multiple minimal and maximal elements in a poset.
• Minimal and maximal elements should not be confused with least and
greatest elements which we define next.
Definition 4. Given a poset A an element a P A is called a least element if for all
b P A, a ¨ b. We then denote a by 0. An element c P A is called a greatest element if
for all b P A, b ¨ c. We then denote c by 1.
Remarks:
• The least element is lesser than all elements in the poset and the greatest
element is greater than all elements.
• If they exist, least and greatest elements are unique.
• A least (greatest) element is always a minimal (maximal) element but
not vice versa.
Definition 5 (Boundedness). A poset A is bounded if it has both a least and a
greatest element.
Definition 6 (Covering relation). Given a two elements a, b P A of a poset A with
a  b we say b covers a and write a ¨: b if there is no c P A with a  c  b such
that a ¨ c ¨ b.
Remarks:
• If b covers a then b is greater than a and there is no element in between
the two.
• If A is finite then knowing all covering relations determines the partial
order of A completely (Grätzer, 2011, p.6).
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• The join, which is defined below, can be seen as the generalisation of the
case where one element covers another to the case where one element
“covers” a whole set of elements.
• The covering relation is helpful for the construction of Hasse diagrams
of posets. These provide an informative visual impression of partial
orders and are introduced next.
Definition 7 (Hasse diagram). A Hasse diagram is a visualisation of a poset. Given
a poset A the Hasse diagram represents the elements of A by dots. The dots represent-
ing the elements are arranged in such away that if a, b P A, a  b, and a ¨ b then the
dot representing a is drawn below the dot representing b. An edge is drawn between
two elements a, b P A if a ¨: b i.e. if b covers a. If edges cross in the diagram this
does not mean that there is an element of A where they cross and edges never pass
through a dot representing an element.
Remarks:
• No edge is drawn between two elements a, b P A if a ¨ b but not a ¨: b.
• Only drawing edges for the covering relation does not imply a loss of
information about the poset since the covering relation determines the
partial order completely (see remark to Definition 6).
• For some example Hasse diagrams see Fig. 3.1
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3.1: Hasse diagrams of three different posets. (a) Two element poset with 0 ¨ 1. This
poset is bounded because it has a zero 0 and unit 1. (b) A bounded poset with five elements.
Note that neither a ¨ b nor b ¨ a, so this is a poset but not a totally ordered set. The partial
order of this set is t0 ¨ a, 0 ¨ b, 0 ¨ c, 0 ¨ 1, a ¨ 0, b ¨ 0, c ¨ 0u. The covering relation is
t0 ¨: a, 0 ¨: b, 0 ¨: c, a ¨: 0, b ¨: 0, c ¨: 0u. Note that the covering relation does not contain
a relation between 0 and 1 but the relation 0 ¨ 1 (no “:”) is a consequence of the covering
relation (see remarks to Definitions 6 and 7). (c) A poset without a zero or a unit. Note that
d, e are minimal elements and a, f are maximal elements.
Definition 8 (Join and meet). Given a subset B  A of elements of a poset A a
least upper bound, supremum, or join

B, if it exists, is an element c P A such that
for all b P B we have b ¨ c and if there exists a P A such that we also have for all
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b P B that b ¨ a then c ¨ a. Conversely, a greatest lower bound, infimum, or meet
B, if it exists, is an element c P A such that for all b P B we have c ¨ b and if there






B are unique if they exist.
• For a pair of elements b1, b2 P A we also write b1 _ b2 for the join and
b1 ^ b2 for the meet.
• Join and meet are both associative,
pi1 ^ ppi2 ^ pi3q  pi1 ^ pi2 ^ pi3, (3.1)
pi1 _ ppi2 _ pi3q  pi1 _ pi2 _ pi3, (3.2)
commutative,
pi1 ^ pi2  pi2 ^ pi1, (3.3)
pi1 _ pi2  pi2 _ pi1, (3.4)
and idempotent,
pi^ pi  pi, (3.5)
pi_ pi  pi. (3.6)
Definition 9 (Lattice). A poset A is a lattice if for every pair of elements a, b P A
both join and meet exist, i.e. a_ b P A and a^ b P A.
Remarks:
• If join and meet exist for every pair they also exist for every finite subset
B  A (Grätzer, 2011, p.9). In this thesis we only encounter finite sets so
we have join and meet for every subset, which in general is an additional
property of lattices called completeness.






• The posets in Fig. 3.1(a) and Fig. 3.1(b) are lattices.
Definition 10 (Atoms and dual atoms). Given a bounded poset A an atom is an
element a P A that covers the zero element, i.e. 0 ¨: a. A dual atom is an element
b P A that is covered by the unit element, i.e. b ¨: 1.
3.1.2 Partitions and the partition lattice
This section recalls the definitions of
• set partitions,
• refinement and coarsening of set partitions,
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• join and meet operation between partitions,
• the partition lattice.
The following definitions are due to Grätzer (2011, p.359).
Definition 11. A (set) partition pi of a set X is a set of non-empty subsets (called
blocks) of X satisfying
1. for all x1, x2 P pi, if x1  x2, then x1 X x2  H,
2.

xPpi  X .
We write LpX q for the set of all partitions of X .
Remark:
• In words, a partition of a set is a set of disjoint non-empty subsets whose
union is the whole set.
Definition 12. If two elements x1, x2 P X belong to the same block of a partition pi
of X write x1 pi x2. Also write x1{pi for the block tx2 P X : x2 pi x1u.
Definition 13 (Refinement and coarsening). We define the binary relation  be-
tween partitions pi, ρ P LpX q as:
pi  ρ if x1 pi x2 implies x1 ρ x2. (3.7)
In this case pi is called a refinement of ρ and ρ is called a coarsening of pi.
Remark:
• More intuitively, pi is a refinement of ρ if all blocks of pi can be obtained
by further partitioning the blocks of ρ. Conversely ρ is a coarsening of
pi if all blocks in ρ are unions of blocks in pi.
• Refinement and coarsening will be used frequently throughout this the-
sis.
Theorem 1 (Partition lattice). Let X be a finite set and LpX q its set of all partitions.
(i) Refinement  is a partial order of LpX q.
(ii) LpXq together with refinement  is a (bounded) lattice. When we write LpX q
in the following we consider it as a lattice with refinement as its partial order.
(iii) The zero of LpX q is the partition consisting only of singleton sets as blocks,
0  ttxuuxPX .
(iv) The unit of LpX q is the partition consisting of a single block containing all
elements, 1  tX u.
(v) The atoms of LpX q are the partitions consisting of a single block containing two
elements and apart from this block only of blocks that are singletons.
(vi) The dual atoms of LpX q are the partitions that consist of two blocks.
(vii) A partition pi P LpX q covers another partition ξ P LpXq, i.e. ξ : pi iff pi is
the result of replacing two blocks of ξ by their union.
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Proof. See Grätzer (2011, p.360).
Remarks:
• The join pi1_pi2 of two partitions pi1,pi2 P LpX q is the unique coarsening
of both pi1 and pi2 which can be obtained by taking the union of the
fewest blocks in either of the two partitions. The meet is the partition
composed of the blocks obtained by taking the set intersections of all
blocks of pi1 and pi2 .
• The Hasse diagrams of the partition lattices of the three and four element
set are shown in Figs. 3.2 and 3.3.
Figure 3.2: Hasse diagrams of the partition lattice of the three element set.
Figure 3.3: Hasse diagrams of the partition lattice of the four element set.
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Theorem 2. The number of partitions of a set X of cardinality |X |  n is given by
the Bell numbers:

















Where Spn, kq are the Sterling numbers of the second kind which are the number of
partitions of a set with n elements into k blocks.
Proof. This is well known.
3.2 Sets of random variables and patterns
3.2.1 Overview
This section introduces the notion of patterns. In the form of spatiotemporal
patterns (which are just patterns in systems where space and time have clear
interpretations) this notion forms an important concept in this thesis. The
main idea is to capture things/structures that can occur within single trajec-
tories of multivariate dynamical systems and stochastic processes. In other
words, we would like to capture structures that very from one trajectory of a
system to another instead of remaining fixed throughout all trajectories. At
the same time these structures should only concern part of a trajectory and
not the whole. A reader familiar with probability theory should have no big
trouble with the following definitions.
3.2.2 Patterns
Definition 14. Let tXiuiPV be set of random variables with index set V and state
spaces tXiuiPV respectively. Then for A  V define:




iPA Xi as the state space of XA,
(iii) xA : pxiqiPA P XA as a value of XA,
Definition 15 (Elementary pattern). Let tXiuiPV be set of random variables with
index set V and state spaces tXiuiPV respectively. An elementary pattern in tXiuiPV
is an assignment
Xj  y
of a value y P Xj to a single one of the random variables Xj P tXiuiPV .
We often choose to denote the value y P Xj we assign to a random variable Xj by
xj so that it indicates the index j of the random variable Xj it is assigned to. This often
allows us to just write xj for an elementary pattern without danger of ambiguity.
Remark:
• Note that it will later sometimes be necessary to move the values as-
signed to one random variable to another random variable. This can
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result in elementary patterns of the form Xj  xk where the index k of
the assigned value is not identical to the index j of the random variable
that it is assigned to. In such cases we will always use the unambiguous
full notation Xj  xk and cannot use just xk to denote the elementary
pattern.
Definition 16 (Pattern). Let tXiuiPV be set of random variables with index set V
and state spaces tXiuiPV respectively. Then a pattern in tXiuiPV is an assignment
tXj  xjujPA
of values txjujPA with xj P Xj for all j P A  V to a subset tXjujPA of the set of
random variables.
An alternative form of specifying a pattern is via XA  xA in which case the
identical ordering of the tuples XA  pXjqjPA and pxjqjPA ensure that the value xi is
assigned to the random variable Xi.
Just like for elementary patterns, if the index set A of a value xA specifies the
index set of the joint random variable that it is assigned to (and in the right order) we
use the short notation xA for the pattern.
Remark:
• Note that by definition a random variable Xi can only occur once and be
assigned a single value in a pattern. This is due to the requirement that
we can index the elementary patterns that occur in a pattern by a subset
A  V. In other words a pattern is just a set of elementary patterns
where each random variable occurs on the left hand side in at most one
elementary pattern.
• Formally the only difference between the two ways of expressing a pat-
tern is that tXi  xiuiPA is a set of elementary patterns and XA  xA ô
pXi  xiqiPA is a tuple of elementary patterns. A set is unordered while
a tuple is ordered. The expressed assignments are the same.
• This notion of patterns is similar to “patterns” as defined in Ceccherini-
Silberstein and Coornaert (2009) and to “cylinders” as defined in Busic
et al. (2010). However the notions there are explicitly limited to single
time-slices. Our notion of patterns purposely extends to spatiotemporal
patterns. These are patterns in specific sets of random variables en-
dowed with notions of time and space like multivariate Markov chains
(see Definition 36).
• This notion of patterns is also similar to the notion of propositions. How-
ever, propositions are usually more general as they allow any logical
combination of the elementary patterns as defined here. For example
Xi  x OR Xj  y is a proposition but not a pattern, since patterns are
only defined as lists of elementary patterns not as logical combinations
thereof. A set of elementary patterns might be seen as a logical conjunc-
tion (AND) of elementary patterns, but a disjunction (OR) is not allowed
by the definition.
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Definition 17 (Trajectory). Let tXiuiPV be set of random variables with index set
V and state spaces tXiuiPV respectively. A trajectory is a pattern tXj  xjujPV that
assigns a value to every random variable in tXiuiPV . We also write xV for trajectories
Remark:
• The use of the term “trajectory” might be somewhat surprising at this
stage as the set of random variables doesn’t have a structure which jus-
tifies its use yet. However, the sets of random variables in this thesis
will usually correspond to Markov chains which makes trajectory an
intuitive choice.
• Trajectories are just particular patterns. However they are special be-
cause they determine the whole set of random variables. Since we will
need to refer to them frequently it is convenient to give them a particular
name.
Definition 18. Given a set of random variables tXiuiPV we say pattern xA occurs
in trajectory x¯V P XV if x¯A  xA. For formal reasons we also define that all empty
patterns are equal i.e. x¯H  xH.
Remark:
• The definition of x¯H  xH implies that xH occurs in every trajectory.
Definition 19. Let tXiuiPV be set of random variables with index set V and state
spaces tXiuiPV respectively. Given a pattern xA let T pxAq denote the set of trajecto-
ries of tXiuiPV in which xA occurs i.e.
T pxAq : tx¯V P XV : x¯A  xAu. (3.9)
Remark:
• Note that T pxHq  XV because of Definition 18.
• Each pattern thus defines a set of trajectories in which it occurs. How-
ever, the converse is not true. As we will see below (Theorem 4) there are
subsets of trajectories of a set of random variables that are not captured
by any of the patterns in the network. The set of trajectories defined by
a pattern is therefore of secondary importance. Primarily patterns are
structures that can occur within trajectories.
Theorem 3. Given a set of random variables tXiuiPV with index set V and state
spaces tXiuiPV respectively, the set of all patterns in tXiuiPV is isomorphic to

AV XA.
Proof. Each element xB  pxiqiPB in

AV XA defines a pattern tXi  xiuiPB.
And each pattern tXi  xiuiPB defines an element xB  pxiqiPB P XB 
AV XA.
Remark:
• Note xH P XH 

AV XA is included here since H  V. The set XH
only contains a single element which is xH. We could have defined this
in an extra definition but it is of no fundamental consequence and so we
just note it here.
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3.2.3 Patterns and invisible subsets of trajectories
Definition 20 (Anti-pattern). Given a pattern xO define its set of anti-patterns
 pxOq that have values different from those of xO on all variables in O:
 pxOq : tx¯O P XO : @i P O, x¯i  xiu. (3.10)
Remark:
• It is important to note that for an element of  pxOq to occur it is not
sufficient that xO does not occur. Only if every random variable Xi with
i P O differs from the value xi specified by xO does an element of  pxOq
necessarily occur. This is why we call  pxOq the anti-pattern of xO.
• Anti-patterns are useful in the construction of examples of patterns. A
generalisation of this anti-patterns will be presented in Definition 48.
Theorem 4. Given a set of random variables tXiuiPV where |V| ¥ 2 there are subsets
of trajectories D  XV such that there is no pattern xA P

CV XC with D 
T pxAq.
Proof. We construct one such subset D for an arbitrary set of random variables
tXiuiPV . Take an arbitrary pattern xA with |A| ¥ 2 and choose another pattern
x¯A from  pxAq. Then let
D : tT pxAq Y T px¯Aqu. (3.11)
To see that there is no pattern x˜B P

CV XC with D  T px˜Bq note that we
can write
x˜C  px˜CzA, x˜CXAq. (3.12)
If C X A  H we must have either x˜CXA  xA or x˜CXA  xA. First, let
x˜CXA  xA but then T px¯Aq  T px˜Cq so D  T px˜Cq. Next choose x˜CXA  xA
but then T pxAq  T px˜Cq so also D  T px˜Cq. So we must have CX A  H.
Now we show that if C X A  H there are trajectories in T px˜Cq that are
not in D. Consider the following trajectory: xˆV : px˜C, xA1 , x¯A2 , xˇDq where
A1 Y A2  A, A1 X A2  H, D  VzpC Y Aq, and xˇD P XD is arbitrary. We
can split up A into A1 and A2 like this because |A| ¥ 2 by assumption. Now
xˆV P T px˜Cq but xˆV  D because xˆA  pxA1 , x¯A2q  xA and xˆA  x¯A due to
our initial choice of x¯A P  pxAq.
Remark:
• We explicitly construct a simple example set D for V  t1, 2u and
tXiuiPV  tX1, X2u the set of random variables. Let X1  X2  t0, 1u.
Then XV  tp0, 0q, p0, 1q, p1, 0q, p1, 1qu. Now let A  V  t1, 2u, choose
pattern xA  p0, 0q and pattern x¯A P  pxAq  p1, 1q from its set of anti-
patterns. Then let
D : tT pxAq Y T px¯Aqu  tp0, 0q, p1, 1qu. (3.13)
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In this case we can easily list the set of all patterns

CV XC:
C  V xC T pxCq
H xH XV
t1u p0q tp0, 0q, p0, 1qu
p1q tp1, 0q, p1, 1qu
t2u p0q tp0, 0q, p1, 0qu
p1q tp0, 1q, p1, 1qu
t1, 2u p0, 0q tp0, 0qu
p0, 1q tp0, 1qu
p1, 0q tp1, 0qu
p1, 1q tp1, 1qu
(3.14)
and verify that D is not among them. This suggests the first part of
the proof above i.e. that C X A  H or else D  T px˜Cq. If there were
a further random variable X3 then any pattern x3 would contain the
trajectory px1, x¯2, x3q  p0, 1, x3q which is not in D and corresponds to
xˆV of the proof.
Definition 21 (Visible and invisible subsets). Given a set of random variables
tXiuiPV a visible subset of tXiuiPV is a subset of trajectories D  XV such that there
is an pattern xA in tXiuiPV with D  T pxAq. Subsets D  XV that are not visible
are called invisible subsets of tXiuiPV .
Remark:
• Visible subsets are completely defined by a pattern whereas this is im-
possible for invisible subsets. For a given trajectory the question whether
a given pattern occurs within this trajectory is well defined via Defini-
tion 18. Intuitively this also makes sense since we can just look at the
trajectory of a cellular automaton for example to check whether a pat-
tern has occurred. However, for invisible subsets there is no defining
pattern, and we cannot inspect a given single trajectory and look for a
pattern within it. We can check whether a given single trajectory is an
element of the invisible set but this is not the same thing. While this
difference might seem to be an inessential subtlety, in this thesis we take
this difference seriously.
• The invisible subsets of a set of random variables do not occur within a
trajectory in the same way that the patterns do. Let D be an invisible set.
To check whether it occurs in a trajectory x¯V by the method defined in
Definition 18 we cannot directly check whether x¯V  D because one is a
vector of numbers px¯iqiPV and the other a set of trajectories txVuxVPD . We
can check whether T px¯Vq  D (which will always fail by the definition
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of invisible sets) but that is not our definition of occurrence. A defini-
tion of occurrence that would allow checking all subsets of XV would
be to require only that x¯V P D. Considering our application to Markov
chains and dynamical systems, this definition however cannot capture
the intuition behind a pattern occurring in a single trajectory. This is due
to the fact that subsets of trajectories can be constructed from patterns
and their anti-patterns together as in the proof of Theorem 4. We would
therefore end up in a situation where a subset could “occur in a trajec-
tory” even though it consists of contradictory patterns. Our definitions
are specifically designed to talk about occurrences of things (here rep-
resented by patterns) within trajectories and not, as the other definition
would offer, to talk about trajectories that are contained in subsets. The
whole idea behind patterns is to end up being able to talk about things
within single trajectories. Maybe it will turn out at some point that pat-
terns are not the right structure for this purpose but in order to evaluate
their suitability we are forced to make this distinction between patterns
and subsets via the distinction of visible and invisible subsets.
3.2.4 Probabilities of patterns
Definition 22. Let tXiuiPV be set of random variables with state spaces tXiuiPV
respectively and let A, B  V. Also, for all i P AY B let xi P Xi. Then:
(i) The joint probability that the pattern tXi  xiuiPA occurs is denoted by:
Pr ptXi  xiuiPAq . (3.15)
It satisfies the usual conditions:
1.





Pr ptXi  xiuiPAq  1. (3.17)
(ii) The conditional probability that the pattern tXi  xiuiPA occurs given that the
pattern tXj  xjujPB occurs is denoted:
Pr
 






tXi  xiuiPA | tXj  xjujPB

:





Definition 23 (Probability distribution). Let tXiuiPV be set of random variables
with index set V and state spaces tXiuiPV respectively and let A  V. We define the
probability distribution of XA as the function pA : XA Ñ r0, 1s with
(i)
pApxAq : PrptXi  xiuiPAq  PrpXA  xAq (3.20)
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Remark:
• The more technically precise term for the probability distribution is a
“probability mass function”.
• The probability distribution takes the arguments in the order specified
by A i.e. the i-th argument is interpreted as the value of the random
variable Xi.
Definition 24. Let tXiuiPV be set of random variables with index set V and state
spaces tXiuiPV respectively and let A, B  V and AX B  H. Then we also define:
pA,BpxA, xBq : PrpXA  xA, XB  xBq  PrptXi  xiuiPA, tXi  xiuiPBq
(3.21)
For convenience we often just write pAYBpxA, xBq instead of pA,BpxA, xBq e.g. if
A Y B  V we write pVpxA, xBq for pA,BpxA, xBq this causes no confusion again
if the index sets A and B unambiguously indicate the random variables XA and XB
which they are assigned to.
Remark:
• Note that, technically,
pA,BpxB, xAq  PrpXA  xB, XB  xAq  pA,BpxA, xBq. (3.22)
In all such cases (where A does not index both the values and the
random variables they are assigned to) we will refrain from writing
pAYBpxB, xAq. Such cases will arise when we look at symmetries of pat-
terns and their probabilities in Section 4.5. This is the main reason for
introducing the more cumbersome full notation of patterns tXi  xiuiPA
and their probabilities PrptXi  xiuiPAq in addition to the short notation
xA and the probability distribution pA.
Definition 25 (Conditional probability distribution). Let tXiuiPV be set of ran-
dom variables with index set V and state spaces tXiuiPV respectively and let A, B 
V. Then we define:
pA|BpxA|xBq : PrpXA  xA|XB  xBq  PrptXi  xiuiPA | tXi  xiuiPBq
(3.23)
If it is clear from the index set of the values we condition on which random variables
they are assigned to, we often just write pApxA|xBq instead of pA|BpxA|xBq.
Definition 26 (Morph of a pattern). Let tXiuiPV be set of random variables with
index set V and state spaces tXiuiPV respectively and let xA be a pattern in tXiuiPV .
Then we define the morph denoted by pVzApXVzA|xAq of xA as the probability distri-
bution pVzA|Ap.|xAq : XVzA Ñ r0, 1s.
Remark:
• The morph is the probability distribution over the rest of the set of ran-
dom variables given a pattern xA.
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• This terminology is inspired by Shalizi (2001). In the case where A
indicates all past variables in some stochastic process and VzA indicates
all future variables, the definition here coincides with the original.
Theorem 5 (Marginalisation). Let tXiuiPV be set of random variables with index






Proof. We do not give a proof here. It follows from the axioms of probability.
For a proof we would need to invoke these axioms which is beyond the scope
of this thesis.
Theorem 6 (Chain rule of probability). Let V be a set of indices for a set of random
variables tXiuiPV with state spaces Xi. Also for all i P V let xi P Xi. Then for any
(re-)labelling i1, i2, ..., i|V| of the index set V we have:
Pr ptXi  xiuiPVq 
|V|¹
j1
PrptXij  xiju | tXik  xikukPtj 1,...,|V|uq. (3.25)
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of the conditional probability, see
Definition 22. Just replace the conditional probabilities by their defining frac-
tions and reduce.
The Kronecker-delta is used in this thesis to represent deterministic condi-
tional distributions.
Definition 27 (Delta). Let X be a random variable with state space X then for x P X
and a subset C  X define
δxpCq :
#
1 if x P C,
0 else.
(3.26)
We will abuse this notation if C is a singleton set C  tx¯u by writing
δxpx¯q : 
#





1 if x  x¯,
0 else.
(3.28)
The second line is a more common definition of the Kronecker-delta.
Remark:
• Let X, Y be two random variables with state spaces X ,Y and f : X Ñ Y
a function such that



















 pXp f1pyqq. (3.34)
3.3 Bayesian networks
In this section we introduce Bayesian networks and the special cases of it that
we will use in this thesis. Our main formal original contributions, the disin-
tegration theorem Theorem 22, and the sli symmetry theorem Theorem 30 in
later sections hold for Bayesian networks in general. In the conceptual part of
this thesis (Chapter 5) we use multivariate Markov chains (Section 3.3.4) which
are a special kind of Bayesian network as systems that can contain agents. A
famous example of a deterministic multivariate Markov chain which we also
use in Section 5.3 is the game of life cellular automaton. Driven (multivari-
ate) Markov chains (Section 3.3.5) are multivariate Markov chains where the
focus is on a subset of the degrees of freedom. Such systems are often used in
practice and we therefore include them in our formal considerations. In the
conceptual part they lay a lesser role. Finally, in Section 3.3.6 we present the
definition of the perception-action loop. This is also a multivariate Bayesian
network. The perception-action loop plays a role in this thesis as a reference
system that is used to formally represent agents in the literature. Furthermore
we present a method to extract perceptions (and actions) from the perception-
action loop that capture all influences from the environment on the agent (the
actions capture all influences from the agent on the environment). We for-
mally prove that this is the case and in the conceptual part (Section 5.5) we
generalize this method of extracting perceptions/influences to “spatiotempo-
ral pattern-based entities”.
We therefore present these as special cases of Bayesian networks. For a
more thorough treatment of Bayesian networks we refer to Pearl (2000).
3.3.1 Bayesian networks and mechanisms
Definition 28. A directed acyclic graph G  pV, Eq with nodes V and edges E is
factorization compatible with the joint probabilities the probabilities of a probability







Where papiq denotes the parents of node i according to G.
Remark:
• In general there are multiple directed acyclic graphs that are factoriza-
tion compatible with the same probability distribution. If we choose any
total order for the nodes in V and define a graph by papiq  tj P V : j  
iu then Eq. (3.35) becomes Eq. (3.25) which always holds. This means
every probability distribution is compatible with all graphs that can be
constructed in this way.
Definition 29 (Bayesian network). A Bayesian network is a finite set of random
variables tXiuiPV and a directed acyclic graph G  pV, Eq with nodes indexed by V
such that the joint probability distribution pV : XV Ñ r0, 1s of tXiuiPV is factoriza-
tion compatible with G. We also refer to the graph set of random variables tXiuiPV as
a Bayesian network implying the graph G.
Remark:
• Since tXiuiPV is finite and G is acyclic there is a set V0 of nodes without
parents.
• We will see specific kinds of Bayesian networks with restricted the graph
structures in Sections 3.3.3 to 3.3.5.
Definition 30 (Mechanism). Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV with index set V
for each node with parents i.e. for each node i P VzV0 (with V0 the set of nodes without
parents) the mechanism of node i or also called the mechanism of random variable Xi
is the conditional probability (also called a transition kernel) pi : Xpapiq  Xi Ñ
r0, 1s mapping pxpapiq, xiq ÞÑ pipxi|xpapiqq. For each xpapiq the mechanism defines a
probability distribution pip.|xpapiqq : Xi Ñ r0, 1s satisfying (like any other probability
distribution) ¸
xiPXi
pipxi|xpapiqq  1. (3.36)
Remark:
• We could define the set of all mechanisms to formally also include the
mechanisms of the nodes without parents V0. However in practice it
makes sense to separate the nodes without parents as those that we
choose an initial probability distribution over (similar to a boundary
condition) which is then turned into a probability distribution pV over
the entire Bayesian network tXiuiPV via Eq. (3.35). Note that in Eq. (3.35)
the nodes in V0 are not explicit as they are just factors pipxi|xpapiqq with
papiq  H.
• To construct a Bayesian network, take graph G  pV, Eq and equip each
node i P pVzV0q with a mechanism pi : Xpapiq Xi Ñ r0, 1s and for each
node i P V0 choose a probability distribution pi : Xi Ñ r0, 1s. The joint










3.3.2 Deterministic Bayesian networks
Definition 31 (Deterministic mechanism). A mechanism pi : XpapiqXi Ñ r0, 1s
is deterministic if there is a function fi : Xpapiq Ñ Xi such that
pipxi|xpapiqq  δ fipxpapiqqpxiq 
#
1 if xi  fipxpapiqq,
0 else.
(3.38)
Definition 32 (Deterministic Bayesian network). A Bayesian network tXiuiPV is
deterministic if all its mechanisms are deterministic.
Theorem 7. Given a deterministic Bayesian network tXiuiPV there exists a function
fVzV0 : XV0 Ñ XVzV0 which given a value xV0 of the random variables without par-
ents XV0 returns the value xVzV0 fixing the values of all remaining random variables
in the network.
Proof. According to Eq. (3.35), the definition of conditional probabilities, and









For every xV0 the product on the right hand side is a probability distribution
and therefore is always greater or equal to zero and maximally one. Also for
every xV0 the sum of the probabilities over all xVzV0 P XVzV0 is equal to one.
As a product of zeros and/or ones the right hand side on the second line can
only either be zero or one. This means for every xV0 there must be a unique
xVzV0 such that the right hand side is equal to one. Define this as the value of
the function fVzV0pxV0q.
Theorem 8 (Pattern probability in a deterministic Bayesian network). Given a
deterministic Bayesian network (Definition 32) and uniform initial distribution pV0 :





where NpxAq is the number of trajectories x¯V in which xA occurs.
Proof. Recall that in a deterministic Bayesian network we have a function
fVzV0 : XV0 Ñ XVzV0 (see Theorem 7) which maps a given value of xV0 to
the value of the rest of the network xVzV0 . We calculate pApxAq for an arbi-
trary subset A  V. To make this more readable let AXV0  A0, AzV0  Ar,
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In the second to last line we used the uniformity of the initial distribution pV0 .
The second sum in the second to last line counts all initial conditions that are
compatible with xA0 and lead to the occurrence of xAr together with some x¯Br .
The first one then sums over all such x¯Br to get all initial conditions that are
compatible with xA0 and lead to the occurrence of xAr . Together these are all
initial conditions compatible with xA. In a deterministic system the number
of initial conditions that lead to the occurrence of an pattern xA is equal to
the number of trajectories NpxAq since every different initial condition will
produce a single, unique trajectory.
Remark:
• Due to the finiteness of the network, deterministic mechanisms, and cho-
sen uniform initial distribution the minimum possible non-zero proba-
bility for an pattern xA is 1{|XV0 |. This happens for any pattern that only
occurs in a single trajectory. Furthermore the probability of any pattern
is a multiple of 1{|XV0 |.
3.3.3 Univariate Markov chain
X1 X2X0
Figure 3.4: First time steps of the Bayesian network representing a univariate Markov chain
tXtutPT .
Markov chains are commonly used to model processes that have no mem-
ory of past states. The Bayesian network2 in Fig. 3.4 shows three initial time
steps of a univariate Markov chain. This is a discrete time stochastic process.
2We abuse the terminology here by also referring to the directed acyclic graph G associated to
a Bayesian network as a “Bayesian network”. Context always resolves this ambiguity however.
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This means that the index set V is isomorphic to a contiguous subset of the
integers. We assume that V is also finite such that we can also assume (with-
out further loss of generality) V : T  t0, ..., n 1u with n P N . Then the
defining feature is that for all t P T the random variable with index t  1 only
depends on the random variable indexed by t. We also assume that the state










where p0 is the initial distribution. From Eq. (3.48) we can see the usual
Markov chain condition:
pt 1pxt 1|x¨tq  pt 1pxt 1|xtq, (3.50)
where x¨t  pxiqi¤t is the entire history up to and including t. Starting from
a Bayesian network we can then define the Markov chain as follows.
Definition 33. Let T  t0, 1, ..., n 1u, n P N . Then a univariate Markov chain
is a Bayesian network with random variables tXtutPT and graph G  pT, Eq such
that
• @t1, t2 P T : Xt1  Xt2 ,
• pap0q  H,
• @t P Tzt0u : paptq  tt 1u.
We can also write the right hand side of Eq. (3.50) as a Matrix called a
Markov matrix.
Definition 34. Given a Markov chain tXiuiPV the Markov matrix Pt at time step t
is the matrix with entries:
pPtqxt ,xt1 : ptpxt|xt1q. (3.51)
Correspondingly we can write the probability distribution over any ran-
dom variable Xt as a column vector pt  pptpxtqqxtPXt . Then we can propagate
thes probability distributions forward in time using the Markov matrix:
pt 1  Pt 1 pt. (3.52)
An especially simple case of Markov chains are time-homogenous Markov
chains.
Definition 35. A time-homogenous Markov chain is a Markov chain with index set
T such that for all t1, t2 P V
Pt1  Pt2 . (3.53)
So the dynamics of time-homogenous Markov chains do not change over
time.
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X1,0 X1,1 X1,2 X1,3
X2,0 X2,1 X2,2 X2,3
X3,0 X3,1 X3,2 X3,3
X4,0 X4,1 X4,2 X4,3









Figure 3.5: First time steps of the Bayesian network representing a multivariate Markov chain
tXtutPT . The shown edges are just an example, any two nodes within the same or subsequent
columns can be connected.
3.3.4 Multivariate Markov chain
A multivariate Markov chain is just a Markov chain where the random vari-
able Xt at each point in time is replaced by a whole set of random variables.
We also define their time-slices here which will be used throughout this thesis.
We then show that time-slices obey the Markov property (this is not surpris-
ing and only included for technical reference). Finally we define the notions
of space- and time-homogeneity, and instantaneous interactions.
Definition 36 (Multivariate Markov chain). Let T  t0, ..., nu with n P N ,
J  t1, ..., du with d P N  and V  tpj, tq P J  Tu. Then a multivariate Markov
chain is a Bayesian network with random variables tXiuiPV and graph G  pV, Eq
such that
• papj, 0q  tpk, 0q P V : k P Jzju,
• papj, tq  tpk, tq P V : k P Jzju Y tpk, t 1q : k P Ju.
We call j the spatial index and t the temporal index.
Remark:
• In essence we get a set of random variables tXj,tujPJ at each point in
time t which only depends either on variables at the same point in time
or the previous point in time t 1 (see Fig. 3.5 for the graph structure).
This ensures that the joint random variable pXj,tqjPJ composed of all
random variables at time t only depends on the joint random variable
pXj,t1qjPJ composed of all random variables at time t 1 which ensure
the Markov property of the joint random vairables. Since these joint
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random variables occur repeatedly throughout this thesis we introduce
a specific terminology and notation for them.
• Dependencies among random variables tXj,tujPJ at the same point in
time t are explicitly allowed in our definition of multivariate Markov
chains as they do not break the Markov property as we will see in The-
orem 9. Note also that the graph of the entire Bayesian network of the
multivariate Markov chain is still directed and acyclic so that we have
no cycles among random variables at the same point in time either.
Definition 37 (Time-slices). Let V  J  T be an index set composed of a spatial
index J and a temporal index T then:
(i) The time-slice Vt of V at time t is the set of indices
Vt : tpj, tq P V : j P Ju. (3.54)
(ii) Similarly, for any subset A  V the time-slice At of A at time t is the set of
indices
At : tpj, tq P A : j P Ju. (3.55)
(iii) Given a multivariate Markov chain tXjujPV with index set V and a subset
A  V of indices the time-slice XAt of XA at time t is the joint random variable
indicated by the time-slice At of A
XAt : pXjqjPAt . (3.56)
Theorem 9. The time-slices XVt of multivariate Markov chains tXiuiPV of Defini-
tion 36 satisfy a the Markov property and therefore form a Markov chain. Formally,
for all t P T:
pVt 1pxVt 1 |xV¨tq  pVt 1pxVt 1 |xVtq. (3.57)
Proof. According to Definition 36 the parents of each node are composed of
two subsets
papj, t  1q  tpk, t  1q P V : k P Jzju Y tpk, tq : k P Ju (3.58)
 ppapj, t  1q XVt 1q Y ppapj, t  1q XVtq. (3.59)













 pVt 1pxVt 1 |xVtq. (3.63)
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Definition 38. Given a multivariate Markov chain tXiuiPV the Markov matrix Pt at
time step t is the matrix with entries:
pPtqxVt ,xVt1 : pVtpxVt |xVt1q. (3.64)
Definition 39 (Space- and time-homogeneity). A multivariate Markov chain with
random variables tXiuiPV and index set V  J  T is
(i) time-homogenous if for all t1, t2 P T
1. XVt1  XVt2 ,
2. for all xVt1 , xVt2 P XVt1 we have
pVt1 1pxVt1 1 |xVt1 q  pVt2 1pxVt2 1 |xVt2 q, (3.65)
or in terms of the Markov matrices:
Pt1  Pt2 ; (3.66)
(ii) space-homogenous if for all j1, j2 P J and all t P T
1. Xj1,t  Xj2,t,
2. Xpapj1,tq  Xpapj2,tq,
3. for all x P Xj1,t, and y P Xpapj1,tq we have
pj1,tpx|yq  pj2,tpx|yq. (3.67)
Remark:
• So space-homogeneity means that all mechanisms associated to the ran-
dom variables within a given time-slice are the same.
Definition 40. An instantaneous interaction is an edge pXj,t, Xk,tq P E between
random variables within the same time-slice.
Remarks:
• An example of a multivariate Markov chain without instantaneous in-
teractions is the perception-action loop of Section 3.3.6.
• Examples of space- and time-homogenous, deterministic, multivariate
Markov chains without instantaneous interactions include the elemen-
tary cellular automata (Wolfram, 1983) as well as the Game of Life cel-
lular automaton (Conway, 1970).
3.3.5 Driven processes
A driven process can model systems under the influence of changing external
factors or control parameters. An example for such a system is the geosphere
which is driven by influence from cosmic and solar radiation. At the same
time earth also emits radiation into the cosmos. Acccordingly, in general we




Figure 3.6: First time steps of the Bayesian network representing a process tYtutPT driving a
process tXtutPT .
the driven process tXtutPT we define a Bayesian network with two interacting
processes and rename one of them tYtutPT in order to simplify discussions.
We assume that both processes have constant state spaces. For a visualization
of the graph of the according Bayesian network see Fig. 3.6.
Definition 41 (Driven process). Let T  t0, ..., nu with n PN  and V  tpj, tq P
t1, 2u  Tu. Consider the Bayesian network with:
• @pj, t1q, pj, t2q P V : Xj,t1  Xj,t2
• pap1, 0q : H,
• pap2, 0q : tp1, 0qu,
• @t P Tzt0u : pap1, tqq  tp1, t 1q, p2, t 1qu,
• @t P Tzt0u : pap2, tqq  tp1, tq, p2, t 1qu.
Rename:
• tX1,tutPT : tYtutPT ,
• tX2,tutPT : tXtutPT .
Then tYtutPT is called the driving process and tXtutPT the driven process.
Remark:
• We note that pXt, YtqtPT is a bivariate Markov chain.
• We choose the driving process to interact instantaneously with the driven
process as a convention. The main aspect of a driven process is that it
highlights the possibility to pay particular attention to the driven pro-
cess’s dynamics and ignore those of the driving process.
Definition 42 (Driven multivariate Markov chain). Let T  t0, ..., nu with n P
N , J  AY B with AX B  H, and V  tpj, tq P J  Tu. Consider the Bayesian
network with:
• @pj, t1q, pj, t2q P V : Xj,t1  Xj,t2
• for j P B, papj, 0q : H,
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X1,0 X1,1 X1,2 X1,3
X2,0 X2,1 X2,2 X2,3
X3,0 X3,1 X3,2 X3,3









Figure 3.7: First time steps of the Bayesian network representing a multivariate process tXtutPT
driven by a process tYtutPT . Note that the process tYtutPT can also be multivariate, but this
would further clutter the graph. Also note that not all edges depicted here must be present.
Here, each random variable in each time-slice of the driven process is influenced by the driving
process and influences it.
• for j P A, papj, 0q  tpk, 0q : k P Bu,
• @t P Tzt0u, j P B : papj, tqq  tpk, t 1q : k P AY Bu,
• @t P Tzt0u, j P A : papj, tqq  tpk, t 1q : k P Au Y tpk, tq : k P Bu.
Then tXBtutPT is called the driving chain and tXAtutPT the (multivariate) driven
Markov chain.
Remark:
• We note that pXVtqtPT is a multivariate Markov chain.
• If B  H then tXiuiPV  tXAtutPT is a multivariate Markov chain.
• A trajectory of the driven Markov chain is a pattern xA,T P XA,T where
pA, Tq : A T.
• The multivariate driven Markov chain models a situation where the fo-
cus is on the multivariate process tXAtutPT even if it is influenced by
other (usually very simple) processes contained in tXBtutPT .
• From the definition we also can write:
pVt 1pxVt 1 |xVtq  pAt 1pxAt 1 |xBt 1 , xAtqpBt 1pxBt 1 |xAt , xBtq. (3.68)




Figure 3.8: First timesteps of the Bayesian network of the perception-action loop. The processes
represent environment tEtutPT , and agent memory tMtutPT .
3.3.6 Perception-action loop
Here we formally introduce the Bayesian network of the perception-action
loop. We first introduce a simple version and then show how to extract im-
plied actions and perceptions without altering the global probability distribu-
tion over agent and environment processes. The perception-action loop has
been employed to define informational closure (Bertschinger et al., 2006), au-
tonomy (Bertschinger et al., 2008), and morphological computation (Zahedi
and Ay, 2013) of agents. In Section 5.6 we discuss the relaiton of our concept
of agents to the agent concept that is implicit in the perception-action loop.
Conceptually perception-action loops go back at least to Von Uexküll (1920).
Recent formalizations of the perception-action loop (also perception-action
cycle, sensorimotor loop) due to Beer (1995) using dynamical systems and
Klyubin et al. (2004) using Bayesian networks. Since then it has also been em-
ployed, sometimes with minor alterations, by Bertschinger et al. (2006, 2008);
Zahedi et al. (2010); Salge and Polani (2011); Ay and Zahedi (2014).
For a rough intuition think of the perception-action as modelling the in-
teractions between an “agent” and its “environment” that occur over time.
Roughly speaking, at each time-step the agent influences the environment via
actions and the environment influences the agent via the latter’s perceptions
(sensors). It is important to note that in the formal models all interactions be-
tween agent and environment are captured by the sensor values and actions
(Beer, 1995).
Let us first consider a simple perception-action loop consisting of agent
and environment only. We assume here that there are no instantaneous in-
teractions between agent and environment. This is particularly suitable for
the situation where we relate our conception of agents to that underlying
the perception-action loop in Section 5.6. In the perception-action loop the
agent memory is represented by a sequence of random variables tMtutPT , the
environment state by tEtutPT . At each time-step the agent memory Mt is in-
fluenced by the last memory state mt1 and the last environment state Mt1.
Conversely the environment state Et is influenced by Et1 and Mt1. See
Fig. 3.8 for the Bayesian network. Next, we define the perception-action loop
formally.
Definition 43 (Perception-action loop). Let T  t0, ..., nu with n P N  and
V  tpj, tq P t1, 2u  Tu. Consider the Bayesian network tXiuiPV with:
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• pap1, 0q : H,
• pap2, 0q : H,
• @t P Tzt0u : pap1, tqq  tp1, t 1q, p2, t 1qu,
• @t P Tzt0u : pap2, tqq  tp1, t 1q, p2, t 1qu,
Rename:
• tX1,tutPT : tEtutPT ,
• tX2,tutPT : tMtutPT .
The Bayesian network is called the perception-action loop, tEtutPT is called the envi-
ronment process and tMtutPT the agent or memory process.
It is customary to explicitly represent actions and perceptions in the perception-
action loop. In Definition 43 these are implicit. The interactions between agent
and environment are not represented by random variables. As mentioned be-
fore in the tradition of perception action loops all interactions between agent
and environment are considered to be captured by the actions and the per-
ceptions (Beer, 1995).
We can construct sequences of random variables representing for each t
the influences of tMtutPT on tEtutPT and vice versa such that the probability
distribution pV over all random variables remains the same. This means we
introduce another Bayesian network, which we will also call the perception-
action loop containing two more processes, the action process tAtutPT and the
sensor process tStutPT . The result will be the perception-action loop consid-
ered in Bertschinger et al. (2006, 2008).
The action at a time t is a block in a partition µt of the state space Mt of
the agent at t. These blocks are composed out of agent states that have the
same effect on the environment’s transitions from Et to Et 1. Formally, we
define the partition µt via the equivalence relation µt relating the elements
of each block in µt.






t ô @et 1 P Et 1, et P Et : pEt 1pet 1|m1t , etq  pEt 1pet 1|m2t , etq.
(3.69)
Then:
(i) The action partition µt is then defined as the set of equivalence classes of the
equivalence relation µt .
(ii) The set of actions is defined as At : µt and an element at P At (which is also
a block in µt is called an action.
(iii) The action function fAt : Mt Ñ At is defined by
fAtpmtq  mt{µt, (3.70)
where mt{µt is the block in µt containing mt (which is also an action).
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Remark:
• The construction of the action partition3 is not new. It is also used for
example in Balduzzi (2011) to obtain coarser states (alphabet) of joint
random variables. It is also similar to the construction of causal states
(Shalizi, 2001). Causal states are usually a partition of pasts x¨t accord-
ing to equal future morphs ppXt |x¨tq. Here we use equal transition
probabilities (“transition morphs”) of another process to partition the
current states.
In the same way we define perceptions or sensor values via a partition et
of Et.
Definition 45. Given a perception-action loop tXiuiPV . For each time t P T and
eˆt, e¯t P Et let
eˆt et e¯t ô @mt 1 PMt 1, mt PMt : pMt 1pmt 1|mt, eˆtq  pMt 1pmt 1|mt, e¯tq.
(3.71)
Then:
(i) The sensor partition et is then defined as the set of equivalence classes of the
equivalence relation et .
(ii) The set of sensor values is defined as St : et and an element st P St (which is
also a block in et is called a perception of a sensor value.
(iii) The sensor function fSt : Et Ñ St is defined by
fStpetq  et{et, (3.72)
where et{et is the block in et containing et (which is also a sensor value).
With these definitions we can extend the Bayesian network of the perception-
action loop by the action process tAtutPT and the sensor process tStutPT with-
out altering the probability distribution pV over all random variables tXiuiPV
in the orginal perception-action loop of Definition 43.
First, we define the extended perception-action loop. For the Bayesian
network see Fig. 3.9.
Definition 46 (Extended perception-action loop). Let tXiuiPV  tMt, EtutPT be
a perception-action loop. Then add to tXiuiPV the sets of random variables tAtutPT
called the action process and tStutPT called the sensor process such that
• @t P T
• papMt 1q : tMt, Stu,
• papAtq : Mt,
• papStq : Et,
• papEt 1q : tEt, Atu.






Figure 3.9: First time-steps of the Bayesian network of the extended perception-action loop. The
processes tAtutPT and tStutPT mediate all interactions between tMtutPT and tEtutPT without
changing the probability distributions over the latter (see Theorem 10).
Furthermore, with fAt the action functions, fSt the sensor functions, p
w denoting
probability distributions of the extended perception-action loop, and p denoting prob-
ability distributions of the original perception-action loop:
• pwM0,E0pm0, e0q : pM0,E0pm0, e0q
• pwAtpat|mtq : δ fAt pmtqpatq,
• pwStpst|etq : δ fSt petqpstq,








Then the resulting Bayesian network tXiuiPW  tMt, At, St, EtutPN  with probabil-
ity distribution pwW is called the extended perception-action loop of Xv.
Remark:
• Since, by definition of fSt , for any t P T and st P St all e¯t P f1St pstq




unambiguous. The corresponding argument holds for fAt so that the
definition of pwEt 1pet 1|at, etq is also unambiguous.
We then have the following theorem:
Theorem 10 (Invariant extension theorem). Given a perception action loop tXiuiPV 
tMt, EtutPT and its extended perception-action loop tXiuiPW  tMt, At, St, EtutPN  .
Let pV  pMT ,ET be the probability distribution over the entire perception action loop
tXiuiPV and let pwMT ,ET be the marginal probability distribution over the memory and
environment process obtained from the probability distribution pwW over the entire
extended perception-action loop. Then
pMT ,ET  p
w
MT ,ET . (3.73)
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Proof.























pwMtpmt|mt1, st1qδ fSt1 pet1q
pst1q





















 fAt1pmt1q, et1qpM0,E0pm0, e0q
(3.77)
 pMT ,ET pmT , eTq. (3.78)
Remarks:
• This proof shows that the introduction of action and sensor process in
the way described by Definition 46 only makes the interactions between
agent and environment processes explicit. Action and sensor processes
are not essential to the perception-action loop and do not introduce
any additional dynamics. They only represent what the environment
“sees” of the agent and vice versa. In other words the dynamics of agent
and environment do not require that the states space Mt  Et of a time-
slice is extended to Mt At  St  Et. This insight is also in line with
Bertschinger et al. (2006) which uses the extended perception-action loop
and refers to the action and sensor processes as “channels”.
• This proof also shows that the sensor process (and conversely the ac-
tions) captures all influences from the environment on the agent. Else
the dynamics of the extended perception-action loop could remain iden-
tical. We use this fact as a starting point for our conception of entity
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perception in Section 5.5. There we want to capture all influences of the
environment on a set of “spatiotemporal patterns” or “entities” instead
of on a stochastic process like tMtutPT . This will require a generalization




This chapter constitutes the formal part of this thesis. We present here a first
investigation of the properties and structure of spatiotemporal patterns1 (STP)
in Bayesian networks in relation to the novel measure of specific local integration
(SLI). Apart from SLI we also present the derived measure of complete local
integration (CLI). The main result is the disintegration theorem which relates
the SLI of whole trajectories of Bayesian networks to the CLI of parts of these
trajectories and vice versa. The connection between the two is revealed by
the disintegration hierarchy (Definition 54) and its refinement-free version (Defi-
nition 56). These are our own constructions. In Section 4.5 we also formally
define the effect of symmetry transformations on STPs in Bayesian networks
and derive the behaviour of SLI under such transformations. The main result
in this respect are the SLI symmetry theorems (Theorems 30 and 31). Finally,
we establish under what circumstances spatial symmetries spread throughout
the entire Bayesian network if the Bayesian networks are multivariate Markov
chains or driven multivariate Markov chains. The according theorems are not
new but provide the connection to more practical scenarios of cellular au-
tomata and reaction diffusion systems. Later, in Chapter 6 we visualise the
disintegration hierarchies, completely locally integrated STPs, and use the SLI
symmetry theorems to explain its structure.
In more detail the chapter contains the following:
• In Section 4.1 we give the definition of the partition lattice of Bayesian
networks. This lattice is an underlying structure throughout this thesis.
• In Section 4.2 we define SLI. We constructively prove its upper bounds
and construct an example of a STP with a particularly low (and neg-
ative) SLI. These constructions are mainly of technical interest and not
employed conceptually. We also propose a normalised version of SLI
which will not be further used but may be of interest for future research.
1In this section we will always speak of spatiotemporal patterns in Bayesian networks instead
of patterns in sets of random variables. There is no formal difference however. We only want
to emphasise that we will consider spatiotemporally extended patterns whenever there are well
defined notions of space and time in this thesis. Also note that every set of random variables can
just be seen as a Bayesian network (possibly without any edges).
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Finally we derive some algebraic properties of differences between spe-
cific local integrations. These are given for technical reference.
• In Section 4.3 we state the definition of CLI. This is an important no-
tion throughout this thesis and the basis for the definition of entities in
multivariate Markov chains in Section 5.3.
• In Section 4.4 we define the disintegration hierarchies and prove the
disintegration theorem.
• In Section 4.5 we first introduce notation and terminology to express
the effect of permutations of nodes within a Bayesian network on STPs,
partitions, and probabilities of spatiotemporal patterns. Then we prove
the SLI symmetry theorems which specify the behaviour of SLI under
permutation symmetries of the Bayesian network. These can provide
insights into the structure of the disintegration hierarchies for systems
with high degrees of symmetries like cellular automata. We will see how
this can be done in Chapter 6. Furthermore, symmetry properties are of
general interest for future theoretical developments.
• In Section 4.6 we look at the Bayesian networks that are multivariate
Markov chains and derive conditions under which spatial symmetries
of initial distribution and Markov matrix spread the spatial symmetry
over the entire Bayesian network. We also do this for driven multivari-
ate Markov chains. The SLI symmetry theorems concern symmetries of
STPs i.e. they depend on symmetries that are not purely spatial. The
theorems in this section provides a way to obtain such extended sym-
metries from more simple and often well known ones. The inclusion of
driven multivariate Markov chains also extends the applicability of our
formal results beyond cellular automata to driven systems.
In summary the original contributions of this chapter are:
• Definition of SLI.
• Constructive proof of upper bound of SLI.
• Construction of negative SLI example.
• Definition of CLI.
• Definition of disintegration hierarchy and refinement-free disintegration
hierarchy.
• Proof of the disintegration theorem.
• Proof of the SLI symmetry theorems.
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4.1 Partition lattice of Bayesian networks
In this section we introduce the partition lattice of a Bayesian network which
is the underlying structure for most of the developments in this chapter. All
STPs occupy blocks of partitions in this lattice and can be further partitioned
into blocks that are also blocks in the partition lattice of the Bayesian network.
We also introduce the set of anti-STPs with respect to a partition which is a
generalisation of the set of anti-patterns  pxAq (Definition 20) of a STP xA.
This will be mainly used in proofs and is not important for the rest of this
thesis.
Definition 47 (Partition lattice of a Bayesian network). Given a Bayesian network
tXiuiPV and a subset A  V we denote the partition lattice of A by LpAq. Every
partition pi P LpAq also naturally induces the following partitions:
(i) partition pipXAq of the joint random variable XA by defining for every block
b P pi the corresponding block Xb P pipXAq
(ii) partition pipxAq of every STP xA P XA by defining for each block b P pi the
corresponding block xb P pipxAq.
When it will be clear from context which instance of pi we are referring to we will
denote these two partitions in the following also just by pi.
Remark:
• Partition lattices were defined in Definition 9
• LpVq is the partition lattice of all nodes in the Bayesian network.
• The partition lattice LpAq of the index set A or equivalently the nodes
in the Bayesian network indexed by A must not be confused with the
partition lattice LpXAq of the state space XA of the joint random variable
of those nodes.
Definition 48. Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV , an STP xA and a partition pi P
LpAq of xA the set of anti-STPs of xA with respect to pi denoted by  pipxAq is defined
via
 pipxAq : tx¯A P XA : @b P pi, x¯b  xbu. (4.1)
Remark:
• Note that  pxAq   0pxAq. Recall that 0 is the finest partition in a parti-
tion lattice and contains only blocks that are singletons (see Definition 4).
Theorem 11. Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV , an STP xA and two partitions ξ,pi
of xA with ξ  pi we have:
 ξpxAq   pipxAq. (4.2)
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Proof.
 ξpxAq :  tx¯A P XA : @b P ξ, x¯b  xbu (4.3)
 tx¯A P XA : @b P ξ, Di P b, x¯i  xiu (4.4)
 tx¯A P XA : @c P pi,@b P ξ with b  c, Di P b, x¯i  xiu (4.5)
 tx¯A P XA : @c P pi, Di P c, x¯i  xiu (4.6)
 tx¯A P XA : @c P pi, x¯c  xcu (4.7)
  pipxAq. (4.8)
Remark:
• This theorem shows that the anti-STP  ξpxAq of a partition ξ that re-
fines a partition pi is the more restrictive anti-STP. It requires for at least
one variable x¯i of each block b that it differs from xi whereas the anti-
STPs with respect to the coarser partition pi  ξ only requires one such
differing value across all the blocks of ξ that make up each block of pi.
4.2 Specific local integration
This section introduces the specific local integration (SLI). It also proves its
upper bounds constructively and constructs an example of negative SLI. We
state a definition of normalised SLI and algebraic properties of differences
between specific local integrations.
4.2.1 General and deterministic case
Definition 49 (Specific local integration (SLI)). Given a Bayesian network tXuiPV
and a STP xO the specific local integration mipipxOq of xO with respect to a partition





In this thesis we use the convention that log 00 : 0.
Theorem 12 (Deterministic specific local integration). Given a deterministic
Bayesian network (Definition 32) and uniform initial distribution the SLI of xO with
respect to partition pi can be expressed in another way: Let NpxOq refer to the number
of trajectories in which xO occurs. Then





Proof. Follows by replacing the probabilities pOpxOq and pbpxbq in Eq. (4.9)
with their deterministic expressions from Theorem 8, i.e. pApxAq  NpXAq{|XV0 |.
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Then:




























In this section we prove upper bounds of SLI. It is not essential for the rest
of the thesis and is presented mainly for technical reference since bounds are
important aspects of measures. However it is also useful to familiarise the
reader with the measure of SLI since we prove the bounds constructively. We
first show constructively that if we can choose the Bayesian network and the
STP then SLI can be arbitrary large. This construction sets the probabilities
of all blocks equal to the probability of the STP. In the subsequent theorem
we show that this property in general gives the upper bound of SLI if the
cardinality of the partition is fixed. This leads directly tho the upper bound
if the cardinality of the partition is not fixed in the next theorem. Finally we
give the expressions of the bounds in the deterministic case for convenient
reference.
Theorem 13 (Construction of a STP with maximum SLI). Given a probability
q P p0, 1q and a positive natural number n we can construct a Bayesian network
tXiuiPV and an STP xO such that
mipipxOq  pn 1q log q. (4.16)
Proof. We construct a Bayesian network which realises two conditions on the
probability pO. From these two conditions (which can also be realised by other
Bayesian networks) we can then derive the theorem.
Choose a Bayesian network tXiuiPV with binary random variables Xi 
t0, 1u for all i P V. Choose all nodes in O dependent only on node j P O, the
dependence of the nodes in VzO is arbitrary:
• for all i P O  V let papiq X pVzOq  H, i.e. nodes in O have no parents
in the complement of O,
• for a specific j P O and all other i P Oztju let papiq  tju, i.e. all nodes in
O apart from j have j P O as a parent,
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• for all i P Oztju let pipx¯i|bx¯jq  δx¯jpx¯iq, i.e. the state of all nodes in O is
always the same as the state of node j,
• also choose pjpxjq  q and
°
x¯jxj pjpxjq  1 q.
Then it is straightforward to see that:
1. pOpxOq  q,
2.
°
x¯OP pxOq pOpx¯Oq  1 q.
Note that there are many Bayesian networks that realise the latter two condi-
tions for some xO. These latter two conditions are the only requirements for
the following calculation.
Next note that the two conditions imply that pOpx¯Oq  0 if neither x¯O  xO




























 pn 1q log q. (4.22)
Remark:
• We will use this construction to reveal the general tight upper bound of
mipipxOq.
• The construction used here ensures that the probability pbpxbq of each
block b P pi is equal to the probability of the STP pOpxOq  q. In other
words, the parts of xO that are indicated by pi all occur if and only if the
whole STP xO occurs. Note that in general xb always occurs if xO occurs
but not vice versa.
Theorem 14 (Upper bound of SLI). For any Bayesian network tXuiPV and STP
xO
(i) The tight upper bound of the SLI with respect to partition pi is
mipipxOq ¤ p|pi|  1q log pOpxOq. (4.23)
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(ii) The upper bound is achieved if and only if for all b P pi we have
pbpxbq  pOpxOq. (4.24)
(iii) The upper bound is achieved if and only if for all b P pi we have that xO occurs
if and only if xb occurs.
























 p|pi|  1q log pOpxOq. (4.31)
This shows that p|pi|  1q log pOpxOq is indeed an upper bound. To
show that it is tight we have to show that for a given pOpxOq and |pi|
there are Bayesian networks with STPs xO such that this upper bound is
achieved. The construction of such a Bayesian network and an STP xO
was presented in Theorem 13.
ad (ii)) If for all b P pi we have pbpxbq  pOpxOq then clearly mipipxOq 
p|pi|  1q log pOpxOq and the least upper bound is achieved. If on the















pbpxbq  pOpxOq|pi|, (4.34)
and because pbpxbq ¥ pOpxOq (Eq. (4.28)) any deviation of any of the
pbpxbq from pOpxOq leads to
±
bPpi pbpxbq ¡ pOpxOq
|pi| such that for all
b P pi we must have pbpxbq  pOpxOq.
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ad (iii) By definition for any b P pi we have b  O such that xb always occurs
if xO occurs. Now assume xb occurs and xO does not occur. In that case
there is a positive probability for an STP pxb, x¯Ozbq with x¯Ozb  xOzb i.e.
pOpxb, x¯Ozbq ¡ 0. Recalling Eq. (4.27) we then see that





which contradicts the fact that pbpxbq  pOpxOq so xb cannot occur with-
out xO occurring as well.
Remarks:
• Note that this is the least upper bound for Bayesian networks in general.
For a specific Bayesian network there might be no STP that achieves this
bound.
• So the least upper bound of SLI mipipxOq is the self-information log ppxOq
of the STP xO multiplied by one less than the cardinality |pi| of the par-
tition.
• In other words, the maximally possible SLI increases with the improba-
bility of the STP and the number of parts that it is split into.
• For an STP xO that achieves the least upper bound of SLI, the occurrence
of any part xb indicated by the partition pi of O implies the occurrence
of the entire STP.
• Using this least upper bound it is easy to derive a least upper bound for
the SLI of an STP xO across all partitions |pi|. We just have to note that
|pi| ¤ |O|. This leads directly to the next statement.
• Further down we will use the least upper bound for specific partitions
in order to normalise the SLI.
Theorem 15. For any Bayesian network tXiuiPV and STP xO the least upper bound
of the SLI with respect to arbitrary partitions is
max
pi
mipipx0q ¤ p|O|  1q log pOpxOq. (4.37)
Proof. Follows from Theorem 14 and the fact that for an arbitrary partition pi
of O we have |pi| ¤ |O|.
Theorem 16 (Deterministic least upper bounds). For any deterministic Bayesian
network (Definition 32) tXiuiPV with uniform initial distribution pV0 we find the
following bounds.
(i) The least upper bound of the SLI with respect to partition pi for a given STP xO
is





(ii) The least upper bound of the SLI for an STP xO across all partitions is
max
pi




(iii) The least upper bound of the SLI with respect to partitions pi of cardinality |pi|
across all STP xO is
max
xO
mipipxOq ¤ p|pi|  1q log |XV0 | (4.40)





mipipxOq ¤ p|V|  1q log |XV0 | (4.41)
Proof. ad (i) Follows directly from Theorem 14 by replacing pOpxOqwith
NpxOq
|XVO |
as shown in Eq. (3.41).
ad (ii) Follows from Theorem 16.(i) and |pi| ¤ |O| for all partitions pi of |O|.
ad (iii) Follows from Theorem 16.(i) and NpxOq ¥ 1 for all xO.
ad (iv) Follows from Theorem 16.(iii) and |pi| ¤ |V| for all partitions pi of all
O  V.
Remarks:
• Again these are tight upper bounds among all deterministic Bayesian
networks with uniform initial distribution. Particular instances of such
Bayesian networks may not contain any STP which achieve these bounds.
• Note that the first term in Eq. (4.10) corresponds to the tight upper
bound in Theorem 16.(iii). So mipipxOq is just this upper bound minus
the second term which is always positive as
±
b Npxbq ¥ NpxOq.
4.2.3 Negative SLI
This section shows that SLI of an STP xO with respect to partition pi can be
negative independent of the the probability of xO (as long as it is not 1) and the
cardinality of the partition (as long as that is not 1). This is not important for
the rest of the thesis but is of technical interest in its own right. It also shows
how to get negative SLI at all which may not be obvious.
Theorem 17. For any given probability q   1 and cardinality |pi| ¡ 1 of a partition
pi there exists an STP xO in a Bayesian network tXiuiPV such that q  pOpxOq and
mipipxOq   0. (4.42)
Proof. We construct the probability distribution pO : XO Ñ r0, 1s and ignore
the behaviour of the Bayesian network tXiuiPV outside of O  V. In any case
tXiuiPO is also by itself a Bayesian network. We define (see remarks below for
some intuitions behind these definitions):
(i) for all i P O let |Xi|  n
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(ii) for every block b P pi let |b|  |O|
|pi|
,
(iii) for x¯O P XO let:
pOpx¯Oq :
$''''&''''%
q if x¯O  xO,
1qd°
bPpi | pxbq|
if Dc P pi s.t. x¯Ozc  xOzc ^ x¯c  xc,
d
| pxOq|
if x¯O P  pxOq,
0 else.
(4.43)
Then we can calculate the SLI. First note that according to (i) and (ii) we have
|Xb|  |Xc| for all b, c P pi and therefore also | pxbq|  | pxcq| for all b, c P pi.


































p1 q dq (4.48)























If we now set d  0 then we can use Bernoulli’s inequality2 to prove that this
is negative for 0   q   1 and |pi| ¥ 2. Bernoulli’s inequality is
p1  xqn ¥ 1  nx (4.53)







2We thank von Eitzen (2016) for pointing this out. An example reference for Bernoulli’s in-
equality is Bullen (2003).
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such that the argument of the logarithm is smaller than one which gives us
negative SLI.
Remarks:
• The construction used to proof this theorem with the achieved value in
Eq. (4.52) is also our best candidate for a tight lower bound of SLI for a
given pOpxOq and |pi|. However, we have not been able to prove this yet.
• The construction equidistributes the probability 1  q (left to be dis-
tributed after q is chosen) to the STPs x¯O that are almost the same as
the STP xO. They are almost the same in a precise sense because they
only differ in only one of the blocks of pi they differ by as little as can
possibly be resolved/revealed by the partition pi.
• In order to achieve the negative SLI of Eq. (4.52) the requirement is only
that Eq. (4.48) is satisfied. Our construction shows one way how this can
be achieved.
• For a pattern and partition such that |O|{|pi| is not a natural number, the
same bound might still be achieved however a little extra effort has to
go into the construction (iii) such that Eq. (4.48) still holds. This is not
necessary for our purpose here as we only want to show the existence
of patterns that with negative SLI.
• An interpretation of the construction is that STPs which either occur as
a whole or (with uniform probability) missing exactly one part always
have negative SLI.
4.2.4 Normalised specific local integration
Here we present a way to employ the least upper bound to define a normalised
version of SLI. This notion is not important for the rest of this thesis.
Definition 50 (Normalised specific local integration). The normalised specific
local integration is just the specific normalised integration mipipxOq divided by the
least upper bound for the STP xO and the partition pi:
nmipipxOq :
mipipxOq
p|pi|  1q log pOpxOq
. (4.55)
The value of nmipipxOq is in the the interval p8, 1s.
Theorem 18. For any Bayesian network, any STP xO and any partition pi
nmipipxOq ¤ 1. (4.56)
Proof. Follows from Theorem 14 and the definition of nmipipxOq.
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Remarks:
• The normalised SLI gives us a measure of integration which is inde-
pendent of the cardinality of the partition. This means we can compare
the specific local integrations of a STP across partitions pi of different
cardinalities.
• At the same time the normalised SLI also compensates for differences in
the self-information  log pOpxOq of the STP xO. This self-information
can be interpreted as a measure of the “size” of the STP. For a given STP
xO this size of course does not change across the partitions. However,
dividing by it allows to also compare the degree of SLI across STPs of
differing sizes.
4.2.5 Difference of SLI with respect to different partitions
This section present some algebraic properties of SLI. An alternative expres-
sion for SLI, the difference between the SLI with respect to different partitions
of the same STP, and between the SLI with respect to different partitions of
different STP. It is presented here for reference and used only in some of the
proofs that follow.
Definition 51. Given a partition pi of a set V and a subset A  V we define the
restricted partition pi|A of pi to A via:
pi|A : tbX A : b P piu. (4.57)
Conversely, if ξ is a partition of A  V and pi a partition of V and pi|A  ξ we call
pi an extension of ξ to V.
Theorem 19. Given any particular total order pb1, ..., bnq of the blocks of a partition










Proof. Follows directly from the chain rule of probability and the properties
of the logarithm.
Definition 52. Given two partitions pi, ξ of O  V and an STP xO then we define
the difference ∆mipiξ pxOq of the respective specific local integrations via:
∆mipiξ pxOq : mipipxOq miξpxOq. (4.59)
Theorem 20. Given three partitions pi, ξ, ρ of O  V and an STP xO. Then:
(i)

































 ∆miρξpxOq  ∆mi
ρ
pipxOq. (4.64)
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from the definitions and properties of the
logarithm.
Remarks:
• Theorem 20.(ii) says that the difference between the specific local integra-
tions ∆mipiξ pxOq of two arbitrary partitions pi, ξ is equal to the difference
of the according sums over the self-informations of the blocks in each
partition.
• Theorem 20.(iii) says that the difference between the specific local inte-
grations ∆mipiξ pxOq of a refinement pi of a partition ξ and the partition ξ
itself is the sum over the specific local integrations mipi|apxaq of each of
the blocks a P ξ of the original partition ξ with respect to their refine-
ment pi|a due to pi.
• Theorem 20.(iv) says that the difference between the specific local in-
tegrations ∆mipiξ pxOq of two arbitrary partitions pi, ξ is also equal to the
negative difference between the sums over the SLI of each of their blocks
with respect to a partition ρ that refines both pi and ξ.














Proof. We will use here that ppxHq  ppxH|xOq  ppHq  1 and ppxO|xHq 
ppxOq for any set O P V and STP xO. This is in accordance with probability
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Then (ii) follows by setting ξ  pi|S.
Remarks:
• Theorem 20 follows from Theorem 21 by setting S  O.
• Theorem 21.(ii) says that an STP xS with vanishing or negative miξpxSq
can be part of an STP xO with S  O such that an extension of ξ to
partition pi of O can have positive mipipxOq.
4.3 Complete local integration
Complete local integration (CLI) is an important concept in this thesis as pos-
itive CLI will form the criterion distinguishing arbitrary STPs from entities in
multivariate Markov chains (see Section 5.3).
Definition 53 ((Complete) local integration). Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV
and an STP xO of this network the complete local integration ιpxOq of xO is the




We call an STP xO completely locally integrated if ιpxOq ¡ 0.
Remarks:
• The reason for excluding the unit partition 1O of LpOq (where 1O  tOu
see Definition 4) is that with respect to it every STP has mi1OpxOq  0.
• The CLI is the SLI of xO with respect to the partition with respect to
which xO is least integrated. Maybe more clearly, it is the SLI of xO with
respect to the partition that disintegrates xO the most. The same idea
is also employed by Tononi and Sporns (2003); Tononi (2004); Balduzzi
and Tononi (2008) in a non-local setting. It is known as the weakest
link approach (Ay, 2015) to dealing with multiple levels of integration.
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We note here that this is not the only approach that is being discussed.
Another approach is to look at weighted averages of all integrations. For
a further discussion of this point in the case of non-local integration (or
complexity which, on a global level, may well be the same thing) see
Ay (2015) and references therein. A full analysis of which approach is
best suited for the local integration measure presented here is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
4.4 Disintegration
In this section we define the disintegration hierarchy and its refinement-free
version. We then prove the disintegration theorem which is the main formal
result of this thesis. It exposes a connection between partitions minimising
the SLI of a trajectory and the CLI of the blocks of such partitions. More
precisely for a given trajectory the blocks of the finest partitions among those
leading to a particular value of SLI consist only of completely locally inte-
grated blocks. Conversely each completely locally integrated STP is a block
in such a finest partition among those leading to a particular value of SLI.
The theorem therefore reveals the special role of STPs with positive CLI with
respect to an entire trajectory of the system. For our purposes this theorem
allows further interpretations of the measure of CLI which will be discussed
in Section 5.3.5. We believe however that it will also be of general interest
in the study of complex systems fore example due to the relation of SLI and
CLI to measures of complexity like multi-information and local information
dynamics (Section 2.1).
Definition 54 (Disintegration hierarchy). Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV and
a trajectory xV P XV , the disintegration hierarchy of xV is the setDpxVq  tD1,D2,D3, ...u
of sets of partitions of xV with:
(i)
D1pxVq : arg min
piPLpVq
mipipxVq (4.73)
(ii) and for i ¡ 1:





j i DjpxVq. We call DipxVq the i-th disintegration level.
Remark:
• Note that arg min returns all partitions that achieve the minimum SLI.
• Since the Bayesian networks we use are finite, the partition lattice LpVq
is finite, the set of attained SLI values is finite, and the number |D| of
disintegration levels is finite.
• In most cases the Bayesian network contains some symmetries among
their mechanisms which cause multiple partitions to attain the same SLI
value.
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• For each trajectory xV the disintegration hierarchy D then partitions the
elements of LpVq into subsets DipxVq of equal SLI. The levels of the
hierarchy have increasing SLI.
Definition 55. Let LpVq be the lattice of partitions of set V and let E be a subset of
LpVq. Then for every element pi P LpVq we can define the set
Epi : tξ P E : ξ  piu. (4.75)
That is Epi is the set of partitions in E that are refinements of pi.
Definition 56 (Refinement-free disintegration hierarchy). Given a Bayesian net-
work tXiuiPV , a trajectory xV P XV , and its disintegration hierarchy DpxVq the





of sets of partitions of xV with:
(i)
D1pxVq : tpi P D1pxVq : D1pxVqpi  Hu, (4.76)
(ii) and for i ¡ 1:
Di pxVq : tpi P DipxVq : D ipxVqpi  Hu (4.77)
Remark:
• Each level Di pxVq in the refinement-free disintegration hierarchy D
pxVq
consists only of those partitions that neither have refinements at their
own nor at any of the preceding levels. So each partition that occurs in
the refinement-free disintegration hierarchy at the i-th level is a finest
partition that achieves such a low level of SLI or such a high level of
disintegration.
• As we will see below, the blocks of the partitions in the refinement-free
disintegration hierarchy are the main reason for defining the refinement-
free disintegration hierarchy.
Theorem 22 (Disintegration theorem). Let tXiuiPV be a Bayesian network, xV P
XV one of its trajectories, and DpxVq the associated refinement-free disintegration
hierarchy.
(i) Then for every Di pxVq P D
pxVq we find for every b P pi with pi P Di pxVq
that there are only the following possibilities:
1. b is a singleton, i.e. b  tiu for some i P V, or
2. xb is completely locally integrated, i.e. ιpxbq ¡ 0.
(ii) Conversely, for any completely locally integrated STP xA, there is a partition
piA P LpVq and a level DiApxVq P D
pxVq such that A P piA and piA P
DiApxVq.
Proof. ad (i) We prove the theorem by contradiction. For this assume that
there is block b in a partition pi P Di pxVq which is neither a singleton
nor completely integrated. Let pi P Di pxVq and b P pi. Assume b is not
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a singleton i.e. there exist i  j P V such that i P b and j P b. Also
assume that b is not completely integrated i.e. there exists a partition ξ
of b with ξ  1b such that miξpxbq ¤ 0. Note that a singleton cannot be
completely locally integrated as it does not allow for a non-unit parti-
tion. So together the two assumptions imply pbpxbq ¤
±
dPξ pdpxdq with




















Then we can define ρ : ppizbq Y ξ such that
(i) miρpxVq  mipipxVq which implies that ρ P DipxVq because pi P
DipxVq, and








Then we can define ρ : ppizbq Y ξ such that
miρpxVq   mipipxVq, (4.82)
which contradicts mipipxVq P Di pxVq.
ad (ii) Let piA : tAu Y ttjuujPVzA. Since piA is a partition of V it is an el-
ement of some disintegration level DiA . Then partition pi
A is also an
element of the refinement free disintegration level DiApxVq as we will
see in the following. This is because any refinements must (by construc-
tion of piA break up A into further blocks which means that the local
specific integration of all such partitions is higher. Then they must be
at lower disintegration level DkpxVq with k ¥ iA. Therefore piA has no
refinement at its own or a higher disintegration level. More formally,
let ξ P LpVq, ξ  piA and ξ  piA since piA only contains singletons
apart from A the partition ξ must split the block A into multiple blocks






















Therefore ξ is on a disintegration level DkpxVq with k ¡ iA, but this is
true for any refinement of piA so D
 iApxVqpiA  H and pi
A P DiApxVq.
4.5 Symmetries and STPs
In this section we present the behaviour of SLI under permutations of the
nodes in the Bayesian network. The behaviour of SLI under such operations
can be used to explain the appearance of identical disconnected components
on the same disintegration levels in the disintegration hierarchy. We we will
see this for simple example systems in Chapter 6. The behaviour under trans-
formations like the permutations is also and important property of formal
objects in general and can serve as the starting point for further investiga-
tions. In order to be able to express the behaviour of SLI under permutations
we first have to define the behaviour of STPs and their probabilities under
symmetry operations.
We first define terminology for dealing with subgroups of the symmetric
group which is the group of all permutations of a set. In particular we will
often restrict the permutations to those that only permute nodes within a
subset of the Bayesian network. This is relevant for example if we are dealing
with a driven multivariate Markov chain where the driven random variables
may be permuted freely among each other but not with the driving random
variables.
Then we define the group actions of such permutations on STPs, parti-
tions, and probabilities of STPs and show that they are indeed group actions3.
We then state clearly what we mean by symmetries of STPs, partitions, and
probabilities of STPs. After two helper theorems we finally come to the SLI
symmetry theorems (Theorems 30 and 31). The first establishes the behaviour
of SLI of STPs xA under permutations that are symmetries of the probability
distribution over XA i.e. over the nodes that are occupied by the STP. The sec-
ond then establishes the conditions under which the SLI stays invariant under
such permutations. These conditions will be used in our example in Chap-
ter 6. We also anticipate that they can be used to establish further theorems
about SLI and CLI in particularly symmetric systems. However this is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
3Group actions have nothing to do with the actions of agents that are important in the concep-
tual part of this thesis.
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4.5.1 Symmetric group terminology
Definition 57. Let V be a finite set.
(i) A permutation of V is a bijective function g : V Ñ V.
(ii) The set of all permutations together with function composition pg1  g2qpiq :
g1pg2piqq, form a group called the symmetric group ΣV .
(iii) A subgroup of ΣV is any subset G  ΣV such that for all g1, g2 P G we have
g1  g2 P G and for every g P G, g1 P G.
(iv) Given a subset A  V and permutation g P ΣV define:
gpAq : tgpiq : i P Au. (4.87)
(v) Given a subgroup G  ΣV and an element i P V define the orbit of i under G
as the set:
Gpiq : tgpiq : g P Gu. (4.88)
(vi) Given a subgroup G  ΣV and a subset A  V define
GpAq : tgpiq : g P G, i P Au. (4.89)
(vii) A subset A  V is an invariant subset or invariant under the action of group
G if
GpAq  A. (4.90)
(viii) A subset A P V is a fixed subset or fixed under the action of group G if for
every g P G and i P A
gpiq  i. (4.91)
(ix) For any a subset A P V let ΣA  ΣV denote the subgroup of permutations
such that VzA is a fixed subset of ΣA. I.e. for g P ΣA we have gpiq  i for all
i P VzA.
(x) Let V be a Cartesian product V  J T and let G1 be a subgroup of ΣJ and G2
a subgroup of ΣT . Then we can form the group G1 G2 which is a subgroup
of ΣV by defining for any g1 P G1,g1 P G2 that pg1, g2qpj, tq  pg1pjq, g2ptqq.
Remark:
• Note that for all permutations g : V Ñ V we have gpVq  V, but in
general for A  V we may have either gpAq  A or gpAq  A.
• Every subgroup contains the identity i of ΣV .
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4.5.2 Actions of the symmetric group on patterns, partitions,
and probabilities
Definition 58. Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV , a subset A P V with Xi  Xj for
all i, j P A, permutations g, h P ΣA, and a pattern xA P XA ^ tXi  xiuiPA define
the following.
(i) For individual i P A
pXi  xiqg : pXi  xgpiqq (4.92)
we also write xgi where there is no danger of confusion.
(ii) Furthermore
pXi  xgpiqq
h : pXi  xgphpiqqq (4.93)
we also write pxgqhi where there is no danger of confusion.
(iii) For B  A the STP xA
tXi  xiu
g
iPB : tpXi  xiq
guiPB (4.94)
we also write xgB where there is no danger of confusion.
Remarks:
• Note that we require the state spaces of all the random variables in A to
be equal in order for xgi to be well defined for all i P A and all xi P Xi.
• In words the pattern tXi  xiu
g
iPB fixes the random variables at i P B to
the values that xA defines at gpiq. Since the state spaces are identical by
assumption this is well defined.
• These definitions are based on the full notation of patterns because the
shorthand notation does not afford the necessary expressiveness. For
calculations in the rest of the section we will often resort to the full
notation but at the same time try to use the visually less demanding
shorthand where possible.
• A simple example: let V  A  t1, 2u and gp1q  2, gp2q  1 then:
tX1  x1, X2  x¯2ug  tpX1  x1qg, pX2  x¯2qgu (4.95)
 tX1  x¯gp1q, X2  xgp2qu (4.96)
 tX1  x¯2, X2  x1u. (4.97)
We used the bar over x¯2 to highlight the movement of the values. This
will be useful when we look at marginalisations later. Note that pX1 
x1qg does not reflect the value that gp1q maps to (there is no bar over
the x) but X1  x¯gp1q does. This means that for the latter notation we
already have to know the result of gp1q in order to know whether to put
a bar over x or not.
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• These definition provide a slight adaptation of the definition of “xg” in
Ceccherini-Silberstein and Coornaert (2009). The reason for the counter
intuitive rule in 4.93 also stems from the close relation of the present def-
inition to the idea behind the definition in that publication. In their case
x is a function acting on the indices and xg is defined as the function
taking as argument gpiq. Consequently, the function pxgqh takes as argu-
ment gphpiqq. In our case x is not a function (and cannot directly be made
into one as the state spaces of the random variables in our Bayesian net-
work may differ unlike in Ceccherini-Silberstein and Coornaert (2009))
so that we emulate similar behaviour with the above rule.
Definition 59 (Action on a STP). Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV a subset
A P V with Xi  Xj for all i, j P A, a permutation g P ΣA, a pattern xA, and a
subset C P A define the action of g on xC, as: In full notation:





If not necessary we write just g instead of g˜.
Remark:
• We use g˜ here to indicate that this is another object than the permutation
g which is a function on index sets. For the subsequent proof that the
above definition is an action this distinction is necessary. Beyond this
proof it is always clear that it is another object from the context.
• The result of the action of g on xC is then another pattern x¯C where the
new value x¯i of the random variable Xi at node i is now the value xj 
xg1piqs originally fixed for the random variable Xj at node j  g
1piq.
One can think of this construction in analogy to “shifting a function
f : X Ñ Y to the right” by a constant d by defining f¯ pxq : f px  dq.
In order to get the function to move in the positive direction by d we its
negative d to the argument. This has the desired effect. Similarly to
transform the STP by g we act on the indices with its inverse g1. This
is common practice in defining group actions, for a similar construction
see Ceccherini-Silberstein and Coornaert (2009).
• It might be redundant to define the action of gxC on top of the previous
definition of xgC which is an equivalent construction. The detour is pre-
sented here because it allows for the use of the standard construction of
the action on probabilities in Definition 61.
Theorem 23. Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV a subset A P V with Xi  Xj for
all i, j P A, the action on STPs of Definition 59 is a group action of the group ΣA on
the set of all STP












h˜pg˜xCq  ph  gqxC, (4.101)
(iii)
i˜xC  xC. (4.102)
Proof. ad (i) Note that g˜xC  tXi  xg1piquiPC. Recall Xi  Xj for all i, j P A
and g P ΣA such that g1 P ΣA. Then we know that for all i P C xg1piq P
Xg1piq  Xi thus x¯C with x¯i  xg1piq is a pattern x¯C P XC 

BA XB.
ad (ii) In the full notation we have:
h˜pg˜xCq  h˜tXi  xiu
g1
iPC (4.103)
 h˜tpXi  xiqg
1
uiPC (4.104)
 tXi  xg1piqu
h1
iPC (4.105)
 tpXi  xg1piqq
h1uiPC (4.106)
 tpXi  xpg1ph1qpiqqquiPC (4.107)
 tpXi  xpg1h1qpiqquiPC (4.108)
 tpXi  xphgq1piqquiPC (4.109)
 tpXi  xiqu
phgq1
iPC (4.110)
 ph  gqtpXi  xiquiPC (4.111)
 ph  gqxC. (4.112)
ad (iii) Note i˜xC  xiC  tXi  xipiquiPC  xC.
Definition 60 (Action on a partition). Given a set V, a subset A  V, a partition
pi P LpAq, and a permutation g P ΣA define the action of g on pi by
gˆpi : tgpbq  V : b P piu. (4.113)
Again if it is not necessary we just write gpi instead of gˆpi.
Theorem 24. Given a set V, a subset A  V a partition pi P LpAq, and a permuta-
tion g P ΣA, the action on partitions of Definition 60 is a group action of ΣA on the
set of all partitions pi P LpAq. This means that for all g, h P ΣA and all pi P LpAq we
have
(i)
gˆpi P LpAq (4.114)
(ii)
hˆpgˆpiq  {ph  gqpi (4.115)
(iii)
ipi  pi (4.116)
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Proof. ad (i) Note that since g P ΣA we have gpiq P A for every i P A. Therefore
gˆpi  tgpbq  V : b P piu  tgpbq  A : b P piu, so all blocks of pi are
mapped to subsets of A.
To show that gˆpi is a partition we need to show two things. First, that
for all b1, b2 P pi we have gpb1q X gpb2q  H. Note b1 X b2  H by
assumption and g : V Ñ V is injective (even bijective) so that we have
for all i, j P V, gpiq  gpjq if i  j. Then for all i P b1, j P b2 always i  j
and gpiq  gpjq so gpb1q X gpb2q  H.
Second, we have to show that

cPgˆpi c  A which follows from surjec-
tivity of g. Pick any j P A then there exists i P A such that gpiq  j. Since
pi is a partition of A, for each such i P A there is a block b P pi with i P pi
such that j P gˆpi.
ad (ii) Note:
hˆpgˆpiq  hˆtgpbq  A : b P piu (4.117)
 thpgpbqq  A : b P piu (4.118)
 tph  gqpbq  A : b P piu (4.119)
 {ph  gqpi (4.120)
ad (iii) Note iˆpi  tipbq  A : b P piu  pi.
Theorem 25. Given a set V, a subset A  V, partitions pi, ξ P LpAq, and a per-
mutation g P ΣA the action of g on the partitions preserves the refinement relation.
Formally:
pi  ξ ô gpi  gξ. (4.121)
Proof. From i pi j which just means that there exists binpi with i, j P b we
get gpiq gpi gpjq since membership of sets is preserved i.e. if i P b then gpiq P
gpbq. So if i pi j ñ i ξ j then also gpiq gpi gpjq ñ gpiq gξ gpjq. So by
Definition 13 gpi  gξ.
Remark:
• Visually, this means that the Hasse diagram of a set of transformed par-
titions is the same as that of the non-transformed partitions.
Theorem 26. Given a set V, a subset A  V, partitions pi P LpAq, and a permuta-
tion g P ΣA the action of g on the partitions preserves the cardinality |pi|. Formally:
|pi|  |gpi|. (4.122)
Proof. We have seen that gpi is a partition as well. By definition it is only
composed out of the images of the blocks, so there cannot be more blocks in
gpi than in pi. We also know that g is injective so no two elements can be
mapped to the same element and by extension no tow blocks can be mapped
to the same block. Therefore there cannot be fewer blocks in gpi than in pi.
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Definition 61 (Action on probability distributions). Given a Bayesian network
tXiuiPV a subset A P V with Xi  Xj for all i, j P A, and any permutation g P ΣA
define the action of g on the probability distribution pV : XV Ñ XV by setting for for
each xV P XV :
pgˇpVqpxVq :  Prpg1tXi  xiuiPVq (4.123)
 PrptXi  xgpiquiPVq. (4.124)
If there is no danger of confusion we also write in short notation of the patterns
pgˇpVqpxVq  pVpx
g
Vq. Also if not necessary we will write pgpVq instead of pgˇpVq.
Remark:
• So the probability distribution gˇpV resulting from the action of g on pV
assigns xV the probability that was originally assigned to g1xV . The
latter is the trajectory xgV that we obtain by moving the values xgpiq to
nodes i.
• The action of g on pV as defined here corresponds to the usual way
group actions are defined on functions. Namely by making the inverse
g1 act on the argument to the function.
• We only require that the state spaces of the random variables tXiuiPA
whose indices g does not keep fixed are equal. This allows us to deal
with situations where some random variables have different state spaces
or do not exhibit the same symmetric structure as those in A. This can
be useful in the case of driven Markov chains.
Theorem 27. Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV a subset A P V with Xi  Xj
for all i, j P A, and a permutation g P ΣA, the action on probability distributions
of Definition 61 is a group action of ΣA on the set of all probability distributions
pV P PpXVq. This means that for all g, h P ΣA and all pV we have
(i)
gˇpV P PpXVq (4.125)
(ii)
hˇpgˇpVq  ph  gqpV (4.126)
(iii)
iˇpV  pV (4.127)
Proof. ad (i) First, note that since g P ΣA so that g1 P ΣA and Xk  Xl for all
k, l P A we have xg1piq P Xi for all i P A. Also because of g1 P ΣA we
have g1piq  i for i P VzA, so actually xg1piq P Xi for all i P V. This
makes xgV a valid pattern.
Second, show that for all xV P XV we have pgˇpVqpxVq P r0, 1s. This
follows from xgV being a valid pattern for each xV and the probability of
any valid pattern being in the interval r0, 1s.
Third, we show that the transformed distribution gˇpV is normalised.
Since the action of g on xV realises a bijective function on XV (g has an
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Pr ptXi  xiuiPVq (4.132)
 1. (4.133)
ad (ii) Note, for all xV :
phˇpgˇpVqqpxVq  pgˇpVqph1xVq (4.134)
 pVpg1ph1xVqq (4.135)
 pppg1  h1qxVq (4.136)
 ppph  gq1xVq (4.137)
 pph  gqpVqpxVq. (4.138)
ad (iii) For all xV P XV , we have iˇpVpxVq  pVpixVq  pvpxVq.
Definition 62 (Symmetries). Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV a subset A P V
with Xi  Xj for all i, j P A, a permutation g P ΣA, a pattern xA, a subset C P A,
and a partition pi of C.
(i) We say g is a symmetry of xC or xC is invariant under g if
gxC  xC, (4.139)
and call the group of all symmetries of xC the symmetry group of xC.
(ii) We say g is a symmetry of pi or pi is invariant under g if
gpi  pi, (4.140)
and call the group of all symmetries of pi the symmetry group of pi.
(iii) We say g is a symmetry of pC : XC Ñ r0, 1s or pC is invariant under g if
gpC  pC, (4.141)
and call the group of all symmetries of pC the symmetry group of pC.
Remark:
• We can only have gxC  xC or gpi  pi if gC  C.
4We use
À
here to denote that for each j there is a sum over xj. This is to keep the notation
somewhat short, and clear.
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4.5.3 Transformation of SLI for invariant probability distribu-
tions
Theorem 28. Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV a subset A P V with Xi  Xj for





































iPB, tXi  x¯iu
g










































































Note the movement of the bar and with it the change of summation indices
from AzB to g1pAzBq.









• The main advantage of the full notation is the clear separation between
the action of g on the index of the assigned values i.e. xi ÞÑ xgpiq and the
action on the sets of indices that are affected by a pattern i.e. B ÞÑ gpBq.
In the shorthand notation this separation may easily get lost during ma-
nipulations of the equations.
• This theorem shows the effect of the action of a group element g P ΣA
on the (marginalised) probability of a pattern within A. Marginalisa-
tion is used in the usual way but now for the transformed probability
distribution gpV instead of for pV .
Theorem 29. Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV , a subset A  V of the index set
V, and a group of permutations G  ΣA. If for all g P G we have:
gpV  pV , (4.155)
then for all g P G also:




















































• This theorem shows that if we find subgroups of ΣV affecting only a
subset A  V of the nodes in Bayesian network (i.e. any subgroup of
ΣA) and we have gpV  pV i.e. the joint probability distribution over
XV is invariant with respect to the action of this subgroup, then the joint
probability distribution pA over the subset of nodes is also invariant with
respect to the action of this group.
Theorem 30 (SLI symmetry theorem). Given a Bayesian network tXiuiPV , a subset
A  V of the index set V, and a group of permutations G  ΣA such that for all
g P G we have:
gpA  pA (4.162)























































Plugging the block probabilities and pApxAq  pApx
g
Aq into Eq. (4.165) con-
cludes the proof.
Remark:
• This theorem concerns the reaction of the SLI to a transformation of the
partition by a permutation under which the probability distribution is
invariant.
• Note that we can substitute xA ÞÑ x
g1
A and get mipipxAq  migpipgxAq.
Theorem 31 (SLI symmetry corollary). Under the assumptions of Theorem 30, let
H be a subgroup of G.
(i) If for some xA we have for all h P H:
xhA  xA (4.173)
then for all h P H:
mihpipxAq  mipipxAq. (4.174)
(ii) If xhA  xA but for all b P pi we have
pbpxhbq  pbpxbq (4.175)
then for all g P G:
migpipxAq  mipipxAq. (4.176)
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(iii) If xgA  xA and there exists a b P pi with pbpx
g









then for all g P G:
migpipxAq  mipipxAq. (4.178)
Proof. ad (i): Follows directly from Theorem 30 by plugging in xhA  xA which
also implies xhb  xb for all b P pi.
ad (ii): Note that ppxhAq  ppxAq since hpA  pA and phpAqpxAq  pApx
h
Aq










Where we used that pbpxhbq  pbpxbq for all b P pi by assumption.
















bPpi pbpxbq by assump-
tion.
Remarks:
• H needs to be a subgroup of G because else we don’t have phpbqpxhpbqq 
pbpxhbq. Recall that this only holds for elements g P G because for those
gpA  pA and only in that case we have Eq. (4.172).
• These equalities all concern the consequences of Theorem 30 for parti-
tions of a single STP xA. The consequences across differing trajectories
are not covered.
• The three statements can be seen to describe three levels of conditions
which imply the equality of SLI. In all three cases, due to the fact that G
leaves pApxAq invariant we have pgbpxgbq  pbpx
g
bq for all b P pi. In the
first case and on what could be called the lowest level if a subgroup of
G also leaves xA invariant then xhb  xb and therefore pbpx
h
bq  pbpxbq
for all b P pi.
The second states that if there is no invariance of xA then for some other
reason the probability distribution pA may still be such that all block
probabilities are invariant i.e. pbpxhbq  pbpxbq for all b P pi and we still
get equal SLI.
The third then shows that if there is no invariance of xA or of all the pb







being equal even if the individual terms differ.
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4.6 Symmetries and Markov chains
Here, we state and prove in our own notation three theorems on symme-
tries and Markov chains. We first define what we mean by a symmetry of a
Markov matrix. These are purely spatial permutations that commute with the
Markov matrix. We then show the consequence for the individual entries of
the Markov matrix of such a symmetry. Then we show that a symmetry of the
initial distribution which is also a symmetry of the Markov matrix becomes a
symmetry of the joint probability distribution of the entire Bayesian network
i.e. of the probability distribution over the trajectories. This theorem is well
known and only presented for quick reference since we use it in Section 6.3.6.
Finally, we look at the special case where only some of the spatial indices are
permuted and (for example) the driving variables are left alone. In that case,
as long as the interactions with the driving variables obey the symmetry as
well (in the sense established by the theorem) the symmetry of an initial dis-
tribution is also extended to the joint probability distribution over the entire
network. This theorem is provided as a connection to simulations of driven
systems which exhibit life-like behaviour. If the drive obeys the condition pre-
sented here the SLI symmetry theorems can also be used for such systems and
not only for cellular automata. We give a short example of a thermostat-like
system in the remark. For the rest of the thesis, this theorem is not important.
Definition 63 (Spatial symmetries of Markov matrices). Let tXiuiPV be a mul-
tivariate Markov chain with V  J  T and let g P ΣJ  tiu.5 Then we say g is
a symmetry of Pt 1 or Pt 1 is invariant under g if for all probability distributions
pVt : XVt Ñ r0, 1s we have
gpVt 1  gpPt 1 pVtq  Pt 1pgpVtq, (4.181)
and call the group of all symmetries of Pt 1 the symmetry group of Pt 1.
Theorem 32. Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain with V  J  T.




|xgVtq  pVt 1pxVt 1 |xVtq (4.182)




|xˆVtq  pVt 1pxVt 1 |xˆ
g1
Vt q. (4.183)




|xˆVtq  pVt 1pxVt 1 |xˆ
g1
Vt q. (4.184)
then G is a symmetry group of Pt 1.
5Recall that i indicates the identity element of a group.
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Proof. ad (i): By assumption Eq. (4.181) holds for any choice of pVt so we
choose for arbitrary xˆVt P XAt
pVtpxVtq  δxˆVt pxVtq, (4.185)
















































|xˆVtq  pVt 1pxVt 1 |xˆ
g1
Vt q. (4.193)






|xgVtq  pVt 1pxVt 1 |xVtq. (4.194)
ad (ii): For the converse note that if Eq. (4.183) holds for an element g of a



























Where we used that we sum over all elements of XVt so changing the x¯Vt
to x¯gVt cannot change the result.
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Theorem 33 (Extension of symmetries of Markov matrices to the whole Markov
chain). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain with V  J  T and let G be a
subgroup of ΣJ  tiu. If for all t P T a group G is a subgroup of the symmetry group
of the Markov matrix Pt and also a subgroup of the symmetry group of the initial
distribution pV0 : XV0 Ñ r0, 1s then for all g P G
gpV  pV (4.200)
and G is also a subgroup of the symmetry group of pV .
Proof. First note that for all g P ΣV
gpV  gpV0,V1,...,VT , (4.201)
so























|xgVtq  pVt 1pxVt 1 |xVtq. (4.205)


















Since additionally G is a subgroup of the symmetry group of pV0 we have
gpV0  pV0 and therefore arrive at gpV  pV .
Remark:
• In words this theorem state that if the transition matrix commutes with
the action of a group that permutes only indices within time slices (i.e.
spatial indices) and the initial distribution is invariant with respect to
such permutations then the joint probability distribution pV over the
entire Bayesian network is invariant with respect to such permutations.
• If the spatial permutation leaves a set B  J fixed we can treat this as a
special case of this theorem. We will do this next.
Theorem 34 (Spatial symmetries of driven multivariate Markov chains). Let
tXiuiPV be a driven Markov chain with index set V  J T and J  AY B with AX
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B  H. Here B indicates the driving random variables and A the driven ones. Also let











and we are given an initial distribution pA0,B0 : XA0 XB0 Ñ r0, 1s with
gpA0,B0  pA0,B0 , (4.209)
then
gpV  pV . (4.210)
Proof. First note for a driven Markov chain we have (see Definition 42)
pVt 1pxVt 1 |xVtq  pA,t 1pxA,t 1|xB,t 1, xA,tqpB,t 1pxB,t 1|xA,t, xB,tq. (4.211)











so condition Eq. (4.208) is equivalent to Eq. (4.182) for g P ΣA  tiu. This
means that if
gpV0  gpAYB,0  gpJ,0  pV0 , (4.213)
we get gpV  pV .
Remarks:
• If Bt  H this reduces to Theorem 33.
• Here we have limited the action of the symmetry group to the driven
spatial random variables. The condition just state that as long as the
interaction with the driving random variables is invariant with respect
to the permutations of the driven random variables, the symmetry of
an initial distribution is maintained throughout the entire Bayesian net-
work.
• A possible example system is where the drive depends on the average
of all states of the nodes in At. Such an average is invariant under
any permutation. For example let XB,t 1  t0, 1u and for all j P At,
Xj  t0, 1u and define (for all t P T:
pB,t 1pxB,t 1|xA,t, xB,tq 
$'&'%
1 if xB,t 1  1^
°
jPA xj,t ¤ |At|{2
1 if xB,t 1  0^
°
jPA xj,t ¡ |At|{2
0 else,
(4.214)
such that xB,t 1 P t0, 1u depends on whether more than half of the vari-
ables in At have value 1 or not. It is straightforward to check that then
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pB,t 1pxB,t 1|xA,t, xB,tq  pB,t 1pxB,t 1|x
g
A,t, xB,tq for any g P ΣA,t. The
influence on the nodes in At 1 also has to be symmetric, which can eas-
ily be achieved by setting all mechanisms of driven nodes (those in A)
equal (just like in the case of spatial homogeneity, see Definition 39, but
only among the driven nodes) e.g. let for simplicity papj, t  1q  pj, tq,
e P r0, 1s, and set for all j P A and xB,t 1
pj,t 1pxj,t 1|xB,t 1, xj,tq 
#
e if xj,t 1  xB,t 1
1 e if xj,t 1  xj,t.
(4.215)
Then, if less (more) than half of the variables in A have value 1, each
variable is switched to 1 (0) with probability e (1 e) and else stays the
same. This is in effect similar to a thermostat keeping the amount of
ones among the nodes in A around |A|{2.
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Chapter 5
Agents within Markov chains
This chapter constitutes the conceptual part of this thesis. We present here
an avenue for a fully formal definition of agents. Taking our cue from the
literature, we extract a list of notions that, if formally defined, would suffice
for a formal agent definition. We do not arrive at a full definition. For goal-
directedness, which would complete such a definition we make no proposal.
For the other notions we propose definitions and motivate these in each case.
Finally, we connect the resulting proto-agents (lacking goal-directedness) to
the existing formal model of agent-environment system called the perception-
action loop.
In more detail the chapter contains the following.
• In Section 5.1 we give a working definition of agents in accordance with
the literature, this stipulates agents as entities contained within systems,
the entities must exhibit actions, perception, and goal-directedness.
• In Section 5.2 we restrict ourselves to a class of target systems that we
want to define agents for, i.e. (driven) multivariate Markov chains.
• In Section 5.3 we present an arguments for three phenomena that should
be possible (and not be precluded) under a general agent definition:
compositionality, degree of freedom traversal, and counterfactual varia-
tion. We also propose spatiotemporal patterns (STPs) as structures that
can exhibit these three features within multivariate Markov chains.
• In Section 5.3.5 we highlight the problem of selecting entities among
all STPs i.e. which we call the problem of identity. We also propose
completely locally integrated STPs as one possible solution.
• In Sections 5.4 and 5.5 we present definitions of actions and perceptions
that are suitable for any notion of entities that is based on STPs.
• In Section 5.6 we show that our proposed notions of action and percep-
tion can be seen as generalisations of existing notions in the perception-
action loop literature.
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The original contributions contained in this chapter are:
• An argument (via compositionality, degree of freedom traversal, and
counterfactual variation) for a STP-based definition of entities.
• The abstraction of entity-sets which enables the formal connection to
perception-action loop.
• A tentative1 formal definition of entities as completely locally integrated
STPs.
• A tentative formal definition of action for arbitrary entity-sets.
• A classification of actions into value actions and extent actions.
• A tentative formal definition of perception for arbitrary entity-sets.
• An exposition of the role of non-interpenetration of entity-sets in per-
ception. Namely, it makes perception naturally unique.
• The formal exposition of the connection of the action definition to non-
heteronomy of Bertschinger et al. (2008) in the perception-action loop.
• The formal exposition of the way the perception definition specialises to
the perception-action loop.
• A construction of a conditional probability distribution (the branch-
morph, including branching partition) over the futures of entities which
allows the definition of perception.
• Proof that the condition on co-perception environments is not stronger
than the assumptions about environment states inherent in the perception-
action loop.
The formal definitions of entities, actions, and perceptions are only tentative.
We will establish in this thesis that they are compatible, i.e. the defined actions
and perceptions apply to the defined entities. We also establish in Sections 6.5
and 6.6 that they fulfil certain expectations and the requirements we propose
in this thesis. They remain tentative for three reasons (in increasing general-
ity):
1. There are still some open questions regarding their interpretation in cer-
tain cases. See Sections 6.5 and 6.6 and Chapter 7.
2. There are further phenomena that should not be precluded by agent
definitions that we have not investigated yet such as death, birth, growth,
and replication.
3. A final formal definition of agents should also be empirically grounded.
For this it should correctly predict the conditions for the occurrence of
agents in some system. For this it is in turn necessary that the occurring
agents are more or less universally acknowledged examples of agents.
1For some context on what we mean by “tentative” see Chapter 5.
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The best examples of such agents are humans but some researchers are
willing to attribute agency to much simpler living organisms like bac-
teria. In that case one can imagine that a formal definition of agents
could in principle get empirical justification: Say we can formally model
beakers filled with suitable chemicals and their dynamics. A formal
agent definition would be empirically justified if it can be used to re-
liably predict the conditions (external influence and initial conditions)
that lead to the occurrence of agents e.g. the emergence of a bacterium
within the beaker. This scenario can (in principle only) also be extended
to the case where only humans are agents. In practice this seems further
magnitudes more unlikely than the scenario involving the bacterium.
Another and possibly simpler path to recognition of an agent definition
would be if it was able to predict which formal systems that can be sim-
ulated contain agents and where such simulations turn out to be “con-
vincing enough” to the research community. Currently neither of these
scenarios has been realised with our formal agent definition. Neither
scenario is also likely to happen in the near future. A classification of
formal systems according to their capacity to contain agents will require
not only further mathematical tools but also the right guess with respect
to the agent definition. This thesis presents one such guess and develops
some associated new mathematical tools. Whether either proposal will
be part of a final and acknowledged formal definition of agents is work
for the future.
5.1 A working definition of agents
Conceptually, agent definitions are not particularly controversial in the liter-
ature. As Barandiaran et al. (2009) have argued a rough consensus is that an
agent is “at least, a system doing something by itself according to certain goals or
norms within a specific environment” (Barandiaran et al., 2009, p.2, italics from
the original). In their subsequent discussion they highlight the necessity for a
“distinguished entity” to exist in order to take the role of the “system doing
something”. For the moment this almost suffices for our purposes. It is not
the main goal of this work to question the concept of agents but instead to
contribute to its formalisation within a preselected class of formal/artificial
systems.
To get a concise working definition we insert the “distinguished entity”
into the consensus definition above and reformulate it slightly:
Definition 64 (Agent working definition). An agent is a distinguished entity
contained within a strictly larger system exhibiting perception, action, and goal-
directedness.
Instead of referring to a “specific environment” we only require a larger
system that encompasses/contains the agent as well as something more. The
“something more” can certainly take the form of an environment and, con-
versely, if there is an environment the “larger system” can always be defined
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as the agent together with its environment. If anything our definition is there-
fore more general than that of Barandiaran et al. though this is not the main
purpose of this formulation. The main purpose is to highlight the existence
of the larger system which contains the agent entirely. It is important to re-
member that this existence is not a new requirement but is present already in
the prevalent concept of agents via the reference to an “environment”. Also
note that when we require that the distinguished entity is contained within
a larger system, we mean the entity cannot be everything that exists for any
amount of time. By “larger” we therefore mean the system is larger during
and throughout the agent’s existence/presence and not “larger” only in the
temporal domain.
It is worth highlighting two more things about how we interpret our work-
ing definition. The first is that an agent is a “distinguished entity” in so far
that it exhibits actions, perception, and goal-directedness. These three proper-
ties distinguish an entity that is an agent among all entities. This leads directly
to the second point: the set of agents is a (set theoretical) subset of the set of
entities contained in the larger system. From this it follows that the set of
entities has to be defined in such a way that it encompasses all agents. We
will come back to this in Section 5.3.
That we choose to use “actions” instead of “doing something by itself” and
“goal-directedness” instead of “according to certain goals or norms” should
not be over-interpreted. We consider these expressions as interchangeable. We
also included perception in the definition because it is (sometimes via “inter-
action”) a very common requirement in the literature (e.g. Maes, 1993; Beer,
1995; Smithers, 1995; Franklin and Graesser, 1997; Christensen and Hooker,
2000). Furthermore, Barandiaran et al. (2009) in their more detailed discussion
of the requirements for agency refer to “interactional asymmetry” instead of
“doing something”. The use of interaction suggests that they also agree with
a requirement of perceptions.
We also want to draw attention to the fact that Definition 64 is still a very
weak definition of agents. Especially when discussing biological agents i.e.
living organisms, further requirements are common. One such requirement
concerns the relation between the goals and the agent. In the definition above
this relation is arbitrary, any goals are valid for any agent. Stronger definitions
require the goals to be somewhat intrinsic to the agent. This can mean that
goals must be in the agent’s own interest (e.g. Franklin and Graesser, 1997;
Kauffman, 2000) for example ensure its survival/existence (cf. constitutive
autonomy e.g. Froese and Ziemke, 2009).
Primary examples of agents are living organisms, the higher organised
they are the less controversial the claim that they are indeed agents. In the end
it cannot be denied, for example, that humans are agents. Many authors agree
that bacteria already qualify as (sometimes called minimal) agents (Chris-
tensen and Hooker, 2000; Kauffman and Clayton, 2006; Froese and Ziemke,
2009; Barandiaran et al., 2009). Due to the supposed lack of representational
capabilities others do disagree (see Schlosser, 2015, for references). We take
the point of view in line with our definition of agents above that bacteria and
all living organisms are agents. For the purpose of this thesis it is not essential
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Figure 5.1: First time steps of the Bayesian network representing a multivariate Markov chain
tXtutPT . The shown edges are just an example, any two nodes within the same or subsequent
columns can be connected.
to make a final commitment on these matters. It would suffice for our argu-
ments if we would use a more restrictive definition, e.g. that only humans are
agents. Whenever we speak of living organisms in the following the inclined
reader might then just replace this by “humans” and the same or similar ar-
guments still hold. Apart from living organisms, other examples of agents are
robots, and more controversially, societies, companies, and nation states.
5.2 Multivariate Markov chains as a class of sys-
tems containing agents
In order to transform the working Definition 64 into a formal definition we
have to formally define every one of the terms mentioned there. The most
fundamental term in Definition 64 is the “larger system”. The distinguished
entities must be “parts of” the larger system so to define those we need to
define the larger system first. Perception, action, and goal-directedness can
then be defined once we have well defined distinguished entities.
As the class of larger systems we choose finite multivariate Markov chains
(see Definitions 36 and 42 as well as Figs. 5.1 and 5.2).
One immediate consequence of choosing a well defined class of systems is
that it forces us to construct all other notions from those well defined for this
class of systems. This has the advantage that it greatly restricts the concepts
to consider for the definitions. The disadvantage is that if the choice is a
bad choice we are destined to fail. A bad choice here would mean that a
useful notion of agents is impossible within our choice of larger systems. In
this section we therefore explain what motivates our choice of finite Markov
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Figure 5.2: First time steps of the Bayesian network representing a multivariate process tXiuiPV
driven by a process tYtutPT . Note that the process tYtutPT can also be multivariate, but this
would further clutter the graph. Also note that not all edges depicted here must be present.
Here, each random variable in each time-slice of the driven process is influenced by the driving
process and influences it.
chains as the “larger systems”.
Since we have required that agents are parts of larger systems in Defini-
tion 64 this system must in one way or another contain the agent candidates.
As a choice for the class of systems that represent the larger systems we should
then use systems for which it is plausible that they can contain agents. At the
same time want to start with the simplest class of systems that shows at least
some promise or is not easily dismissed.
This desire for simplicity is due to two factors. First, in artificial life we
are mainly interested in the principles that allow the occurrence of agents/life
within a system and not in the precise description of actual agents/living
organisms. Second, choosing simpler systems greatly reduces the technical
burden so that the concepts play a more prominent role.
The main factor in choosing a finite system is that implementations of the
systems under consideration in computer simulations are of great interest in
artificial life. Such simulations are restricted to discrete and finite systems.
Continuous systems can be approximated, but the approximations are in the
end finite again so such approximations are included in the class of finite
systems.
As living organisms are our prime example of agents it would be straight-
forward to choose systems which resemble or model systems that contain
living organisms. The safest bet is then to use models of the universe as a
whole. By definition the universe contains living organisms entirely.
Another reasonably safe bet is the entire geosphere, by which we mean the
planet earth together with its atmosphere and the exchange of radiation with
the sun and the rest of the universe. Similarly there are smaller subsystems of
the geosphere that can contain living organisms like ponds, tidal pools, and
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other ecosystems.
Realistic models of the universe or the geosphere are continuous, use quan-
tum mechanics (e.g. as in Saitta and Saija, 2014), relativistic mechanics, or even
more involved theories.
However, for the sake of simplicity and finiteness we abstract away from
the more realistic continuous, relativistic, or quantum dynamical systems to
finite multivariate Markov chains Definitions 36 and 42.
This class of systems contains synchronous finite cellular automata like
the game of life (Conway, 1970). These automata can be seen as discretised
versions of field theories (Shalizi and Moore, 2003) and have successfully been
used to model physical systems Chopard (2009).
Multivariate Markov chains can also be used to approximate particle-based
systems if we use the random variables to represent the positions and mo-
menta of the particles. An interesting recent system with life-like behaviour
which falls into this class is Schmickl et al. (2016).
Since we also include driven multivariate Markov chains our considera-
tions also extend to reaction-diffusion systems. Such systems are also fre-
quently used to model biological phenomena (Turing, 1952), as well as indi-
vidualised and metabolising structures (Virgo, 2011; Froese et al., 2014; Bartlett
and Bullock, 2015, 2016).
Last but not least, the driven multivariate Markov chains can be used to
approximate/simulate systems obeying the (multivariate) Langevin equation
(as a discretised version of the associated Fokker-Planck equation). Such sys-
tems underlie recent investigations into the physics of cell replication (Eng-
land, 2013) and adaptation (Perunov et al., 2014) as well as a theory of life
(Friston, 2013). They are also used in Still et al. (2012) to study advantages
of prediction, perception and action for thermodynamic efficiency. Similarly
Sagawa (2012) studies the increased work extraction due to feedback control,
which can be seen as perception and action as well. Kondepudi et al. (2015)
studies a form of goal-directedness in a driven system.
Therefore we believe that multivariate (driven) Markov chains are a rea-
sonable choice for a first class of systems to develop an agent definition for.
Our hope is that these system are powerful enough to contain agents. How-
ever, if we find that they are not then we may at least find out why they are
not. At the current state of this research this question is still undecided.
5.3 Entities in multivariate Markov chains that can
be agents
As mentioned in Section 5.1 all agents are entities. After choosing multivariate
Markov chains as the class of containing systems we have to define entities in
this class of systems. For this purpose we propose to use subsets of STPs in
general and completely integrated STPs (Definition 53) in particular. Employ-
ing STPs to represent entities is already implicit in (Beer, 2014b,a). The notion
of completely integrated STPs and the proposal of using them as entities in an
agent definition are two of the main original contributions of this thesis. The
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section is loosely based on our own publication Biehl et al. (2016).
Formally, the first goal of this section is to establish that the set of entities
EptXiuiPVq for any given (driven) multivariate Markov chain2 tXiuiPV should





Using subsets of STPs is in contrast (i.e. not equivalent) to using subsets of
random variables i.e.
EptXiuiPVq  2V (5.2)
as entities. The latter are often implicitly used in the literature. The arguments
for Eq. (5.1) are to a large degree independent of arguments that concern the
exact determination of which subset EptXiuiPVq should correspond to. Conse-
quently, there may be different notions of agents based on different choices
of the exact subset. In order to accommodate this we introduce the notion of
entity sets which later allow us to define actions and perception independent
of the exact choice of EptXiuiPVq. The exact choice is the subject of the second
part of this section and the problem of identity. There we will motivate the
choice of completely integrated STPs
EptXiuiPVq  txO P
¤
OV
XO : ιpxOq ¡ 0u. (5.3)
Note that this section does not contain a rigorous derivation of the ne-
cessity to choose the entities as we propose. We merely present heuristic
arguments which speak for this choice. The main tool in this endeavour is the
following argument.
As already mentioned in Section 5.1 the set of entities for a given larger
system has to (at least) encompass all agents within the system. In other words
the definition of entities must not exclude structures which might be agents.
Now say that there are phenomena or properties that are known to be exhib-
ited by some (possibly not all) agents. Say that furthermore there is an entity
definition which implies that these phenomena or properties are impossible for
entities. Then we must reject this entity definition on the grounds that it can-
not encompass all agents since it precludes these phenomena or properties. In
the following this argument will be employed multiple times and referred to
as the non-preclusion argument. Note that we cannot require all phenomena
that are exhibited by some agents to be exhibited by all entities of an entity
definition. This would lead to a small and possibly empty subset of agents.
We can however require that all phenomena that are exhibited by some agents
are not-precluded by the entity definition. In this way every phenomenon that
is exhibited by some agent can be turned into a condition on entity definitions.
2We will not explicitly mention “driven” in the following. We will also refer to the Markov
chain tXiuiPV without explicitly mentioning driving or driven random variables. The process
tXiuiPV should be seen as the process of interest that may or may not be driven by some other
process whose dynamics are ignored. For the purpose of this chapter whether tXiuiPV is driven
or not makes no difference.
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We illustrate our arguments for choosing entities within the class of mul-
tivariate Markov chains using the popular example of a glider in the game of
life cellular automaton. The glider is not necessarily a life-like structure, but
it already exhibits the three phenomena that we will further discuss in this
thesis:
1. compositionality,
2. degree of freedom traversal,
3. counterfactual variation.
These phenomena are also exhibited by more life-like structures in less well
known examples of (driven) multivariate Markov chains. We refer the reader
to the motile and interacting reaction-diffusion spots in Virgo (2011); Froese
et al. (2014), different reaction-diffusion spots in Bartlett and Bullock (2015,
2016), and the particle-based cell-like structures in Schmickl et al. (2016). In
the following when we refer to “other life-like structures” we refer to these
examples.
Note that there are further phenomena of living organisms and life-like
systems that should not be precluded by an entity definition. Examples of
such phenomena are birth, death, growth, and replication. The investigation
of these is beyond the scope of this thesis.
In Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.3 we discuss each of the three phenomena above
separately. For each we will also note that they seem plausible for real liv-
ing organisms. We then invoke in each case the non-preclusion argument
and require that a definition of entities in multivariate Markov chains should
allow structures that exhibit this phenomenon. In the course of these argu-
ments we settle for STPs as the superset of entities and state this explicitly in
Section 5.3.4. There we will also define compositionality, degree of freedom
traversal, and counterfactual variation formally. This leaves open the problem
of selecting entities among all STPs which is the problem of identity discussed
in Section 5.3.5.
5.3.1 Compositionality of entities
The compositionality of entities refers to the possibility that life-like structures
are composite of multiple parts. This can be separated into two kinds of
compositionality, spatial compositionality and temporal compositionality. We
first discuss spatial compositionality.
In the example of the glider we observe that a glider is not just a single
cell or the state of a single cell (e.g. black or white). In order for a glider to
occur multiple cells that are in a particular arrangement have to have partic-
ular states at some time-step. The glider is therefore a (spatially) composite
structure. The same is true for other life-like structures.
In reaction-diffusion systems (e.g. Froese et al., 2014; Bartlett and Bullock,
2015) the individualised spots occupy a contiguous bounded region in a two
dimensional plane. Each position in the reaction-diffusion system is a random
101
variable that indicates the concentrations of the involved chemicals at this po-
sition. A single position or a single set of concentrations at a position does
not constitute a spot or life-like structure these are composite of all the con-
centrations in an area. So reaction-diffusion spots are also spatially composite
structures.
In the particle-based system of Schmickl et al. (2016) the life-like structures
are spores or cells. These are composite of particles. In this case each particle
j has three degrees of freedom, two positions xj,t, yj,t and heading φj,t. Each
degree of freedom can represented by a random variable. The union of these
degrees of freedom over all particles and all times form the random variables
of the multivariate Markov chain. A spore or cell occurs if these random
variables stand in particular relation to each other. Without going into further
details, a necessary condition is that the positions of multiple particles must
be (in some sense) close to each other. A single particle is not a cell or a spore
so again we find that life-like structures are spatially composite structures.
Finally, living organisms (presumably composite of molecules) are also
generally seen as composite structures.
So by the non-preclusion argument the entities in multivariate Markov
chains should include spatially composite structures.
The glider is also a temporally composite structure. It is an essential fea-
ture of a glider that it “moves” which means that in general it can exist at
multiple time-steps and we refer to it as the same glider. This means the
glider can persist or can be composite out of parts at different time-steps.
Similarly, the life-like structures in other systems are persistent structures.
Furthermore living organisms persist and are generally seen to have histories
which is another indication that they are composite out of parts at different
times. In Section 5.3.2 we will discuss temporal compositionality with partic-
ular attention to the possibility that the spatial parts that the glider or many
life-like structures are composite of change over time. We therefore keep the
discussion of temporal compositionality short.
Note that both choices of entities EptXiuiPVq  2V and EptXiuiPVq 

OV XO
can represent composite structures in the form of sets of random variables or
sets of values of random variables respectively.
5.3.2 Degree of freedom traversal of entities
Degree of freedom traversal refers to the possibility that life-like structures
maintain a form of identity while exchanging the spatial parts they are made
of.
The glider in the game of life “moves” in one of four possible directions.
As it moves the cells that it occupies change at every time step. Nonetheless
we speak of the same glider even when none of the cells it occupied in one
configuration are still occupied several time steps later. Intuitively then the
glider maintains its identity along its path. We call the maintenance of iden-
tity under exchange of the spatial occupied cells or spatial occupied random
variables degree of freedom traversal. Note that a block in the game of life does
not exhibit such degree of freedom traversal.
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Other life-like structures in multivariate Markov chains also exhibit degree
of freedom traversal. In reaction-diffusion systems (e.g. Froese et al., 2014;
Bartlett and Bullock, 2015) the individualised spots travel through the two
dimensional plane and thereby occupy changing spatial regions over time.
As mentioned before, each position in a reaction diffusion system indicates
a random variable representing the concentrations of the involved chemicals
at this position. So reaction-diffusion spots also exhibit degree of freedom
traversal.
In the particle-based system of Schmickl et al. (2016) particles can be seen
to jump into and out of the spores and cells which intuitively maintain their
identity throughout. As mentioned before each particle corresponds to three
degrees of freedom/random variables. The “spatial” random variables that
are occupied by a spore or cell are those of the particles that it is formed by.
This means that when a particle jumps in or out of the spore or cell the random
variables occupied by this structure change. Therefore these structures also
exhibit degree of freedom traversal.
Furthermore, we also see real living organisms as maintaining their iden-
tity while exchanging the parts they are made of. The molecules that a cell is
made of change during its lifetime. So if a cell (or a larger living organism) is
seen as a particular configuration of molecules then these also exchange the
parts they are made of.
Together these observations suggest that degree of freedom traversal is
exhibited by life-like structures in Markov chains. According to the non-
preclusion argument a definition of entities should therefore allow the pos-
sibility of entities that traverse degrees of freedom.
Both candidates for entities mentioned in Section 5.3.1 can represent de-
gree of freedom traversal. The subsets of random variables EptXiuiPVq  2V
also contain sets of random variables that differ from time-step to time-step.
This is possible because we use the “time-unrolled” Bayesian network formu-
lation of multivariate Markov chains where each time step has its own set of
random variables tXiuiPVt for time-slice Vt. A subset of V can then combine
any subsets of the time-slices at different times.
The subsets of STPs EptXiuiPVq 

OV XO clearly also contain STPs that
fix different random variables at different times since they can fix the random
variables in any subset of V.
We note here again that the choice of entity sets EptXiuiPVq  2V was used
in Krakauer et al. (2014) to construct a notion of what is called individuals
in this work. This work also deals with degree or freedom traversal of these
individuals. However, the phenomenon of life-like structures discussed in
Section 5.3.3 suggests that this construction precludes certain structures that
we would like to include. This is also the case for the perception-action loop
(Section 3.3.6) where the agent is represented by the set of random variables
tMtutPT .
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5.3.3 Counterfactual variation of entities
Counterfactual variation of structures refers to the possibility that the life-like
structures within a multivariate Markov chain differ from one trajectory to
another. The difference or variation can take two forms:
1. variation in value,
2. variation in extent.
We could add “variation in existence” but this is a special case of variation in
extent. Before we give a formal definition of counterfactual variation we can
already state a few observations about gliders. First, a glider can occur in one
trajectory of the cellular automaton and not occur in a second one (e.g. if all
cells are white in the second one). This would be a variation in existence. It
can be seen as a variation in extent since its extent in the second trajectory is
zero.
Second, a glider can occur in one place and move in one direction in the
course of one trajectory and occur in another place and move in another di-
rection in the course of a second trajectory. This is also a variation in extent
if the cells that the two gliders occupy in the two trajectories along their path
do not completely coincide.
Third, a variation in value occurs if in two trajectories the structures/gliders
occupy exactly the same cells but the cells they occupy have differing values.
For gliders this can happen if we look at trajectories that are only one time-
step long Fig. 5.3.
Note that if two glider in two trajectories have the same values and extent
we consider it them the same glider.
Note that it is a non-trivial question which cells/random variables the
glider actually occupies. A detailed discussion can be found in Beer (2014b).
The example of counterfactual variation in value in Fig. 5.3 is based on the
characterisation of a glider as a STP by Beer.
We have seen that gliders are structures that exhibit counterfactual varia-
tion of the two kinds. For real living organisms it is impossible to say with
certainty whether they exhibit counterfactual variation. We have no access to
counterfactual trajectories of the universe. However, due to the symmetries
of the laws of physics it is quite plausible that living organisms also exhibit
counterfactual variation. Assume we have two identical aquarium containing
a different fish each. The laws of physics suggest that the fish in one aquarium
could also be in the same place in the other aquarium and similarly for the
other fish. This would be counterfactual variation in extent of the fish within
either aquarium.
Together with evidence from other life-like structures we therefore con-
sider it justified to invoke the non-preclusion argument and require that coun-
terfactual variation is possible for entities within multivariate Markov chains.
Therefore it should be possible for entities to occur within single trajectories






Figure 5.3: Counterfactual variation in value exhibited by the spatial patterns of two gliders in
two different trajectories of a game of life cellular automaton. Both grids depict a single time-
step of the two dimensional cellular automaton and therefore a special case of STPs without
temporal extension. The cells that are not occupied by the patterns are grey, occupied cells are
white or black according to the glider configuration. The extra layer of white cells around the
black cells of the gliders is in accordance with the extent of gliders as derived by Beer (2014b).
The two particular configurations shown here are also presented there. We see that the cells that
are occupied coincide in both cases. The only difference between the two glider configurations
are the values of two cells. The one right in the centre of the grid and the cell just below it have
switched their values. This shows that there can be a glider in one trajectory and a different
glider in another trajectory with both having identical extent. This is a counterfactual variation
in value.
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Conversely, this throws out the possibility that entities are by definition
structures that do not vary with the trajectories. In particular this excludes
the possibility to define entities as random variables, sets of random variables,
or stochastic processes i.e. EptXiuiPVq  2V since these do not vary with the
trajectories. A subset of random variables XA where A  V is not dependent
on the trajectories, it only takes different values in different trajectories. The
different values are just STPs however. Note that this does not mean that it is
not justified in particular cases to represent entities by sets of random variables.
In particular, if it happens that every STP xA P XA is an entity then it could
make sense to speak of these STPs as different realisations of one thing / an
individual / an “entity” 3. For example, this is the assumption for the agent
process tMtutPT in the perception-action loop (see Section 3.3.6) and will be
discussed further in Sections 5.5 and 5.6.
We then settle for STPs as the candidates for entities i.e. entities are seen
as special cases of STPs. For a given multivariate Markov chain entities are
therefore a subset of the STPs. We fix this assumption formally in the next
section where we also give a formal definition of compositionality, degree of
freedom traversal, and counterfactual variation.
5.3.4 Definition of entity sets via STPs
In accordance with Section 5.3.3 we define the set of entities in a multivariate
Markov chains to be a subset of the STPs. We call this subset the entity set.
Definition 65 (Entity set). Given a multivariate Markov chain tXiuiPV with index








• We expect that it is useful to require certain algebraic properties from
entity sets. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Using entity sets we can also define compositionality, degree of freedom
traversal, and counterfactual variation formally. To connect this with the ex-
ample of a glider recall that a trajectory xV P XV of a multivariate Markov
chain is a STP that extends throughout the entire Bayesian network. In other
words a trajectory occupies all random variables in the Markov chain. The
multivariate Markov chain describing a cellular automaton assigns each cell
j P J (where J is a two dimensional grid of cells) at each time step t P T a ran-
dom variable Xj,t. The random variables in the multivariate Markov chain are
then indexed by V  J  T and a trajectory is a STP xV  xJ,T . Structures like
the glider (and similar life-like structures) occupy/fix subsets of the random
variables in the multivariate Markov chain. They can therefore be described
by STPs.
3The quotations only indicate that we will reserve the term entity for STP based entities in the
rest of this thesis.
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We can then define spatial and temporal compositionality, first for STPs,
then for entity sets.
Definition 66 (Composite STPs). Given a multivariate Markov chain tXiuiPV we
say a STP xA is
(i) spatially composite or extended if it has a time-slice xAt occupying more than
one random variable i.e. if there exists t with |At| ¡ 1,
(ii) temporally composite or extended if it has more than one non-empty time-slice
i.e. if |tt P T : At  Hu| ¡ 1.
If xA is spatially and temporally extended we say it is spatiotemporally composite or
extended.
Definition 67 (Compositionality). Given a multivariate Markov chain tXiuiPV the
entity set EptXiuiPVq satisfies compositionality if it contains a composite STP.
Similarly for degree of freedom traversal.
Definition 68 (Degree of freedom traversing STPs). Given a multivariate Markov
chain tXiuiPV with index set V  J T we say a STP xA traverses degrees of freedom
if there are two time-slices that occupy random variables with different spatial indices
i.e. if there exists t, s P T with t  s such that
tj P J : pj, tq P Atu  tj P J : pj, sq P Asu. (5.5)
Definition 69 (Degree of freedom traversing entity set). Given a multivariate
Markov chain tXiuiPV the entity set EptXiuiPVq is degree of freedom traversing if it
contains a degree of freedom traversing STP.
Remark:
• The indices of a multivariate Markov chain may be renamed such that
the property of degree of freedom traversal vanishes from the entity set.
We accept this caveat here. If needed the notion of degree of freedom
traversal can be strengthened by requiring that no such index renaming
removes the property. Note that if there are two entities, one that doesn’t
traverse degrees of freedom and one that does and both occupy the same
degree of freedom at some time t then they make it impossible to rename
the indices at all times where the two entities differ. This is the case for
the two gliders of Fig. 5.3. Also, since the renaming of indices is rarely
practically done or considered in case of cellular automata (it leads to
complex update rules) and other systems exhibiting life-like phenomena
our simple notion of degree of freedom traversal is sufficient for the
purpose of this thesis.
Finally, we define counterfactual variation by first defining variation (or
difference) in value and extent:
Definition 70 (Variation of STPs). Given a multivariate Markov chain tXiuiPV .
Two STPs xA, x¯B differ or vary
(i) in value if A  B and there exists i P A with xi  x¯i,
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(ii) in extent if A  B.
(iii) in value and extent if A  B and there exists i P AX B with xi  x¯i.
We just say xA, x¯B differ or vary if any of the above are true. Else we say they are
identical or equal.
Remark:
• We will encounter the difference in value and extent again when we
define actions for agents based on STPs in Section 5.4. There we can
distinguish between actions in value and actions in extent.
We then have counterfactual variation if the set of all entities in one trajec-
tory differs from the set of entities in another.
Definition 71 (Counterfactually varying entity set). Given a multivariate Markov
chain tXiuiPV the entity set EptXiuiPVq exhibits
(i) counterfactual variation if there are two trajectories xV , x¯V P XV with xV  x¯V
such that the set of entities that occur in each are not equal i.e.
txˆA P EptXiuiPVq : xˆA  xAu  txˆA P EptXiuiPVq : xˆA  x¯Au (5.6)
(ii) counterfactual variation in value only if for any two trajectories xV , x¯V P XV
set of entities that occur in each only differ in value which means that they all
occupy the same sets of random variables i.e.
tA  V : DxˆA P EptXiuiPVq, xˆA  xAu  tA  V : DxˆA P EptXiuiPVq, xˆA  x¯Au
(5.7)
(iii) counterfactual variation in extent if it exhibits counterfactual variation but not
counterfactual variation in value only.
In Section 6.5 we will see that the entity set we propose in Section 5.3.5.2
exhibits all three of these phenomena. Next we turn our attention towards
choosing the right entity set from among all STPs.
5.3.5 The problem of identity
5.3.5.1 General considerations
Roughly, the problem of identity is the problem of determining which struc-
tures within a system form a (possibly) composite entity and which structures
don’t. We have already mentioned the maintenance of identity that we at-
tribute to gliders and other life-like systems in Section 5.3.3. Since we have
now decided on entities as subsets of STPs we can now look at identity more
closely.
We can also state the problem of identity formally.
Definition 72. Given a multivariate Markov chain tXiuiPV the problem of identity
is the problem of deciding on a particular entity set EptXiuiPVq.
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This trivial solution is akin to what is called “unrestricted mereological com-
position” in philosophy Gallois (2015). Every combination of spatial, tempo-
ral, and STPs is an entity (or object in the case of unrestricted mereological
composition). This includes all trajectories whether they are possible under
the mechanisms of the multivariate Markov chain or not.
However, our intuition is that some STPs are more entity-like than others.
We think that a glider or a block in the game of life is more of an entity than,
for example, half of a glider together with half a block far away in the grid.
We also think that a glider pattern at time t and together with the subsequent
glider pattern at time t   1 are more of an entity than the glider at time t
and the far away block at time t  1 taken together as one STP. Similarly, in
the real world we also see differences between the degrees to which certain
subsets of the world are entities. An animal’s leg together with the rest of
its body forms more of an entity than its leg together with part of a nearby
(or indeed far away) tree trunk. Living organisms account for a large number
of examples but also some non-biological structures at least seem like entities
e.g. hurricanes, tornadoes, etc., (soap) bubbles, and maybe human created
artefacts.
The question is then what makes some composite structures more “entity-
like” than others. An answer would be that there is a special relation that
holds between the parts of “entity-like” structures that does not hold (or holds
to a lesser degree) for other structures. In the case of STPs in multivariate
Markov chains we should then look for relations between the parts of the
STPs. Here, the different parts of STPs are related (or unrelated) due to the
dynamics of the system. These dynamics are defined via the mechanisms
of the multivariate Markov chain and generate the probability distribution
over the entire chain. In this sense the probability distribution over the chain
contains all information about relations between STPs (and their parts since
the parts are again STPs). This suggests using the probabilities to formulate a
quantitative condition, relation, or measure that given a STPs tells us in how
far it constitutes and entity.
5.3.5.2 Completely locally integrated STPs as entities
There are certainly multiple candidates for such a measure. It is beyond the
scope of this thesis to provide a systematic comparison between multiple such
candidates. We only propose complete local integration as on instance of such
a measure. The formal structure of complete local integration has been inves-
tigated in Chapter 4 and we provide examples of this structure in Chapter 6.
In future work we will investigate other identity measures and also plan to
try more axiomatic approaches. A starting point for an axiomatic approach
would be the questions raised in the philosophical discussion on location and
serology (Gilmore, 2014). One such question is whether entities should be
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allowed to overlap or interpenetrate4. Choosing an answer could be turned
into an axiom which might restrict the possible identity measures. However
here we only present some intuitions behind the first candidate for an identity
measure: complete local integration.
For this let us treat the problem of identity as a combination of
1. spatial identity and
2. temporal identity
for the moment. In the end we will propose a solution which makes no dis-
tinction between these two aspects. We note here that conceiving of entities
(or objects) as composite of spatial and temporal parts as we do in this thesis
is referred to as four-dimensionalism or perdurantism in philosophical discus-
sions (see e.g. Hawley, 2015). The opposing view holds that entities are spatial
and endure or persist over time. This view is called endurantism. Here we
will not go into the details of this discussion.
The main intuition behind complete local integration is that every part of
an entity should make every other part more probable.
This seems to hold for example for the spatial identity of living organisms.
Isolated parts of living organisms are rare compared to whole living organ-
isms. For example it is rare to see only an arm without the rest of a human
body attached compared to seeing an arm with the rest of a human body
attached. The body seems to make the existence of the arm more probable
and vice versa. This seems to hold for all living organisms but also for some
non-living structures. The best example of a non-living structure we know
of for which this is obvious are soap bubbles5. Half soap bubbles (or thirds,
quarters,...) only ever exist for split seconds whereas entire soap bubbles can
persist for up to minutes. Any part of a soap bubble seems to make the ex-
istence of the rest more probable. Similarly, parts of hurricanes or tornadoes
are rare. So what about spatial parts of structures that are not so entity-like?
As a crude approximation we can think about whether a monkey’s leg makes
a part of a tree trunk more probable/common (than the part of the tree trunk
is by itself). In fact there might be a slight increase of the probability of a
part of a tree trunk in the universe if there is a monkey’s leg in the universe.
However, surely the monkey’s leg has much more positive influence on the
probability of the existence of the rest of the monkey. Similarly, the part of
the tree trunk is more a part of the tree in this sense than of the monkey’s
leg. These arguments concerned the spatial identity problem. However, for
temporal identity similar arguments hold. The existence of a living organism
at one point in time makes it more probable that there is a living organism
(in the vicinity) at a subsequent (and preceding) point in time. If we look
at structures that are not entity-like with respect to the temporal dimension
we find a different situation. A part of a tree trunk at some instance of time
does not make the existence of a monkey’s leg at a subsequent instance much
4Note that in Section 5.5 we will also see that non-interpenetration of entities allows a uniquely
defined notion of perception. A uniquely defined notion of perception in the case of interpene-
trating entities still eludes us.
5We thank Eric Smith for pointing out this example.
110
more probable. It makes the existence of a tree at a subsequent instance much
more probable. So the part of the tree trunk seems to be more a temporal
instance/part of the tree than of the monkey’s leg. For STPs we can easily
formalise such intuitions. We required that for an entity every part of the
structure, which is now a STP xO, makes every other part more probable. A
part of a STP is a STP xb with b  O. If we require that every part of a STP




















We can interpret this form as requiring that for every possible partition pi P
L2pOq into two parts xb1 , xb2 the probability of the whole STP xO  pxb1 , xb2q
is bigger than its probability would be if the two parts were independent. To
see this, note that if the two parts xb1 , xb2 were independent we would have
pOpxOq : pb1,b2pxb1 , xb2q  pb1pxb1qpb2pxb2q. (5.12)





From this point of view the choice of bipartitions only seems arbitrary. For





seems to suggest that the STP xO is not an entity but instead composite of
three parts. We can therefore generalise Eq. (5.11) to include all partitions
LpOq (see Theorem 1) of O except the unit partition 1O (Definition 4). Then






This measure already results in the same entities as the measure we propose.
However, in order to connect with information theory, log-likelihoods, and
related literature we formally introduce the logarithm into this equation. For
this we use the definition of specific local integration mipipxOq of a STP xO






Then according to Definition 53 we can write the complete local integration




Finally, we can define ι-entities as those STPs that are completely locally inte-
grated.
Definition 73 (ι-entity). Given a multivariate Markov chain tXiuiPV a STP xO is a
ι-entity if
ιpxOq ¡ 0. (5.16)
The ι-entity-set EιptXiuiPVq is then defined as follows.
Definition 74 (ci-entity-set). Given a multivariate Markov chain tXiuiPV the ι-
entity-set is the entity-set
EιptXiuiPVq : txO P
¤
AV
XA : ιpxOq ¡ 0u. (5.17)
Note, that due to the disintegration theorem (Theorem 22) EιptXiuiPVq con-
tains the same elements as the union of the refinement-free disintegration hi-





5.3.5.3 Interpretations and relations
The notion of ι-entities can be interpreted in multiple ways. The introduction
of the logarithm into our formalism might seem arbitrary. However, it leads
to connections to other considerations especially in information theory and
inference. Here we list some of these connections.
• A first consequence of introducing the logarithm is that we can now
formulate the condition of Eq. (5.16) analogously to an old phrase at-
tributed to Aristotle that “the whole is more than the sum of its parts”.
In our case this would need to be changed to “the log-probability of the
(spatiotemporal) whole is greater than the sum of the log-probabilities of
its (spatiotemporal) parts”. This can easily be seen by rewriting Eq. (4.9)
as:




• Another side effect of using the logarithm is that we can interpret Eq. (5.16)
in terms of the surprise value (also called information content) log pOpxOq
MacKay (2003) of the STP xO and the surprise value of its parts with re-





p log pbpxbqq  p log pOpxOqq.
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Interpreting Eq. (5.16) from this perspective we can then say that a STP
is an entity if the sum of the surprise values of its parts is larger than
the surprise value of the whole.
• With respect to hypothesis testing, we can view the product probability±
bPpi pbpxbq with respect to partition pi as the probability of xO associ-
ated with the hypothesis that the parts xb are stochastically independent.





Similarly, we can view the joint probability pOpxOq as the probability of
xO under the hypothesis that the full joint probability is needed. Let us
write H1 for this hypothesis and define accordingly:
ppxO|H1q : pOpxOq. (5.21)
The occurrence of xO is then said to provide what is called the “weight
of evidence in favour of H1” (MacKay, 2003) defined by
log
ppxO|H1q
ppxO|Hpiq ¡ 0. (5.22)
So in this terminology a completely locally integrated STP xO provides
evidence in favour of H1 compared to each hypothesis Hpi , pi P LpOqz1
that supposes it is composite of stochastically independent parts.
• In coding theory, the Kraft-McMillan theorem (Cover and Thomas, 2006)
tells us that the optimal length (in a uniquely decodable binary code)
of a code word for an event x is lpxq   log ppxq if ppxq is the true
probability of x. If the encoding is not based on the true probability of
x but instead on a different probability qpxq then the difference between
the optimal code word length and the chosen code word length is




Then we can interpret the specific local integration as a difference in code
word lengths. Say we want to encode what occurs at the nodes/random
variables indexed by O i.e. we encode the random variable XV . We can
encode every event (now a STP) xO based on pOpxOq. Let’s call this the
joint code. Given a partition pi P LpOq we can also encode every event xO
based on its product probability
±
bPpiO pbpxbq. Let’s call this the product
code with respect to pi. For a particular event xO the difference of the code
word lengths between the joint code and the product code with respect
to pi is then just the specific local integration with respect to pi.
Complete local integration then requires that the joint code code word
is shorter than all possible product code code words. This means there
is no partition with respect to which the product code for the STP xO
has a shorter code word than the joint code. So entities are STPs that are
shorter to encode with the joint code than a product code.
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• We can relate our measure of identity to other measures in information
theory. For this we note that the expectation value of specific local in-
tegration with respect to a partition pi is the multi-information IpipXOq












The multi-information plays a role in measures of complexity and infor-
mation integration (Ay, 2015). The generalisation from bipartitions to
arbitrary partitions is applied to expectation values similar to the multi-
information above in Tononi (2004). The relations of our localised mea-
sure (in the sense of Lizier (2012)) to multi-information and information
integration measures also motivates the name specific local integration.
Relations to these measures will be studied further in the future. Here
we note that these are not suited for measuring identity of STPs since
they are properties of the random variables XO and not the values xO.
• Using the disintegration theorem (Theorem 22) results in yet another
point of view. The theorem states that for each trajectory xV P XV of a
multivariate Markov chain the refinement-free disintegration hierarchy
only contains completely integrated STPs i.e. it only contains ι-entities.
It also contains all ι-entities that occur in that trajectory. The disinte-
gration hierarchy is obtained by sorting the partitions pi P LpVq of the
trajectory xV according to increasing specific local integration mipipxVq
of xV . This results in the disintegration levels DipxVq with D1pxVq con-
taining the partitions with the least specific local integration. To get to
the refinement-free version of the disintegration hierarchy, we remove
all partitions from each level DipxVq that either have a refinement at
that level or have a refinement at a lower level DjpxVq with j   i. A
partition in the refinement-free disintegration hierarchy is always a min-
imal/finest partition (Definition 3) reaching such a low specific local
integration.
Each ι-entity is then a block xc with c P pi of a partition pi P DpxVq for
some trajectory xV P XV of the multivariate Markov chain.
Let us recruit the interpretation from coding theory above. If we want
to find the optimal encoding for the entire multivariate Markov chain
tXiuiPV this means finding the optimal encoding for the random variable
XV whose values are the trajectories xV P XV . The optimal code has the
code word lengths  log pVpxVq for each trajectory xV . The partitions in
the lowest level D1pxVq in the refinement-free disintegration hierarchy






is minimal among all partitions. At the same time these partitions are
the finest partitions that achieve this low specific local integration. This
implies on the one hand that the code word lengths of the product codes
associated to these partitions are the shortest possible for xV among all
partitions. On the other hand these partitions split up the trajectory in as
many parts as possible while generating these shortest code words. In
this combined sense the partitions in D1pxVq generate the “best” product
codes for the particular trajectory xV .






which is the more important measure for encoding in general, might
not be short at all. The product codes based on partitions in D1pxVq are
specifically adapted to assign a short code word to xV i.e. to a single tra-
jectory or story of this system. They are constructed/forced to describe
xV as a composition of stochastically independent parts. More precisely
they are constructed in the way that would be optimal for stochasti-
cally independent parts. The parts themselves are chosen to minimise
mipipxVq for xV .
Nonetheless, the product codes exist (they can be generated using Huff-
man coding or arithmetic coding Cover and Thomas (2006) based on
the product probability) and are uniquely decodable. What would they
be useful for? Say for some reason the trajectory xV is more important
than any other and that we want to “tell its story” as a story of as many
as possible (stochastically) independent parts (that are maybe not really
stochastically independent) i.e. we wanted to encode the trajectory as if
it were a combination of as many as possible stochastically independent
parts/events. And because xV is more important than all other trajecto-
ries we wanted the code word for xV to be the shortest possible. Then we
would use the product codes of partitions in the refinement-free disin-
tegration hierarchy because those combine exactly these two conditions.
The pseudo-stochastically-independent parts would then be the blocks
of these partitions which according to the disintegration theorem are
exactly the ι-entities occurring in xV .
On a very speculative note we mention that the trajectory/history that
we (real living humans) live in is more important to us than all other
possible trajectories of our universe (if there are any). What happens in
this trajectory needs to be communicated more often than what happens
in counterfactual trajectories. Furthermore a good reason to think of a
system as composite of as many parts as possible is that this reduces the
number of parameters that need to be learned which in turn improves
the learning speed (see e.g. Kolchinsky and Rocha, 2011). So the entities
that mankind has partitioned our history into might somehow serve a
purpose related to the product codes generated form partitions of the
refinement-free disintegration hierarchy of our universe.
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Recall that this kind of product code is not the optimal code in general
(which would be the one with shortest expected code word length). It is
possibly more of a naive code that does not require deep understanding
of the dynamical system but instead can be learned fast and works. The
language of physics for example might be more optimal in the sense of
shortest expected code word lengths reflecting a desire to communicate
efficiently about all counterfactual possibilities as well.
This concludes the motivation of our proposal to use completely locally inte-
grated patterns as entities in multivariate Markov chains. Next we will present
definitions of actions and perceptions.
5.4 Entity action
Here we define a concept of actions for a given entity set (Definition 65) in a
multivariate Markov chain. First we discuss some challenges that arise when
trying to define actions within such rigidly defined systems (Section 5.4.1).
Then we motivate our approach to actions (Section 5.4.2). In Section 5.4.3,
we finally present the formal definition of actions for entities in multivariate
Markov chains. Conceptually, this section is loosely related to our own publi-
cation Biehl and Polani (2015) but the formal setting is different. The formal
definition of actions in Section 5.4.3 to our knowledge is the first of its kind.
This is to say that it is the first formal definition of actions that is applicable to
individuals/entities within multivariate Markov chains (including dynamical
system, cellular automata etc.).
In order to avoid confusion we will refer to individuals whenever we speak
of entities that are not necessarily elements of an entity set in the techni-
cal sense of Definition 65. For example, we speak of animals as individuals
that can perform actions. This does not imply that there is another notion of
“individual” which needs to be defined. We argued in Section 5.3 that in the
context of multivariate Markov chains such individuals correspond to entities.
Outside of multivariate Markov chains we have not made such arguments and
therefore use the term individual here.
5.4.1 Contrast to more common conceptions
Paraphrasing Wilson and Shpall (2012) only slightly, what distinguishes ac-
tions among events or occurrences is that they do not merely happen to indi-
viduals but rather that they are made to happen by the individuals.
This is problematic in our setting where STPs (as entities) take the role
of individuals. What “happens” in a multivariate Markov chain are the tra-
jectories and the STPs occurring in them. The Markov chain’s dynamics are
determined by its mechanisms pj,t with j P J, t P T. These in turn determine
(possibly stochastically) what is going to happen anywhere within the chain.
All mechanisms at all time-steps are fixed by the definition of the Markov
chain and then cannot be altered anymore. If it is desired that mechanisms
change over time then this must be decided when defining the Markov chain.
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Since the occurrence of STPs is an effect of these fixed mechanisms the STP
cannot “make anything occur” within the chain. Just like the occurrence of
any STP up to time t is a consequence of the mechanisms so are the occur-
rences of STPs in the future of t. More formally, given any STP (be it an entity
or not) xA, its morph (see Definition 26) pVzA|ApXVzA|xAq is the probabil-
ity distribution over the rest possible states XVzA of the multivariate Markov
chain given that xA occurs. By definition this morph is determined uniquely
by the mechanisms of the chain. This means whatever “happens” beyond the
STP xA is already determined when the Markov chain is defined.
Therefore, it is impossible that a multivariate Markov chain contains an
STP or entity that can make something happen beyond what happens anyway
due to the mechanisms. This means we have to explain and define actions in
a different way.
Before we go on we should note that many accounts of actions require the
actions to be in the interest of some goal or to serve some purpose (Wilson
and Shpall, 2012). In accordance with our working definition we view goal-
directedness as a separate phenomenon and will not follow the practice of
requiring such for actions themselves. In our case an entity with actions will
be considered goal-directed if its actions are goal-directed in some sense.
After these comments on what we cannot do and what we choose not to
do we will now motivate our own approach. First, we give some background
and observations about actions that motivate our definition. Then we present
the main ideas behind it and finally state the definition.
5.4.2 Background to our concept of actions
We can make two observations about the common (human) usage of the term
action. The first is that events called actions are usually attributed to a limited
or bounded region or part of the universe e.g. the body of a living organism or
sometimes just its brain if it has one. These parts usually contain mechanisms
or configurations of matter that are either
• not directly observable to a human observer e.g. hidden in an opaque
container, or
• not well understood by the human observer, or
• both.
These factors inevitably lead to unpredictability of such events. In other
words, events that are attributed to well understood and therefore predictable
mechanisms, e.g. sunrises, are not considered actions.
Let us consider the above more closely. Historically, actions (agency) have
been attributed to more things than just animals or living systems (or robots).
An example of this is the attribution of natural phenomena like thunder and
lightning to divine interventions in Rome in 50 BCE which was criticised by
Lucretius (2007). Lightning in particular was often seen as a goal-directed ac-
tion by the god Zeus; the goal being to punish humans. Later, in the 19th cen-
tury Nietzsche (1892, pp.26) criticised the separation of “the lightning” (der
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Blitz) as a subject and the flashing light (das Leuchten) as its action (Thun).
It is notable that as science progressed it was able to explain more and more
phenomena without divine (or any other) interventions and without reference
to any actions (or goal-directedness) at all 6. Also note that, the mechanics be-
hind lightning and thunder were difficult to understand before technological
and scientific advances and still are difficult to observe as they are due to
electrodynamics (and happen in places that are hard to access).
Nowadays we have a mechanistic account and events like thunder and
lightning are hardly considered more special than an apple falling to the
ground because of gravity. Actions do remain to be attributed to animals
of course. Most prominently to humans and their nervous systems. These
systems coincide with the most complex known parts of the known universe
i.e. those parts that are extremely hard to understand . From our point of view
this is not a coincidence. It is the complexity and opacity of these mechanisms
that make us attribute actions to them. If we would have the sensory and com-
putational capacity to watch and keep track of the dynamics of entire brains,
we believe that it would look to us again like an apple falling to the ground.
From this point of view actions are not, beyond their possibly complex and
unobserved origin, special events but may appear as such to observers that
lack the sensory and computational capacity to resolve or understand them.
This suggests that for actions to occur within a system there needs to be both
observers and corresponding mechanisms that exceed the capacity of those
observers to resolve them i.e. see them as mere consequences of the dynami-
cal law. Note that the observers might themselves be such opaque mechanisms
for other observers and for themselves.
There may be a possibility to define actions in a fundamental way without
the need to define observers first. Say there are events within the universe
which are as a matter of principle not distinguished by any observer. Then
events occurring as a consequence of these events will be inexplicable for any
observer. So these events will appear to be actions in general. This is the route
we take below. Note that this approach remains compatible with an observer-
dependent notion of actions. The “fundamental” actions are apparent actions
for every possible observer while other events are actions for some observers
and “plainly” predictable events for others.
What we have ignored in this discussion up to now is the role of random-
ness. True randomness (in the sense of stochastic independence of the event
from any other event in the universe), if it exists in a universe, can never be
explained, predicted, or understood. Combined with our reasoning above this
suggests that all random events are actions and even fundamental actions in
the sense that no observer could possibly resolve the different events that lead
to the random events just because there are no different events that lead to a
random event. The random event happens independently of everything else.
This is also the reason why we would not like to see random events as actions.
They are not the result of some indistinguishable but in-system events. Even
6The term “action” in the “principle of least action” plays a major role in physics. However, this
principle is used to determine trajectories of dynamical systems and has no relation to possible
actions performed by parts of the system. It is therefore ignored in the discussion here.
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an all-observing being external to the universe could not predict them from
the internals.
One way to avoid random events being mistaken for actions would then be
to require that external observers, which are not limited by the restrictions on
observability for internal observers, can predict the action events from other
events that are internally unobservable. Note that this could be seen as the
adaptation to our setting of the widely accepted view that actions are initi-
ated by the agent (e.g. Schlosser, 2015). In our definition of actions we do
not explicitly require this. Instead, the burden to avoid the random events
from being mistaken for actions is put on the choice of the entity set. In
our conception of actions, actions can only be performed by entities, more
precisely they can only occur as parts of larger entities. Intuitively entities
are spatiotemporal-patterns whose parts are in some way connected to each
other. Random events (stochastically independent from all other events) are
therefore not expected to be parts of entities. If the entities in a given entity-
set do not contain parts that are random events an explicit requirement of
predictability is not needed. Note that, according to trivial definitions of en-
tities (like the unrestricted mereological composition of Section 5.3.5) random
events may be parts of larger entities. In that case we expect non-intuitive
consequences anyway.
5.4.3 Definition of actions for entities
When we want to define actions for entities the first issue we run into is that
entities are already fixed STPs. They may or may not have “acted” within a
trajectory that they occur in but once we have the entity its “story” is fixed.
In order to define actions we therefore look at the sequence of time-slices of
an entity and investigate what “could have happened”. In the end, whenever
there are counterfactual entities that could have taken the place of the entity
without changes in the rest of the system and then went on a different path
we will say that an action occurred.
In more detail, first note that an action always requires the possibility of
an alternative action. However, as argued before, a single entity xA occurring
in trajectory xV has no alternative options since the trajectory determines ev-
erything. Therefore for an action of entity xA in trajectory xV we require the
existence of alternative/counterfactual entity yB in another trajectory yV . For
an action to occur at time t
• the entities xA and yB must occupy the same random variables at t i.e.
At  Bt,
• the time-slices xvt and yVt at t of the two trajectories must coincide every-
where apart from the random variables that are occupied by the entities
i.e. xVtzAt  yVtzAt .
It is then impossible that any observer that is in the “environment” xVtzAt of
the entities can distinguish the entities because the states of all such observers
are identical in both trajectories. For an action to occur the two identities must
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then differ at time t  1. We define the environment of a STP here for further
use.
Definition 75 (Environment of an STP). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov
chain with V  J  T and let xA be a STP. Then the environment of xA at time t is
the spatial pattern xVtzAt .
As mentioned before we do not require that the difference at time t  1 is
predictable from the entities during the interval. Such relations between parts
of entities, if desired, must be imposed by the choice of the entity set.
This construction may lead to the following question. According to this
definition actions rely on counterfactual trajectories. However, actions as com-
monly understood occur all the time within the single history/trajectory that
we are experiencing. Since nobody has ever experienced two alternative tra-
jectories of our universe the question is how can this concept play a role in our
conception of the world? The answer to this is that the existence of actions
as we defined them will force conceptions or models of the world to incor-
porate them. Let us assume that humans model the universe they exist in
to some degree. According to the indistinguishability requirement whenever
there is an action by another entity this model will lack the data to distinguish
which act will occur. In such situations it should be prepared for both acts,
i.e. it should model both acts. So the counterfactual trajectory of the universe
becomes relevant for individuals modelling their environment/world.
Another question may concern the effect of actions according to this def-
inition. We have not required that the actions i.e. the different time-slices of
the counterfactual entities at time t  1 are distinguished by any “observer”.
While such requirements may be possible we make no such requirement here.
Our definition of actions is deliberately weak. As mentioned before it is the
entity set that we see as selective. In the future further notions of actions will
be investigated.
We now state the definition of an action of an entity at a time t in a partic-
ular trajectory formally.
Definition 76 (Action and co-action of an entity). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate
Markov chain with V  J  T and let xV P XV with pVpxVq ¡ 0. Also let xA be
an entity with non-empty time-slices at t, t  1. Then xA performs an action xAt 1
at time t in trajectory xV if there exists an entity yB with non-empty time-slices at
t, t  1 such that
(i) yB occurs in yV  xV with pVpyVq ¡ 0,
(ii) at t the entities xA and yB occupy the same random variables: Bt  At,
(iii) at t the trajectories xV and yV are otherwise identical: xVtzAt  yVtzAt ,
(iv) at t  1 the entities are different: xAt 1  yBt 1 .
We also call yB a co-action entity, yV a co-action trajectory, and yBt 1 a co-action.
Remark:
• Note that all requirements are symmetric. Therefore, if xA performs an
action xAt 1 at time t in trajectory xV then also yB performs an action
yBt 1 at time t in trajectory yV . This motivates our terminology of co-
actions.
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• The notion of co-action entities can easily be extended to more than one
co-action entity. We only have to make sure that all entities in a set of
co-action entities are mutually different at t  1.
• A further requirement that we could make here would be that yB does
not occur in xV . This is not excluded in this definition. At time t the
two entities can in principle be equal xAt  yBt . At t  1 we could have
At 1X Bt 1  H so that even if xAt 1  yBt 1 we can have xBt 1  yBt 1 .
This requires that entities can be identical at some time t and then dif-
ferent at some time t  1. We do not exclude this possibility here. It is
an interesting question for further research at what level such situations
should be prevented (if it should be prevented). It could be introduced
as an axiom for entity sets which corresponds to prohibiting interpen-
etration of entities. However, it could also be a selective criterion for
specific dynamics of the multivariate Markov chain. One could imag-
ine that there is a set of dynamics obeying a certain conservation law
that prevents interpenetration. The notion of ι-entities does not prevent
interpenetration as we see in Section 6.5.
• It is easy to generalise the definition of actions to situations where xA
and yB must occupy the same variables for an interval of time rtm : ts
before the action. In that case, the environment xVrtm:tszArtm:ts must
also be identical during this interval.
The condition that the two acting entities differ at time t  1 can be fulfilled
in two ways. The entities can differ in this time-slice in value or in extent.
Definition 77 (Value and extent actions). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov
chain with V  J  T. If xA performs an action xAt 1 at time t in trajectory xV and
yBt 1 is its co-action we can distinguish two special cases of actions:
(i) if the actions differ in extent i.e. we have
At 1  Bt 1 (5.28)
then we call these actions extent actions.
(ii) if the actions differ only in value i.e. we have
At 1  Bt 1 (5.29)
so that
xAt 1  yAt 1 . (5.30)
then we call these actions value actions.
Remarks:
• Value actions are a particularly weak notion of action in some sense.
Since we define the action only as a difference to the co-action. The en-
vironment (or the entire future) may stay unaffected by such an “action”.
The entire morph can be identical for such actions i.e.
pVzAt 1pXVzAt 1 |xAt 1q  pVzAt 1pXVzAt 1 |yAt 1q. (5.31)
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Note that the extent actions always have an effect since they change
the random variables that are part of the entity. Formally, the morphs
of two different extent actions are always different because they range
over different variables. Stronger definitions of value and extent actions
which require for example that the environments change or that their
morphs differ in particular respects are also possible and may have their
own merits. However, an investigation of different definitions is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
The difference between value actions and extent actions is made possible
due to our definition of entities as STPs. We have argued in Section 5.3.3
that entities should vary counterfactually in value and extent. An intriguing
question for the future is whether the capabilities of agents to act both in value
and extent are truly superior to agents that only act in value. With regard to
the theory of computation in distributed systems by Lizier et al. (2014) one
can also ask whether there are computational advantages to either. As we will
see in Section 5.6 probabilistic and information theoretic expressions are easy
to formulate for actions in value only. However, for actions in extent this has
not been done yet.
5.5 Entity perception
In this section we formally define perception for entities in multivariate Markov
chains. We make no distinction here between perception, experience, and sen-
sory input. In the tradition of modelling agent-environment systems using
dynamical systems or their probabilistic generalisations stochastic processes
we define perception as all effects that the environment has on an individ-
ual/agent (Beer, 1995). In contrast to previous work along this line the indi-
viduals are not modelled as a dynamical system coupled to the environment
(Beer, 1995; Der et al., 1999; Ay et al., 2012) or a stochastic process interaction
with another one (Klyubin et al., 2004; Lungarella et al., 2005; Bertschinger
et al., 2008; Seth, 2010; Ay et al., 2012). In our case the individuals are entities
i.e. special kinds of STPs. In order to define perception we therefore have to
capture all effects of the environment on entities or if we focus on perception
of a single entity all effects on that entity.
Thinking about this we run into a similar problem as with the actions. An
entity is already a fixed STP that contains all influence that it may have been
subjected to. It is in this sense the result of influence (or no influences) from
its surroundings. In order to investigate these influences we therefore have to
deconstruct the entity and see how it was “formed” by external influences /
perceptions time-slice by time-slice.
The idea here is to use the same (or a similar) construction as in the extrac-
tion of sensor-values for the extended perception-action loop in Section 3.3.6.
As we have seen there this construction of sensor-values captured all influ-
ences of the environment process on the agent process. This was established
by showing that the dependence on the environment can be replaced by the
dependence on the sensor-values without changing the agent or environment
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processes. So whatever influence the environment process has on the agent
process, this influence is contained in the sensor-values. Underlying this con-
struction is the classification of the environment into classes that have identical
influence on the transition of the agent process from on time-step to the next.
More precisely, the sensor-values of the extended perception-action loop are
constructed as equivalence classes of environments with respect to the con-
ditional probability distributions pMt 1p.|mt, etq : Mt 1 Ñ r0, 1s. We defined
that two environments eˆt, e¯t P Et at time t are produce the same perception /
sensor value if they induce the same conditional probability distribution over
the agent’s next time-step:
eˆt et e¯t ô @mt 1 PMt 1, mt PMt : pMt 1pmt 1|mt, eˆtq  pMt 1pmt 1|mt, e¯tq.
(3.71 revisited)
Here et is the partition induced by this equivalence relation. In this section we
are interested in defining the influence of the environment on an entity. This
will require a generalisation of Eq. (3.71) which involves some subtleties.
Before we present the generalisation let us look at a simple example of the
standard construction. This will lead to a better intuition for our concept of
perception.
5.5.1 Example of perception in the perception-action loop
Say we have a binary agent process Mt  tm1t , m2t u and a ternary environ-
ment process Et  te1t , e2t , e3t u. For a given fixed value mt P Mt of the agent
memory at t each environment value et P Et then has an associated conditional






t , mtq q 1 q
pMt 1p.|e
2
t , mtq r 1 r
pMt 1p.|e
3
t , mtq s 1 s
(5.32)
where q, r, s P r0, 1s. First, assume q  r  s. We then have for all mt 1 PMt 1
pMt 1pmt 1|mt, e
1
t q  pMt 1pmt 1|mt, e
2
t q  pMt 1pmt 1|mt, e
3
t q. (5.33)
Since we are eventually interested in fixed realisations of entities (and not in
random variables), we here drop the requirement of Eq. (3.71) that Eq. (5.33)
needs to hold for all m¯t P Mt and consider the equivalence classes that are










t uu. So all envi-
ronments have the same influence on the next agent state mt 1 given mt. Or,
equivalently, given mt, no differences in the environment make a difference
to mt 1. Since we equate influence with perception here, we interpret this as
saying that no perception occurs in the transitions from mt into Mt 1.
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t uu containing two
blocks. This means that e1t and e
2
t influence the transition from mt into Mt 1
in the same way while e3t has a different influence. We then say that in the
transition from mt into Mt 1 there are two perceptions/sensor values corre-
sponding to the two blocks of et. Note that while we have perception in this
transition the perception is not perfect. It cannot distinguish between e1t and
e2t .





three blocks and fully resolving the environment. This means each environ-
ment influences the transition from mt into Mt 1 differently. We then have
three different perceptions in the transition from mt into Mt 1 resolving the
environment states fully.
So our notion of perception employs differences in the influence of envi-
ronments on transitions from a value mt to its possible successors Mt 1 to
classify the environments. For entities we will try to use the same approach
with some necessary generalisations. for this it is also helpful to note the
following.
Instead of only considering the next time-step note that we can also use
the next two time-steps (or any number r P rt  1 : n 1s of next time-steps7,
where n 1 is the last time-step in T) in the same way to partition the envi-
ronment. For example if we consider the next two time-steps t  1, t  2 we
can define the equivalence classes of environments via:
eˆt e2t e¯t
ô @mt 1 PMt 1, mt PMt :
pMt 1,Mt 2pmt 1, mt 2|mt, eˆtq  pMt 1,Mt 2pmt 1, mt 2|mt, e¯tq.
(5.35)





pMt 1,Mt 2pmt 1, mt 2|mt, etq (5.36)
such that all environments eˆt, e¯t P Et that are in distinct blocks of et i.e. those
with
pMt 1pmt 1|mt, eˆtq  pMt 1pmt 1|mt, e¯tq (5.37)
are also in distinct blocks of e2t because Eqs. (5.36) and (5.37) imply
pMt 1,Mt 2pmt 1, mt 2|mt, eˆtq  pMt 1,Mt 2pmt 1, mt 2|mt, e¯tq. (5.38)
The more time-steps into the future we consider the finer the induced partition
of the environment. Conversely, the partition of the environment obtained
by considering only one next time-step is a coarsening of those obtained by
considering more time-steps.
7In fact the same construction can be used with any subset of the future times rt  1 : n 1s.
We will not pursue this generalisation further in this thesis.
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5.5.2 Steps to get perception for entities
In order to get a notion of perception for entities that is similar to the notion
of perception based on influence that we used for the perception-action loop
the intuition is then simply
• “take an entity at time t” (analogous to mt ),
• get the “possible next time-slices of this entity” at t   1 (analogous to
Mt 1 above),
• obtain “the” conditional probability distribution over these “next time-
slices” given the current one and the environment (analogous to pMt 1p.|mt, etq)
• classify the environments according to their influence on the transitions
to these “next time-slices”.
There are, however, multiple problems which complicate the formal definition
of the required notions. Some more obvious ones are listed next. We discuss
them and more subtle ones in more detail in the subsequent sections.
1. An entity at time t is either a spatial entity (no temporal extension) or it
is a time-slice of an entity. If it is a spatial entity then it has no “next-
time slice”. If it is a time-slice we are not “taking” the entire entity. If we
take the entire entity then it comes with possibly long past and future
extension. It can also have a past and an empty next time-slice.
2. Related to the previous point is another problem. Assuming an entity
that has future extension i.e. the next-time slice is not empty, then there
are no other “possible next time-slices of the entity”. As mentioned
before the entity is defined in its entirety. Accordingly the next time-
slice of an entity (not only if it is empty) is uniquely defined just like its
entire future.
3. Assuming we have obtained some “next time-slices” in a reasonable way,
these may not be mutually exclusive and exhaustive unlike the values
mt 1 PMt 1. This means multiple next time-slices can occur together (if
they are not mutually exclusive) or none of the next time-slices occurs (if
they are not exhaustive). This makes the construction of the conditional
probability distribution complicated.
It turns out that the steps to get a generalisation of perception for entities
are more clearly presented in a slightly different order. The overarching goal
remains the construction of a conditional probability distribution that gener-
alises pMt 1p.|mt, etq : Mt 1 Ñ r0, 1s. The steps we take in the next sections
are then:
• Define entities with identical pasts up to t as analogues of “an entity at
time t”. These are the co-perception entities.
• Define the entire futures of the co-perception entities as the proto-analogues
of “possible next time-slices of the entity” and only later focus on the ac-
tual next time-slices of these entities via the “branching partition”.
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• Devise a way to deal with the problems of non-exhaustion on the level
of the entire futures of entities. To define the conditional probability dis-
tribution we need an exhaustive set of possible outcomes/futures since
the sum over the possible outcomes must equal one.
• Restrict the environments that can be classified by perception to those
that can co-occur with the entities.
• Deal with the problem of mutual exclusion of entity futures, which can
be done by a further assumption of non-interpenetration of entities. We
will see that, to define the conditional probability distribution, we need
a mutually-exclusive set of possible outcomes/futures.
• Partition all co-perception entities into blocks (called branches) of enti-
ties with identical next time-slices since co-perception entities may differ
at even later times only. This partition is called the branching-partition.
The final conditional probability distribution over “next time-slices” will
then be over the branches of his partition.
• The environments are then classified according to the conditional prob-
ability distribution over the branches.
5.5.3 Co-perception entities
We first discuss the problem that entities have unique next time-slices and
therefore the set of “possible next time-slices” only contains a single time-
slice. This will be resolved by using the “co-perception entities” in order to
provide a set of possible next time-slices. These do not come from the same
entity but from the co-perception entities. Here we motivate and discuss these
entities.
First note that any part of an entity xA (which is a STP) can also be a part
of another entity yB. This means that AX B  H and xAXB  yAXB. Therefore
we can also have entities xA, yB that are identical at some time t, i.e.
xAt  yBt . (5.39)
These can in general have different next time-slices. The next time-slices of all
entities that are equal to xA at time t (where xAt is not empty) are then a first
candidate for the conditional probability distribution to range over.
Note however that these entities can also have different pasts. Since we
want to define the perception of a single entity we therefore only consider
entities that are identical up to some time t, i.e.
xA¨t  yB¨t . (5.40)
The set of entities with identical pasts up to time t can be interpreted as the
set of entities that are the most like xA up to t. These are different entities but
they only differ in the future. Their futures (including their next time-slices)
are therefore a close analogue to the “possible next time-slices of the entity”.
To make sure however that the entities have a next time-slice we also require
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that they have non-empty next time-slice. These requirements together define
the notion of the co-perception entities of an entity xA at time t. These are entities
that also perceive something (maybe the same thing) at t (in their trajectories)
if xA perceives something at t.
Definition 78 (Co-perception entities of an entity at t). Let tXiuiPV be a mul-
tivariate Markov chain with V  J  T and entity set E. Let xA P E be an entity
with non-empty time-slices at t and t  1. The set of co-perception entities SpxA, tq
of entity xA at t is the set of entities with non-empty time-slices at t and t  1, and
that are identical up to t:
SpxA, tq : tyB P E : Bt, Bt 1  H, yB¨t  xA¨tu. (5.41)
As mentioned before the time-slices at t   1 of the co-perception entities
SpxA, tq provide an analogue of the “possible next time-slices of the entity
xA”. The next step would then be to define a conditional probability distri-
bution over this set given the past xA¨t of the entity and any environment
xVtzAt at t. Instead of only looking at the next time-slices at t  1 we can also
consider the whole future t   rt  1 : n 1s (n 1 is the last time-step in
T) of the co-perception entities. As we have indicated in Section 5.5.1 if we
define the conditional probability distribution over the whole futures we will
obtain a finer classification of the environments. We can then still refocus on
the next time-slice afterwards. This general viewpoint is also more suitable
for the formal development of the theory.
In order to discuss the associated problems we consider the special case of
a set of co-perception entities that contains only two entities quite thoroughly.
So assume that there are only two co-perception entities (including xA itself)
i.e. SpxA, tq  txA, yBu.
Apart from the conditions on co-perception entities (Definition 78) the en-
tities in SpxA, tq are arbitrary STPs since we are trying to define perception
for arbitrary entity sets.
Still we can note that since txA, yBu forms a set the two entities are not
equal
xA  yB (5.42)
and since xA¨t  yB¨t (due to Definition 78) we then know that
xAt   yBt  . (5.43)
But we do not know at which time-slices they differ. For example they could
be equal at t  1 or any other particular future time-step t  r with r P r1, n
1 ts (at the last time step n 1 of the multivariate Markov chain there is no
perception since there is no future). For the next time-slices xAt 1 and yBt 1 of
xA and yB we have the extra condition that they are non-empty, i.e.
At 1 XVt 1  H (5.44)
and
Bt 1 XVt 1  H. (5.45)
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Apart from this, the entities in SpxA, tq are completely arbitrary. For the fol-
lowing it is important to keep the possible relations between the time-slices of
entities in SpxA, tq in mind. We therefore take a look at these possible relations
as well as their implications for the co-occurrence (i.e. the joint probabilities)
of the time-slices. The time-slices can occupy the same random variables and
have the same values (i.e. be identical), occupy the same random variables
and have different values, occupy partly the same random variables and have
the same values at the random variables in the intersection, occupy partly the
same random variables and have the different values at the random variables
in the intersection, and occupy only different random variables. Formally,
for the time-slices xAt r and yBt r of xA and yB we can have the following
situations:
1. At r  Bt r and xAt r  yBt r ,
2. At r  Bt r and xAt r  yBt r ,
3. At r  Bt r, At r X Bt r  H and xAt rXBt r  yAt rXBt r ,
4. At r  Bt r, At r X Bt r  H and xAt rXBt r  yAt rXBt r ,
5. At r X Bt r  H.
So in general we have to write the probability that both of the time-slices occur
(given8 an arbitrary environment xVtzAt and the identical past xA¨t ) as:
PrpXAt r  xAt r , XBt r  yBt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq (5.46)
PrpXAt rzBt r  xAt rzBt r , XAt rXBt r  xAt rXBt r ,
XAt rXBt r  yAt rXBt r , XBt rzAt r  yBt rzAt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq
(5.47)
δxAt rXBt r pyAt rXBt rqPrpXAt rzBt r  xAt rzBt r ,
XAt rXBt r  xAt rXBt r ,
XBt rzAt r  yBt rzAt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq
(5.48)
δxAt rXBt r pyAt rXBt rq
pAt rYBt rpxAt rzBt r , xAt rXBt r , yBt rzAt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq
(5.49)
Consequently the five situation above imply the following for the proba-
bility of co-occurrence:
1. At r  Bt r and xAt r  yBt r implies
PrpXAt r  xAt r , XBt r  yBt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq pAt rpxAt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq
(5.50)
pBt rpyBt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq.
(5.51)
8This conditioning can also be removed in the following calculation. However, since we are
only interested in probabilities under these conditions in this section we keep it.
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2. At r  Bt r and xAt r  yBt r implies:
PrpXAt r  xAt r , XBt r  yBt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq  0 (5.52)
3. At r  Bt r, At r X Bt r  H and xAt rXBt r  yAt rXBt r implies
PrpXAt r  xAt r , XBt r  yBt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq (5.53)
 pAt rYBt rpxAt rzBt r , xAt rXBt r , yBt rzAt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq (5.54)
4. At r  Bt r, At r X Bt r  H and xAt rXBt r  yAt rXBt r implies
PrpXAt r  xAt r , XBt r  yBt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq  0 (5.55)
5. At r X Bt r  H implies
PrpXAt r  xAt r , XBt r  yBt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq (5.56)
 pAt r ,Bt rpxAt r , yBt r |xVtzAt , xA¨tq. (5.57)
5.5.4 The problems of exhaustion and mutual-exclusion
In order to define our notion of perception we need to define a suitable con-
ditional probability distribution over the next time-slices or the futures of the
co-perception entities SpxA, tq. Intuitively, we want to know with what prob-
ability which entity occurs at the next time-slice in order to classify the en-
vironments accordingly. We are then only interested in cases where one of
the co-perception entities’ (non-empty) futures actually occurs. Other situa-
tions should not be taken into consideration since they do not concern the
co-perception entities. However, in general it is possible that none of the co-
perception entities occurs. This also poses a formal problem since the proba-
bility distribution should range over a set of possible outcomes such that one
of them always occurs i.e. the sum over the probabilities of all outcomes must
be one. In other words the outcomes must be exhaustive. Another require-
ment is that the outcomes are mutually exclusive, i.e. only one (and with the
previous requirement exactly one) of the outcomes occurs. This property is
also not satisfied in general for co-perception entities. In the following we
will take a short look at how to construct a probability distribution over a set
of events that is not exhaustive. This construction will also require that the
events are mutually exclusive. The construction is basically elementary and
well known probability theory. We expose it here in some detail to show why
we require mutual exclusion and exhaustion and how these requirements are
implicit in the perception-action loop.
Consider again the simple case where SpxA, tq  txA, yBu. From the mul-
tivariate Markov chain we know the probabilities for each of them given the
identical past and the environment i.e. we know
q : pAt pxAt  |xVtzAt , xA¨tq (5.58)
and
r : pBt pyBt  |xVtzAt , xA¨tq. (5.59)
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It is not guaranteed that any of the two STPs will occur. It is generally guar-
anteed if At   Bt  and XAt  can only take these two values i.e. XAt  
txAt  , yAt u or at least if for all zAt  P XAt  and environments xVtzAt we have
pAt pzAt  |xVtzAt , xA¨tq  0. (5.60)
In all other cases the random variables with indices in At  Y Bt  can take
values that lead to neither xAt  nor yBt  occurring.
9
In order to state the property of exhaustiveness formally we first define
a notation for the probability that one or more elements of a set txkAkukPI of
STPs occurs. We here stop conditioning on xVtzAt , xA¨t here for readability.
Conditioning all following probabilities does not interfere with the argument.
Definition 79. Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain with V  J  T also let


















Where T pxkAkq is the set of trajectories that xkAk occurs in (Definition 19).
Then we define that a set of STPs C is exhaustive if the probability that one
or more of them occur is one.
Definition 80 (Exhaustiveness of a set of STPs). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate







Else, we call C non-exhaustive.
Remark:
• It is important to note that for any subset A  V of V the set XA is an
exhaustive set of STPs. An example we have seen in Section 5.5.1 before
is the set Mt 1 of possible next values of the agent-process. An example
we will encounter later in Section 5.6 is Mt , the set of possible futures
starting from time t  1 of the agent process in a perception action loop.
Since there is no guarantee that the set SpxA, tq of co-perception entities is
exhaustive, the question is how to construct a (conditional) probability distri-
bution over a set of non-exhaustive STPs. The standard approach is to use the






9For example if we let Ct  : At  Y Bt  and define zCt  in such a way that it differs from
both xAt  and yBt  i.e. there exist nodes i P At , j P Bt  (possibly with i  j) such that zi  xi
and zj  yj. Then if pCt  pzCt  |xVtzAt , xA¨t q ¡ 0 we have q  r   1.
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With this we can define the probability of any single STP xkAk P C given that
one or more of the STPs in a non-exhaustive set C occur. At least as long as






we can replace F Ñ

C and E Ñ tXAk  x
k





































































While conditioning on C guarantees that one of the STPs xkAk occurs it still
does not necessarily result in a probability distribution since the sum over all





















However, if the STPs in C are mutually exclusive this changes.
Definition 81 (Mutual exclusion). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain
with V  J  T also let C  txkAkukPI be a set of STPs. We say that C is a set of
mutually exclusive STPs if for all k, l P I we have
PrpXAk  x
k
Ak , XAl  x
l
Al q  0. (5.73)
Remark:
• It is important to note that for any subset A  V of V the set XA is
a mutually exclusive set of STPs. Both Mt 1 and Mt  of the agent
process in a perception action loop are examples of this.








































in our usual notation. Then the above defines a probability for each element
of the set C or equivalently for each index k P I. We can then define the









In summary, if we have a set C of non-exhaustive but mutually exclusive STPs
we now know how to define a probability distribution over them. For refer-
ence we put this in a theorem.10
Theorem 35 (Probability distribution construction for non-exhaustive but mu-
tually exclusive sets of STPs). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain with
V  J  T also let C  txkAkukPI be a set of STPs. If C is mutually exclusive (not




Al q ¡ 0 (5.78)









For convenience we also write this as a probability distribution over an index set of
S:
pCpkq : pCpxkAkq. (5.80)












follows from mutual exclusion. This is straightforward but tedious. The idea
is that since the probability of all intersections of the sets of trajectories T pxkAkq
vanishes (due to mutual exclusion) we get the same result as if all T pxkAkq
were disjoint. The probability of a union of disjoint sets is the sum over the
probabilities of the sets.
10This is not an original theorem of this thesis. We presented the preceding arguments since
they help to understand subsequent notions.
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For the previous example of a simple co-perception set SpxA, tq  txA, yBu
this means that if they are mutually exclusive i.e.
PrpXAt   xAt  , XBt   yBt  |xVtzAt , xA¨tq  0 (5.82)
and at least one of their conditional probabilities is positive i.e.
q  r ¡ 0 (5.83)
we can write x1A1 : xA and x
2
A2  yB, and b P t1, 2u to get a conditional
probability distribution11

















With such a conditional probability distribution we can define perception
in basically the same way as for the perception-action loop.
5.5.5 Co-perception environments
Equation (5.84) is already a step towards entity perception since it is a condi-
tional probability distribution over futures of (co-perception) entities i.e. over
things already quite similar to “next time-slices of the entity”. There are two
remaining problems however. The construction of the conditional probability
distribution relies on Theorem 35. For this to apply we need mutual exclusion
of the STPs (in this case the co-perception entities) and we need Eq. (5.78) to
hold. In general the set of co-perception entities SpxA, tq is not mutually exclu-
sive. This will be discussed further in Section 5.5.6. In this section we discuss
the second problem. Our solution may seem like it includes a strong require-
ment on the environments. We then show that this requirement is implicit in
the perception-action loop as well.
The second problem is the condition of Eq. (5.78) which in the case of co-
perception entities concerns the sum over the probabilities of the next time-





|xVtzAt , xA¨tq. (5.86)
This is not necessarily greater than zero for all environments xVtzAt P XVtzAt .
In fact if





|xVtzAt , xA¨tq (5.88)
11Since all probabilities involved are conditioned on the same STPs the above argument and
Theorem 35 hold equally for conditional probabilities.
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is not even defined. To be able to use Theorem 35 we must therefore require
of environments xVtzAt that can be classified that
pVt ,A¨tpxVtzAt , xA¨tq ¡ 0 (5.89)
and that there is at least one element xk
Akt 




, xVtzAt , xA¨tq ¡ 0 (5.90)
We can summarise these two conditions as the condition that there exists
xkAk P SpxA, tq with
pAk ,Vtpx
k
Ak , xVtzAtq ¡ 0 (5.91)
where we used that Ak
¨t  A¨t. We can also get rid of the need for the
existence quantifier by writing this condition as:
Pr
¤
SpxA, tq X tXVtzAt  xVtzAtu
	
¡ 0. (5.92)
We call the subset of such environments the co-perception environments.
Definition 82 (Co-perception environments). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov
chain with V  J T and entity set E. Let xA P E be an entity with non-empty time-
slices at t and t  1 and SpxA, tq its co-perception entities. Then define the associated
co-perception environments XSVtzAt  XVtzAt by
XSVtzAt : tx¯VtzAt P XVtzAt : DyB P SpxA, tq, pB,VtzAtpyB, x¯VtzAtq ¡ 0u. (5.93)
Remark:
• The co-perception environments of a co-perception set SpxA, tq are then
the spatial patterns XVtzAt at t that can co-occur with at least one co-
perception environment.
It may seem like a (too) strong requirement that the co-perception environ-
ments are compatible with an entire entity including its (entire) future. This
also seems strange from a causal perspective. One way to interpret this is
to say that the co-perception environments are just the environments that are
ever going to be classified by an entity. Whenever an environment that is not
in XSVtzAt occurs at t together with the identical past xA¨t there will not be
any perception since no entity with the identical past will be there at t   1.
Whenever there is an entity with the identical past at t  1 the environment is
in XSVtzAt .
At the same time this assumption is also implicit in the perception-action
loop. Say (as is the case in the perception-action loop) the futures of the co-
perception entities are just the possible values of a set C of random variables
i.e. if there exists C  Vt  such that
SpxA, tqt  : tyBt  : yB P SpxA, tqu  XC. (5.94)
134
Then futures of the co-perception entities are exhaustive and mutually ex-
clusive. In that case it turns out that it is sufficient to require that the co-
perception environments can co-occur with the identical past xA¨t . The re-
quirement that it can co-occur with at least one future of a co-perception en-
tity is then automatically satisfied and vice versa. So if SpxA, tqt   XC it is
sufficient to define
XSVtzAt : tx¯VtzAt P XVtzAt : pA¨t ,VtzAtpxA¨t , x¯VtzAtq ¡ 0u. (5.95)
This condition always needs to be satisfied for probabilities pp.|xA¨t , x¯VtzAtq,
that condition on the identical past xA¨t and environment x¯VtzAt to be defined.
To see that the two sets of Eqs. (5.93) and (5.95) are equal recall with Eq. (5.92)
that if SpxA, tqt   XC an environment x¯VtzAt is in XSVtzAt if
Pr
¤
XC X tXA¨t  xA¨tu X tXVtzAt  x¯VtzAtu
	
¡ 0. (5.96)


















pC,A¨t ,VtzAtpxˆC, xA¨t , x¯VtzAtq (5.99)
pA¨t ,VtzAtpxA¨t , x¯VtzAtq. (5.100)
Where we used mutual exclusion from the second to the third line and exhaus-
tiveness from the fourth to the fifth. So the two sets of Eqs. (5.93) and (5.95)
are identical in this case. Without mutual exclusion and exhaustiveness the
two sets are not equal.
More intuitively this can be understood by noting that assuming that the
entities exhaust a set of future random variables XC means that there is a
future of a co-perception entity in every trajectory compatible with xA¨t . Since
all environments that are compatible with xA¨t must occur in one of those
trajectories Eq. (5.93) is automatically satisfied. Our definition of co-perception
environments therefore does not contain an additional assumption compared
to cases where futures of entities exhaust sets of random variables like in the
case of the perception-action loop or the models of biological individuals of
Krakauer et al. (2014).
5.5.6 Non-interpenetration and mutual exclusion
In this section we define the formal assumptions of general non-interpenetration
and (past specific) non-interpenetration for entity sets. This leads to mutual-
exclusion of entities in ways that enable a unique definition of our notion
of entity perception. Without these assumptions we can still define entity
perception but there will an arbitrary choice involved which influences the
perceptions (we will see this in Section 5.5.8).
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So different choices mean that the extracted perceptions are different. This
is not a desirable situation since we are making this choice. The goal of this
thesis is, however, that all the notions only depend on the multivariate Markov
chain itself. Non-interpenetration is therefor a desirable property.
General non-interpenetration requires that any two STPs xA, yB that partly
occupy the same random variables i.e.
AX B  H (5.101)
never co-occur i.e.
PrpXA  xA, XB  yBq  0. (5.102)
This notion of non-interpenetration treats spatial and temporal overlap (we
call AX B the overlap) equally. There is a philosophical debate about whether
interpenetration is possible for real objects (see e.g. Gilmore (2014)). Here we
only want to suggest that non-interpenetration may be a reasonable assump-
tion for entities. Non-interpenetration says that the same spatiotemporal re-
gion cannot be occupied by two different entities. This is intuitively true for
solid objects. It is however somewhat problematic when we think of multi-
cellular organisms as entities that may contain cells that are also entities by
themselves. In that case these cells would be parts of two different entities and
violate non-interpenetration. It is also possible that the cells by themselves are
actually not entities according to some other entity criterion. We also note that
on the level of cells we do not have interpenetration. Two different cells never
occupy the same spatiotemporal region. A cell may divide, but that is one
spatiotemporal entity dividing spatially into two at some point in time. This
suggests that there may be some levels of organisation or hierarchies12 of enti-
ties involved. We will not further discuss this here. Instead we only note that
the formal property of general non-interpenetration relates to our notion of
perception by providing mutual exclusion of co-perception entities. We now
state the definition of general non-interpenetration for future reference.
Definition 83 (General non-interpenetration). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov
chain with V  JT. An entity set E 

BV XB satisfies general non-interpenetration
or is generally non-interpenetrating if for all yB, zC P E with yB  zC we have
BX C  Hñ PrpXB  yB, XC  zCq  0. (5.103)
It turns out that general non-interpenetration is not necessary for our pur-
poses. We require only that all co-perception entities are mutually exclusive.
For this it is already sufficient that for two entities xA, yB if there is a time
t P T such that they have identical pasts up to t
xA¨t  yB¨t (5.104)
but are then different at some time in the future
xAt   yBt  (5.105)
12Whether the disintegration hierarchies are related is beyond the scope of this thesis but an
interesting avenue to pursue in the future.
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must be mutually exclusive given that their pasts occurred:
PrpXAt   xAt  , XBt   yBt  |xA¨tq  0. (5.106)
This means that there cannot be two different entities which are identical up to
some point in time t and then, in the same single trajectory (with positive prob-
ability), at some point “reveal” their difference. If entities with identical pasts
ever reveal their difference they must be in different trajectories i.e. they must
be mutually exclusive. We could call this “past specific non-interpenetration”
but since we only need this notion outside of this section we will just refer to
it as non-interpenetration.
Definition 84 (Non-interpenetration). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain
with V  J  T. An entity set E 

BV XB satisfies non-interpenetration or is
non-interpenetrating if for all yB, zC P E we have
Dt P T : yB¨t  zC¨t and yBt   zCt 
ñ PrpXBt   yBt  , XBt   zCt  |yB¨tq  0.
(5.107)
Remark:
• We note here that non-interpenetration is not necessarily satisfied by
ι-entities as we will see in Section 6.6.
Non-interpenetration implies that co-perception entities are mutually ex-
clusive:
Theorem 36. Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain with V  J  T and
entity set E. Let xA P E be an entity with non-empty time-slices at t and t  1 and
SpxA, tq its co-perception entities. If E satisfies non-interpenetration then SpxA, tq
is mutually exclusive.
Proof. Let yB, zC P SpxA, tq with yB  zC. Then they have identical pasts and
so we have yB¨t  zC¨t . From non-interpenetration we then get
PrpXB  yB, XC  zCq  0. (5.108)
Remark:
• Note that non-interpenetration does not imply anything about exhaus-
tiveness. We can have non-interpenetrating co-perception entities that
are not exhaustive. But since we know how to define a conditional prob-
ability distribution for non-exhaustive sets of STPs (Theorem 35) this is
not a problem.
This means that under non-interpenetration we can always define a con-
ditional probability distribution over the entire futures of a set SpxA, tq of
co-perception entities.
Definition 85 (Co-perception morph). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain
with V  J  T and a non-interpenetrating entity set E. Let xA P E be an entity
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with non-empty time-slices at t and t  1 and SpxA, tq  txkAkukPI its co-perception
entities. Furthermore let XSVtzAt  XSVtzAt be the set of co-perception environments.
Then the conditional probability distribution pS : SÑ r0, 1s










is well defined and we call it the co-perception morph.
The co-perception morph is a conditional probability distribution over the
entire futures of the co-perception entities. It can be used to partition the
co-perception environments by assigning environments to the same block /
perception if the lead to the same co-perception morph. However, we wanted
to define perception that occurs from t to t  1. In the co-perception morph
there may be entities that only start differing far in the future. If two environ-
ments have different influences only on these two entities and equal influence
on all other co-perception entities the co-perception morph still distinguishes
the two environments at t already. This does not seem like a good definition
of perception from t to t  1. We therefore partition all co-perception entities
according to their next time-slices in the next section.
5.5.7 Branching partition
In this section we will present a partition of the co-perception entities called
the branching partition. This will put all entities into the same blocks (called
branches) that have identical time-slices at t  1. This construction is intuitive
as it ignores differences between co-perception entities that only become ap-
parent at times later than t  1. Since we are interested in the perceptions that
happen in the transition from t to t   1 such differences should be ignored.
The branches (blocks) of the branching partition are therefore an even bet-
ter analogue to the “possible next time-slices” than the set of co-perception
entities directly.
First some more detail: at each transition from time-step t to t  1 the co-
perception entities SpxA, tq split up into sets of entities that are identical up
to t  1 (we will call these sets the branches). Only one of these sets is the set
SpxA, t 1q. For example an entity yB P SpxA, tqwith the same past up to t but
with a different time-slice at t 1 i.e. yBt 1  xAt 1 is part of a different branch.
In that case this branch is SpyB, t 1q and we have SpyB, t 1qXSpxA, t 1q 
H. In summary then the dynamics of the system split up the co-perception
entities of xA up to t into disjoint sets (the branches) of entities with identical
pasts up to t  1. We can then interpret the branches at the time t  1 as the
distinctions among the co-perception entities that are revealed at time t  1.
Further distinctions among the co-perception entities are only revealed at later
times. This also means that these are all differences that could possibly be due
to the influence of the environment at t and that show their effect at t  1 (not
later). In this way the perceptions at t should also be defined with respect to
these branches. We call the partition that is defined via the identification of
entities in SpxA, tq that are identical up to t  1 the branching partition.
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Definition 86 (Branching partition). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain
with V  J  T and entity set E. Let xA P E be an entity with non-empty time-
slices at t and t  1 and SpxA, tq its co-perception entities. Then define the branching
partition ηpxA, tq of SpxA, tq as the partition induced by the equivalence classes of
the equivalence relation
yB zC
ô yBt 1  zCt 1 ,
(5.110)
where yB, zC P SpxA, tq.
Remark:
• The definition of the branching partition can easily be generalised to
more than one time-step into the future. Instead of requiring equality at
t  1 we can require equality for the next r time-steps:
yB zC
ô yBt 1:t r  zCt 1:t r
(5.111)
This leads to a partition of SpxA, tq which is a refinement of ηpxA, tq.
The branches of t   1 are further partitioned according to the equality
of the contained entities at t  2, and similarly at each subsequent time-
step. This may be used to construct a kind of multi-time-step perception
which is more precise than one-time-step perception. Here we focus
only on the one-step-perception, nonetheless all further notions are eas-
ily adapted to the multi-step case.
The branches of the branching partition are the final analogue notion of “the
entity’s next possible time-slices”. We then define a conditional probability
distribution over the branches (called the branch-morph) and classify the co-
perception environments accordingly.
5.5.8 Branch-morph
Given the branching partition ηpxA, tq for a non-interpenetrating entity set
we can then define a conditional probability distribution over the branches by
just summing up the probabilities of all entities in each branch (remember that
they are all mutually exclusive) to get the probability of a branch i.e. write for
every block b P ηpxA, tq:
ppb|xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq :
¸
yBPb
pBt ,VtzAtpyBt  |xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq. (5.112)
Since the branches are also mutually exclusive (because all co-perception en-
tities are mutually exclusive) we can divide by the sum of probabilities of the
branches to get a probability distribution.
pηpxA ,tqpb|xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq :
ppb|xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq°
cPηpxA ,tq ppc|xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq
. (5.113)
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This is the idea behind Definition 87 below.
However, we do not necessarily need the mutual exclusion of the entire
set of co-perception entities if we want to define some perception. For this we
can use a subset ζpxA, tq  SpxA, tq with xA P ζpxA, tq of mutually exclusive
co-perception entities. We can then still use the branching partition on this
subset and define perception in the same way as below by replacing SpxA, tq
with ζpxA, tq everywhere.
However, for a set of co-perception entities that is not naturally mutu-
ally exclusive as in the case of non-interpenetration there are many possible
choices of such subsets which lead to different perceptions. For example say
SpxA, tq  txA, yB, zCu. Then if they are not all mutually exclusive, we can
have that xA and yB are mutually exclusive and xA and zC are mutually ex-
clusive but yB and zC are not mutually exclusive. So then to get a proxy
ζpxA, tq of SpxA, tq (consisting only of mutually exclusive co-perception enti-
ties) we can either choose ζpxA, tq  txA, yBu or ζpxA, tq  txA, zCu. These
choices will in general lead to different perceptions such that perception is
not unique if we don’t have mutual exclusion of all co-perception entities. So
non-interpenetration is an attractive property for entity sets if we want to use
our notion of perception since it allows us to uniquely define it.
We now finally state the definition of the branch-morph, the co-perception
environment partition and the perceptions which are just the blocks of the
co-perception environment partition.
Definition 87 (Branch-morph). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain with
index set V  J  T and entity set E. Let xA P E be an entity with non-empty
time-slices at t and t   1 and SpxA, tq its co-perception entities and ηpxA, tq the
branching partition. Furthermore, let XSVtzAt  XVtzAt be the associated co-perception
environments. Also write for every block b P ηpxA, tq:
ppb|xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq :
¸
yBPb
pBt ,VtzAtpyBt  |xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq. (5.114)
Then for each xˆVtzAt P XSVtzAt we define the branch-morph over ηpxA, tq as the prob-
ability distribution pηpxA ,tqp.|xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq : ηpxA, tq Ñ r0, 1s with
pηpxA ,tqpb|xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq :
ppb|xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq°
cPηpxA ,tq ppc|xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq
, (5.115)
for all b P ηpxA, tq.
With the branch-morph we can then define, as expected, the perceptions
as equivalence classes of the co-perception environments with respect to the
associated branch-morph. First we define a partition of the co-perception
environments called the co-perception environment partition. The perceptions
are then the blocks of this partition.
Definition 88. Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain with index set V  JT
and entity set E. Let xA P E be an entity with non-empty time-slices at t and t 1 and
SpxA, tq its co-perception entities and ηpxA, tq the branching partition. Furthermore,
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let XSVtzAt  XVtzAt be the associated co-perception environments. Then define the
co-perception environment partition piSpxA, tq of XSVtzAt as the partition induced by
the equivalence classes of the equivalence relation
xˆVtzAt x¯VtzAt
ô @b P ηpxA, tq : pηpxA ,tqpb|xˆVtzAt , xA¨tq  pηpxA ,tqpb|x¯VtzAt , xA¨tq.
(5.116)
Remarks:
• This means all associated co-perception environments in the same block
of piSpxA, tq have the same branch-morph. In other words they lead
to the same branch of entity futures (i.e. the same future branch) with
the same probabilities. Then all elements of these environment blocks
have identical effects on the future branches and these branches cannot
distinguish between environments within the blocks.
Definition 89 (Perceptions). Let tXiuiPV be a multivariate Markov chain with in-
dex set V  J  T and entity set E. Let xA P E be an entity with non-empty
time-slices at t and t   1 and SpxA, tq its co-perception entities. Furthermore, let
XSVtzAt  XVtzAt be the associated co-perception environments and piSpxA, tq its
co-perception environment partition.
Then the blocks of piSpxA, tq are called the perceptions of xA at t.
5.6 Entity action and perception in the perception-
action loop
We now show that agent-environment systems as modelled by the perception-
action loop are multivariate Markov chains containing a specific choice of
entity sets.
In this section we interpret the perception-action loop from the perspec-
tive of our own concept of agents. We identify an entity set and the subset
of the entity set that are agents from the perception-action loop perspective.
Both of these choices turn out to be nonrestrictive. The perception-action loop
itself puts no strong constraints on the “agents” (often only referred to as sys-
tems) it models. Its Bayesian network structure of Fig. 5.4 is also compatible
with two independent and identically distributed random variables. Accord-
ingly there have been attempts to identify further restrictions or measures that
quantify further distinctions among such systems. The most relevant in our
context is the measure of autonomy for an agent in the perception-action loop
(Bertschinger et al., 2008). We show how our notion of actions is sufficient
for the property of non-heteronomy which is part of the requirement for au-
tonomy. We also show that, as expected due to our construction, our notion
of perception specialises to the notion of perception in the perception action
(Section 3.3.6). The main point of this chapter is to show how our notion




Figure 5.4: First time-steps of the Bayesian network of the perception-action loop. The processes
represent environment tEtutPT , and agent memory tMtutPT .
autonomous) agents as they are modelled in perception-action loops. Our no-
tions are more general because they are well defined for non-exhaustive and
extent varying entity-sets.
Recall that an agent in a perception-action loop (Definition 43) is a stochas-
tic process tMtutPT interacting with an environment process tEtutPT . If we
want to make the interactions explicit we can use the extended perception-
action loop of Definition 46. In this case we also have an action process
tAtutPT and a sensor process tStutPT . For convenience we again show the
Bayesian network (of the non-extended version) in Fig. 5.4.
In the perception-action loop each trajectory xV is considered to consist of
a time-evolution mT of the agent and a time-evolution of the environment eT .
The agent therefore occurs in every trajectory and occupies the same degree
of freedom in every trajectory. According to our working definition (Defini-
tion 64) all agents are entities and according to our concept of entities (Def-
inition 65), entities are STPs. Each of the time-evolutions mT is a STP in the
perception-action loop. We can then define the entity set E of a perception-
action loop as the set of time-evolutions of the agent process i.e.




With this definition every time-evolution of the agent process corresponds to
an entity and every such entity corresponds to the time-evolution of an agent
(or the agent). Similarly, we can define entities for the environments and add
them to EPA. The symmetry of the perception-action loop makes no a priori
difference between agents and environments. We will focus on the agent
process here and do not need environment entities.
Compared to ι-entities (Definition 74) the entity set EPA is not very re-
strictive. Even if each Mt for t P T is a independently distributed random
variable the sequences mT would still be considered time evolutions of en-
tities. Furthermore, each of these entities would be considered an agent
in this picture. In order to introduce stronger conditions efforts have been
made to distinguish informationally closed (Bertschinger et al., 2006) and au-
tonomous (Bertschinger et al., 2008) agents. Our own concept of agents also
puts stronger constraints on the notion of an entities. We require actions, per-
ception, and goal-directedness from entities that can be counted as agents.
We have not defined a notion of goal-directedness, but the notions of entity
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actions (Section 5.4) and entity perceptions (Section 5.5) can be used for the
perception-action loop entity set EPA. We will consider this next and see that
our more general requirements of actions corresponds to a requirement by
Bertschinger et al. in the case of perception-action loop entity sets.
5.6.1 Entity actions in the perception-action loop
According to our definition (Definition 76) an entity xA performs an action
at time t in a trajectory xV if there is a co-action entity yB occurring in a co-
action trajectory yV with xVtzAt  yVtzBt . In the case of the perception action
loop we can write every trajectory as a pair pmT , eTq where mT is an entity.
The entity mT then performs an action at time t in trajectory pmT , eTq with
pMT ,ET pmT , eTq ¡ 0 if there is an entity m¯t such that
• m¯T occurs in pm¯T , e¯Tq  pmT , eTq with pMT ,ET pm¯T , e¯Tq ¡ 0,
• at t the entities mT and m¯T occupy the same random variables, which is
the case for all entities in EPA,
• at t the environments of mT and m¯T are identical: et  e¯t,
• at t  1 the entities are different: mt 1  m¯t 1.
Since all entities occupy the same random variables we can only have value
actions in the perception-action loop.
We now show that these conditions can be related to conditions for au-
tonomous systems/agents proposed by Bertschinger et al. (2008). We can say
that the more entities perform actions at t the higher is potentially the non-
heteronomy component of a measure of autonomy proposed by Bertschinger
et al..
If we assume that these conditions are fulfilled at some time t for two
entities mT , m¯T we can derive that the conditional entropy HpMt 1|Etq of the
next agent state given the current environment state is greater than zero:
HpMt 1|Etq ¡ 0. (5.118)
Proof. From pMT ,ET pmT , eTq ¡ 0 and pMT ,ET pm¯T , e¯Tq ¡ 0 it directly follows that
pMt 1pmt 1|etq ¡ 0, pMt 1pm¯t 1|etq ¡ 0 and pEtpetq ¡ 0. Then:















We can also see from this that the more entities perform actions at t the
more terms in Eq. (5.119) are positive. The final value of HpMt 1|Etq depends
on the actual probabilities but the maximum value for n positive terms is log n.
So the more different co-action entities there are for a time t the higher the
conditional entropy HpMt 1|Etq can get. Also note that if there are no actions
at t i.e. no co-action entity in no co-action trajectory at t then HpMt 1|Etq 
0. Entity actions of entities in EPA are therefore necessary and sufficient for
HpMt 1|Etq ¡ 0.
The conditional entropy HpMt 1|Etq measures the uncertainty about the
next agent state when the current environment state is known. It has been
proposed as a measure of non-heteronomy in Bertschinger et al. (2008). Non-
heteronomy means that the agent is not determined by the history of the
environment. We only treat here the case where the history length is just
one time-step Et but generalisations to multiple time-steps HpMt 1|Etl:tq are
straightforward (see remark to Definition 76). We have argued above that non-
heteronomy at time t depends on the existence of entity actions performed
at t and is limited by the number of different such actions at t. The entity
actions as we have defined them are therefore like building blocks that make
up the non-heteronomy of a stochastic process. In other words they are a
local version of non-heteronomy in the case of value actions. Furthermore our
definition applies to extent actions as well.
The measure of autonomy proposed by Bertschinger et al. (2008) contains
another component measuring self-determination i.e. the degree to which the
current agent state determines its next state. This is not ensured by our defini-
tion of actions. If Mt 1 is an independently and uniformly distributed random
variable then there are |Mt 1| co-actions at t and HpMt 1|Etq  HpMt 1q 
log |Mt 1|. The role of ensuring self-determination in our case is delegated to
the entity set. The perception-action loop entity set EPA is too nonrestrictive
for this purpose. Our notion of ι-entities on the other hand would not count
a value mt 1 of an independently distributed random variable as part of a
larger entity .
We expect that there are multiple action definitions that coincide with con-
ditions similar to autonomy/non-heteronomy in the case of perception-action
loop entities. An example would be requiring that the environments at t  1
differ in some way. We have only presented one definition here. Investigating
and comparing further possible notions is future work.
We note that Ikegami and Taiji (1998) propose to use possible/compatible
counterfactual trajectories of game players as signs of autonomy. This idea
is similar to ours. We construct the capability to act from the counterfactual
trajectories. Actions are arguably the basic units that realise autonomy over
a longer period of time. In this sense we have in fact used the counterfactual
trajectories to allow for a kind of autonomy.
5.6.2 Entity perception in the perception-action loop
We now look at how entity perception as defined in Section 5.5 specialises
to the case of the perception-action loop. This argument in effect consti-
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tutes a proof that our Definition 87 of the branch-morph is a generalisation
of the conditional probability distributions pMt 1p.|mt, etq : Mt 1 Ñ r0, 1s to
non-interpenetrating, co-perception entities that (in contrast to the case of the
perception-action loop) do not exhaust a set of future random variables and
may exhibit counterfactual variation in extent. This result is not surprising
since we set out to do just this but it is also instructive to work through the
recovery of the original expression of the conditional probability distribution
starting from the general branch-morph.
We pick an entity mT from the entity set EPA and consider its perceptions
at an arbitrary time-step t P T. In order to get the perceptions at t we need
1. the co-perception entities SpmT , tq of mT at t,
2. the branching partition ηpmT , tq with its branches,
3. the co-perception environments,
4. the branch-morphs for each environment,
5. and the co-perception environment partition piSpxA, tq with its blocks,
the perceptions.
These can be identified in the following way.
1. The co-perception entities SpmT , tq are the entities in EPA that have non-
empty time-slices at t, t   1, and that are identical to mT up to t. All
entities in EPA have non-empty time slices at all times. So we have:
SpmT , tq  tm¯T P EPA : m¯¨t  m¨tu (5.122)
Note that as t increases there are less and less co-perception entities. At
t  n 1 (recall that T  0 : n 1) we eventually have SpmT , tq  tmTu.
Also note that the futures of the co-perception entities exhaust the future
random variables Mt  i.e.
SpmT , tqt   tm¯t  : m¯T P SpmT , tqu Mt . (5.123)
2. First recall that the entity set EPA satisfies non-interpenetration since
they all occupy the same set tMtutPT of random variables. Therefore
Spmt, tq is mutually exclusive and we get unique perception via the
branching partition ηpmT , tq of the entire set Spmt, tq. The branching par-
tition ηpmT , tq is composed out of blocks (the branches) of co-perception
entities that are identical up to t  1 i.e.
mˆT m¯T
ô mˆt 1  m¯t 1.
(5.124)
We can therefore identify the blocks of ηpmT , tq i.e. the future branches
by the values that the entities take at t  1. Define the branch bpm¯t 1q
associated to m¯t 1 PMt 1 via
bpm¯t 1q : tmˆT P SpmT , tq : mˆt 1  m¯t 1u. (5.125)
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The branching partition is then:
ηpmT , tq  tbpm¯t 1q  SpmT , tq : m¯t 1 PMt 1u. (5.126)
3. The co-perception environments are the STPs xVtzAt compatible with at
least one co-perception entity. For the perception-action loop and entity
mT at t we have XVtzAt  Et and therefore XSVtzAt  ESt . Where ESt is
ESt  tet P Et : Dm¯T P SpmT , tq, pMT ,Etpm¯T , etq ¡ 0u. (5.127)
As we have noted in Section 5.5.5 since the co-perception entities exhaust
Mt  this requirement is equivalent to
ESt  tet P Et : pMt ,Etpm¯t, etq ¡ 0u. (5.128)
4. The branch-morphs are the probability distributions pηpmT ,tqp.|et, m¨tq :
ηpmT , tq Ñ r0, 1s over the branches for each co-perception environment






We can rewrite the sum on the right hand side using Eq. (5.125) for












pMt ,Etpm¯t 1, mˆt 1 , et|m¨tq (5.132)
 pMt 1,Etpm¯t 1, et|m¨tq. (5.133)
The definition of the branch-morph for the perception-action loop is
pηpmT ,tqpbpm¯t 1q|et, m¨tq : 
ppbpm¯t 1q, et|m¨tq°
bPηpmT ,tq ppb, et|m¨tq
(5.134)
(5.135)
which we can rewrite now








 pMt 1pm¯t 1|et, m¨tq (5.138)
 pMt 1pm¯t 1|et, mtq. (5.139)
In the last line we used the Bayesian network of the perception-action
loop.
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5. The co-perception environment partition piSpmT , tq of ESt  is the par-
tition induced by the equivalence classes of the equivalence relation
eˆt e¯t
ô @b P ηpmT , tq : pηpmT ,tqpb|eˆt, m¨tq  pηpmT ,tqpb|e¯t, m¨tq.
(5.140)
Using the branch-morph above this is equivalent to
eˆt e¯t
ô @mt 1 PMt 1 : pMt 1pmt 1|eˆt, mtq  pMt 1pmt 1|e¯t, mtq
(5.141)
which is just the equivalence relation of Eq. (3.71) used to extract the
sensor-values in Section 3.3.6.
So we have seen that our definitions of Section 5.5 specialise in the case of the
perception-action loop to the same concept of perception as in Section 3.3.6.
More interesting for future research is that the branch-morphs are gen-
eralisations of the conditional probability distribution pMt 1p.|et, mtq. These
conditional probability distributions play a role in various information the-
oretic concepts formulated for the perception-action loop. Examples include
informational closure (Bertschinger et al., 2006), autonomy (Bertschinger et al.,
2008), and morphological computation (Zahedi and Ay, 2013). We have also
related entity actions to information theoretic measures in the perception ac-
tion loop. The branch-morph (and also the entity actions) therefore suggest
that it is possible to generalise these measures to entity sets that are non-
exhaustive and vary counterfactually in extent. As we have argued in Sec-
tion 5.3 such entities should be considered in a general definition of agents
in multivariate Markov chains. The branch-morphs (and possibly other sim-







In this chapter we investigate the structure of integrated and completely lo-
cally integrated spatiotemporal patterns as it is revealed by the disintegration
hierarchy. This will expose many of the formal notions introduced in Chap-
ter 3 in practice. For this we will use two very simple multivariate Markov
chains. We will use the disintegration theorem (Theorem 22) to extract the
completely locally integrated spatiotemporal patterns. We will also use the
SLI symmetry theorem and its corollary (Theorems 30 and 31) to explain the
structure of the disintegration hierarchies.
In Section 5.3.5.2 we proposed to employ the completely locally integrated
spatiotemporal patterns as a formal definition for entities. The entity set ob-
tained in this way are called the ι-entities. We will calculate the entity sets
for
We will see in Section 6.5 that the three phenomena that entity definitions
should not preclude (compositionality, degree of freedom traversal, counter-
factual variation) are exhibited by ι-entities in the example systems.
In Sections 5.4 and 5.5 we defined entity actions and entity perceptions for
arbitrary entity-sets. In Section 6.6 we present examples of entity actions and
entity perceptions of ι-entities in the example systems.
In Chapter 7 we discuss the results of this chapter, point out weaknesses,
and propose further research directions. While there are some promising
signs with respect to using ι-entities as entity sets and our notions of en-
tity action and entity perception there are also some problems that need to be
addressed before these proposals can claim to capture agents that only lack
goal-directedness.
This chapter exclusively investigates examples of original notions that we
have presented in Chapters 3 and 5. Therefore, almost its entire content is
original. For reference the contributions of this chapter are:
• Computation and presentation of disintegration and refinement-free dis-
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integration hierarchies for two simple systems.
• Explanation of the occurrence of multiple disconnected components in
the partially ordered disintegration levels via the SLI symmetry theo-
rems.
• Computation and presentation of the completely locally integrated spa-
tiotemporal patterns of two simple systems.
• Examples of ι-entities that exhibit the three phenomena compositional-
ity, degree of freedom traversal, and counterfactual variation that we
argued for in Section 5.3.
• Examples of entity actions of ι-entities.
• Example of interpenetrating ι-entities showing that they do not neces-
sarily obey non-interpenetration.
• Example of an entity perception and a branch-morph using a proxy for
a co-perception partition.
• Example of an entity action and entity perception of the same ι-entity at
the same time-step.
• Discussion of the results on ι-entities as entity sets in the example sys-
tems.
As we will see in Section 6.1 the computational complexity of computing
the completely locally integrated spatiotemporal patterns increases rapidly.
Since an important aspect of our proposal to use these patterns as entities
is that they do not rely on further intuitions or prior knowledge about what
entities are we must consider all possibilities exhaustively. The multivariate
Markov chains we choose in this section are therefore extremely small. While
this limits the relevance for the interpretation of the completely locally inte-
grated spatiotemporal patterns as agents it allows us to discuss these patterns
themselves more thoroughly.
The systems we will look at are the following:
1. MC which consists of two constant and independent binary random
variables.
2. MCe which consists of two binary random variables that are mostly
constant but where a noise term e makes every other transition possible.
In all cases we choose a uniform initial distribution in order to exhaust the
dynamics of all trajectories of the Markov chains.
6.1 Properties of partition lattices
Before we look at examples of partition lattices in the following chapters we
quickly recall some properties that hold for all such lattices. As mentioned in
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Figure 6.1: Bell and Sterling numbers. (a) Logarithmic plot of the Bell numbers B|V| for
showing the number of partitions of a set V with |V|  t1, ..., 15u. (b) Logarithmic plot of
the Sterling numbers showing the number of partitions pi with |pi| blocks. The different lines
correspond to different cardinalities |V| of the set V that the pi partition. The number at which
a line ends indicates |V|.
Theorem 2 the number of elements |LpVq| in a partition lattice LpVq of a set
V is given by the Bell number B|V|. Asymptotically, this number grows faster
than exponentially with |V| (De Bruijn, 1970) as is suggested by the more than
linear growth in the logarithmic plot Fig. 6.1(a). We also mentioned that the
number of partitions pi with a fixed number |pi|  k of blocks is given by the
Sterling number Sp|V|, kq. The most partitions then turn out to exist for the
number of blocks k around |V|{2. This can be seen in Fig. 6.1(b).
6.2 Number of STP
The number NpatptXiuiPVq of STPs in a Bayesian network tXiuiPV is equal to
the the sum over all k of the subsets of size k times the number of different
STP on this subset of size k. The number of different STP on a subset A  V










If we assume that the state spaces of all random variables in the network are










To get the number NsliptXiuiPVq of SLI that have to be evaluated to check every
partition of each STP xA we have to further multiply the number of STPs |XA|
in Eq. (6.1) by the number of partitions B|A| of these STPs. So the number of



















If we use the disintegration theorem we evaluate all partitions of the entire
Bayesian network for each trajectory i.e.
NDsliptXiuiPVq  |XV |B|V| (6.5)
partitions which is only the last term for k  |V| of the sums over k in Eqs. (6.3)
and (6.4). For equal state spaces this becomes
NDsliptXiuiPVq  n
|V|B|V|. (6.6)
We still obtain what we are most interested in which are all the completely
integrated patterns within the trajectories. However we also have to obtain the
refinement free disintegration hierarchy which requires us to find the finest
partitions at each disintegration level and check if they have refinements at
preceding levels. If we ignore this for the moment, the disintegration theorem
saves us






evaluations. Which in the case of equal state spaces is:









evaluations. However as can be seen from Eqs. (6.5) and (6.6) the superex-
ponential growth of the number of evaluations with the size of the index set
V remains even if we use the disintegration theorem. The extra burden of
finding the refinement free disintegration hierarchy has to be added to this as
well.
We also note here that the above considerations do not include the compu-
tational resources needed to calculate the probabilities needed for the evalua-
tion of specific local integrations. In order to calculate the disintegrations of a
trajectory we need the global probability distribution over the entire Bayesian
network. This means we need the probability (a real number between 0 and
1) of each trajectory. If we only have binary random variables, the number of
trajectories is 2|V| which make the straightforward computation of disintegra-
tion hierarchies unrealistic even for quite small systems. If we take a seven
by seven grid of the game of life cellular automaton and want to look at three
time-steps we have |V|  147. If we use 32 bit floating numbers this give us
5  1030 petabytes of storage needed for this probability distribution. This
suggests that formal proofs are more useful for the investigation of specific
local integration and disintegration hierarchies than simulations. Nonetheless





Figure 6.2: Bayesian network of MC. There is no interaction between the two processes.
6.3 Two constant and independent binary random
variables: MC
6.3.1 Definition
Define the time- and space-homogeneous multivariate Markov chain MC




H if t  0,
tpj, t 1qu else,
(6.9)
•
pj,tpxj,t|xj,t1q  δxj,t1pxj,tq 
#




pj,0pxj,0q  1{4. (6.11)
The Bayesian network can be seen in Fig. 6.2.
6.3.2 Trajectories
In order to get the disintegration hierarchy DpxVq we have to choose a trajec-
tory xV and calculate the SLI of each partition pi P LpVq. There are only four
different trajectories possible in MC and they are:
xV  px1,0, x2,0, x1,1, x2,1, x1,2, x2,2q 
$''''&''''%
p0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0q if x1,0  0, x2,0  0;
p0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1q if x1,0  0, x2,0  1;
p1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0q if x1,0  1, x2,0  0;
p1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1q if x1,0  1, x2,0  1.
(6.12)
Each of these trajectories has probability pVpxVq  1{4 and all other trajecto-
ries have pVpxVq  0. We call the four trajectories the possible trajectories. We
visualise the possible trajectories as a grid with each cell corresponding to one
variable. The spatial indices are constant across rows and time-slices Vt corre-
spond to the columns. A white cell indicates a 0 and a black cell indicates a 1.
This results in the grids of Fig. 6.3.
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(a) p0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0q (b) p0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1q (c) p1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0q (d) p1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1q
Figure 6.3: Visualisation of the four possible trajectories of MC. In each trajectory the time
index increases goes from left to right. There are two rows corresponding to the two random
variables at each time step and three columns corresponding to the three time-steps we are
considering here.
6.3.3 Partitions of trajectories
The disintegration hierarchy is composed out of all partitions in the lattice of
partitions LpVq. Note that we are partitioning the entire spatially and tem-
porally extended index set V of the Bayesian network and not only the time-
slices. Blocks in the partitions of LpVq are then, in general, spatiotemporal
patterns and not only spatial patterns.
The number of partitions |LpVq| of a set of |V|  6 elements is B6  203 (see
Theorem 2). These partitions pi can be classified according to their cardinality
|pi| (number of blocks in the partition). The number of partitions of a set of
cardinality |V| into |pi| blocks is the Sterling number Sp|V|, |pi|q. For |V|  6
we find the Sterling numbers:
|pi| 1 2 3 4 5 6
Sp|V|, |pi|q 1 31 90 65 15 1
(6.13)
It is important to note that the partition lattice LpVq is the same for all
trajectories as it is composed out of partitions of V. On the other hand the
values of SLI mipipxVq with respect to the partitions in LpVq generally depend
on the trajectory xV .
6.3.4 SLI values of the partitions
We can calculate the SLI mipipxVq of every trajectory xV with respect to each





In the case of MC the SLI values with respect to each partition do not depend
on the trajectories. For an overview we plotted the values of SLI with respect
to each partition pi P LpVq for any trajectory of MC in Fig. 6.4. We can see
in Fig. 6.4 that the cardinality does not determine the value of SLI. At the
same time there seems to be a trend to higher values of SLI with increasing
cardinality of the partition. We can also observe that only five different values
of SLI are attained by partitions on this trajectory. We will collect these classes
of partitions with equal SLI values in the disintegration hierarchy next.
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Figure 6.4: Specific local integrations mipipxVq of any of the four trajectories xV seen in Fig. 6.3
with respect to all pi P LpVq. The partitions are ordered according to an enumeration with
increasing cardinality |pi| (see Pemmaraju and Skiena, 2009, chap. 4.3.3 for the method). We
indicate with vertical lines at what partitions the cardinality |pi| increases by one.
6.3.5 Disintegration hierarchy






Figure 6.5: Same as Fig. 6.4 but with the partitions sorted according to increasing SLI.
In order to get insight into the internal structure of the partitions of a tra-
jectory xV we obtain the disintegration hierarchy DpxVq (see Definition 54)
look at the Hasse diagrams of each of the disintegration levels DipxVq. If we
sort the partitions of any trajectory of MC according to increasing SLI value
we obtain Fig. 6.5. There we see groups of partitions attaining the SLI values
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t0, 1, 2, 3, 4u these groups are the disintegration levels tD1pxVq,D2pxVq,D3pxVq,D4pxVq,D5pxVqu.
The exact numbers of partitions in each of the levels are:
i 1 2 3 4 5
mipi 0 1 2 3 4
|Di| 2 18 71 78 34
(6.15)
Next we look at the Hasse diagram of each of those disintegration levels.
Since the disintegration levels are subsets of the partition lattice LpVq they are
in general not lattices by themselves. The Hasse diagrams visualise the set of
partitions in each disintegration level partially ordered by refinement  (see
Definition 13). Recall that in Hasse diagrams of such posets the partitions are
arranged such that if pi  ξ and pi  ξ then pi is drawn below ξ. Also, an
edge is drawn from partition pi to ξ if one covers the other e.g. if pi : ξ.
The Hasse diagrams are shown in Fig. 6.6. We see immediately that within
each disintegration level apart from the first and the last the Hasse diagrams
contain multiple connected components.
Furthermore, within a disintegration level the connected components of-
ten have the same Hasse diagrams. For example in D2 (Fig. 6.6(b)) we find
six connected components with three partitions each. The identical refine-
ment structure of the connected components is related to the symmetries of
the probability distribution over the trajectories. This will be discussed in Sec-
tion 6.3.6. We can visualise the partitions themselves in the Hasse diagrams
as in Fig. 6.7.
Recall that due to the disintegration theorem (Theorem 22) we are inter-
ested especially in partitions that do not have refinements at their own or any
preceding (i.e. lower indexed) disintegration level. These partitions consist
of blocks that are completely integrated i.e. all possible partitions of each of
the blocks results in a positive SLI value or is a single node of the Bayesian
network. The refinement-free disintegration hierarchy DpxVq contains only
these partitions and is shown in a Hasse diagram in Fig. 6.8.
6.3.6 Symmetries
As shown in Theorem 36.(i) the symmetries of the trajectory xV that are also
symmetries of pV generate partitions with respect to which the SLI has the
same value. More formally, if for all elements h of a group of permutations
H we have both hpV  pV and hxV  xV (for the particular trajectory xV ,
not necessarily for all trajectories) then mihpipxVq  mipipxVq. This means if
we start with one partition pi with a particular SLI value (i.e. on a particular
disintegration level) then we can generate the orbit of partitions Hpi : thpi :
h P Hu under H which contains only partitions with equal SLI value. Since
any permutation preserves the refinement relation between and cardinality
of partitions (see Theorems 25 and 26 respectively) we can also take a set of
partitions partially ordered by refinement and generate identical posets (with







Figure 6.6: Hasse diagrams of the five disintegration levels of the trajectories of MC. Every
vertex corresponds to a partition and edges indicate that the lower partition refines the higher
one.
the following we will find the symmetries of both pV and of the four possible
trajectories.
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Figure 6.7: Hasse diagram of D2 of MC trajectories. Here we visualise the partitions at
each vertex. The blocks of a partition are the cells of equal colour. Note that we can obtain all
six disconnected components by permuting the indices via spatial inversion hÙpj, tq  p|J|  
1  j, tq and “global” time shifts hÑpj, tq  pj, pt  1q mod 3q. For example acting on the
partitions in the first component from the left we obtain: the second component via hÑ, the
third component via hÙ  h1Ñ , the fourth via hÙ  hÑ, the fifth via hÙ, and the sixth via h1Ñ .
Figure 6.8: Hasse diagrams of the refinement-free disintegration hierarchy D of MC trajec-
tories. Here we visualise the partitions at each vertex. The blocks of a partition are the cells of
equal colour. It turns out that partitions that are on the same horizontal level in this diagram
correspond exactly to a level in the refinement-free disintegration hierarchy D. The i-th hor-
izontal level starting from the top corresponds to Di . Take for example the second horizontal
level from the top. The partitions on this level are just the minimal elements of the poset D2
which was visualised in Fig. 6.7. We have shown the posets of the other disintegration lev-
els only without their partitions in Fig. 6.6 but their minimal elements are all present at the
according horizontal level in this diagram.
We will now establish symmetries of pV . It is not difficult to just look at the
probability distribution pV which attributes the probability 1{4 for each of the
four possible trajectories and infer symmetries by visual inspection. We only
need to find permutations of the index set V that transform all trajectories
into trajectories with the same probability. Since all four possible trajectories
in Fig. 6.3 have the same probability every permutation that maps these tra-
jectories onto each other is a symmetry of pV . Note that permutations which
map one of those trajectories into a trajectory with probability zero cannot be
symmetries of pV . To get an intuition for this take one of the less symmetric
possible trajectories of MC from Fig. 6.3 e.g. the second one
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Any permutation of the cells in this grid is a permutation of V. Since the
other possible trajectories are either more symmetric (like the first and the
fourth) or share the same symmetry (like the third) any permutation which
maps this trajectory to one of the four is a symmetry of pV . Such symmetries
are “spatial inversion” (flipping the top and bottom row in Fig. 6.3), “global
time-slice permutations” (reordering the columns in Fig. 6.3 in any way) , and
“individual time-slice permutation” (reordering the cells within a single row
in Fig. 6.3 in any way). Spatial inversion maps the second trajectory above
to the third and vice versa, the first and second trajectory are left invariant.
The time-slice permutations both leave all possible trajectories invariant. Note
that the global time-slice permutations can actually be constructed from the
individual time-slice permutations. An example of a permutation that is not a
symmetry is to invert only a single time-slice and not change the others (flip-
ping the top and bottom cell in the second column). Next, we will formally
derive theses intuitions from the definition of MC.
First let us look at “individual time-slice permutations” more precisely this
means permutations of the form hpj, t1q  pj, t2q where for different spatial
indices the time-shift may be different i.e. for j1  j2 we may have hpj1, t1q 
pj1, t2q, hpj2, t1q  pj2, t3q, and t2  t3. We can separate such permutations into
two sets, those that permute the time indices only for the first spatial index
and those that only permute them for the second. Let Tj  Σpj,Tq  ΣV be the
subgroup of permutations only affecting the indices in pj, Tq  tpj, tq : t P Tu (
we will in the following loosely refer to p1, Tq, p2, Tq as the first and second, or
top and bottom row since this is visually intuitive given our representation of
trajectories and patterns as grids). Note that by combining elements h1 P T1
and h2 P T2 to get h1  h2 we can affect both p1, Tq and p2, Tq so that we can also
permute whole time-slices at once if both h1 and h2 permute the respective sets
in the same way. This gives the “global time-slice permutations”.
Now note that for the present case both Tj, j P t1, 2u are actually sym-
metry groups of all possible trajectories xV . This means they are necessarily
symmetry groups of pV since for any arbitrary pV if x
g
V  xV then of course
gpVpxVq  pVpx
g
Vq  pVpxVq. Formally, for any j P t1, 2u and hj P Tj we have
hjxV  hjxJ,T  pxi,tq
h1j
iPJ,tPT (6.16)
 tXi,t  xi,tu
h1j
iPJ,tPT (6.17)
 tXi,t  xh1j pi,tq
uiPJ,tPT (6.18)
 tXi,t  xi,tuij,tPT Y tXi,t  xh1j pj,tq
uj,tPT (6.19)
If we now recall that for all possible trajectories xV and t, s P T we have
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xj,t  xk,s so that xh1j pj,tq
 xj,t we see that
hjxV  xV (6.20)
for all possible trajectories. Since all permutations are bijective, the impossible
trajectories must also be mapped to impossible trajectories such that all hj P Tj
with j P t1, 2u are symmetries of all trajectories and therefore also symmetries
of pV .
Next we will look at spatial inversion. Note first that spatial inversion does
not leave all the possible trajectories invariant since it transforms the second
into the third and vice versa. So spatial inversion is only a symmetry of pV .
It would not be difficult to derive that spatial inversion is a symmetry of
pV directly from looking at its effect on pV . However, we here want to exhibit
how Theorem 33 can be used in establishing symmetries.
Theorem 33 tells us that a group of spatial symmetries of both the Markov
matrix and the initial distribution is also a symmetry group of pV . De-
fine the spatial inversion via hÙpj, tq  p|J|   1  j, tq. Then hÙ  hÙ  i,
h1Ù  hÙ which means thÙ, iu form a subgroup of the spatial permutations
ΣJ  tiu. We now show that this is a symmetry group of pV . Note that
V0  pJ, 0q  tp1, 0q, p2, 0qu, and recall that we chose the uniform distribu-
tion as initial distribution such that for any xV0 , x¯V0 P XV0 we have pV0pxV0q 
pV0px¯V0q  1{4. Since by construction x
hÙ
V0
P XV0 we have for any xV0 P XV0 





 PrptX1,0  x1,0, X2,0  x2,0uhÙq (6.22)
 PrpX1,0  xhÙp1,0q, X2,0  xhÙp2,0qq (6.23)
 PrpX1,0  x2,0, X2,0  x1,0q (6.24)
 pV0pxV0q. (6.25)
Or in short hÙpV0  pV0 . We also have hÙpPpVtq  PphÙpVtq. To see this recall
the definition of the dynamics of each of the two random variables of MC in
Eq. (6.10) which was:
pj,tpxj,t|xj,t1q  δxj,t1pxj,tq 
#
1 if xj,t  xj,t1,
0 else.
(6.10 revisited)














Vt q  PrptXj,t 1  xj,t 1u
hÙ
jPJ |tXj,t  xj,tu
hÙ
jPJq (6.29)
 PrppX1,t 1  x1,t 1qhÙ |pX1,t  x1,tqhÙq
 PrppX2,t 1  x2,t 1qhÙ |pX2,t  x2,tqhÙq
(6.30)
 PrpX1,t 1  xhÙp1,t 1q|X1,t  xhÙp1,tqq
 PrpX2,t 1  xhÙp2,t 1q|X2,t  xhÙp2,tqq
(6.31)
 PrpX1,t 1  x2,t 1|X1,t  x2,tq












By Theorem 36.(ii) this implies hÙpPpVtq  PphÙpVtq and together with hÙpV0 
pV0 Theorem 33 then implies hÙpV  pV which shows that hÙ is a symmetry
of pV . Clearly, ti, hÙu is then a symmetry group of pV .
We have now established that T1,T2, and ti, hÙu are symmetry groups of
pV . Since they are all subgroups of ΣV we can combine their elements via
function composition (e.g. hj  hÙ) to get (possibly further) elements of ΣV . The
set of elements that can be formed in this way is a subgroup of ΣV called the
subgroup generated by T1,T2, and ti, hÙu. Since all elements of this subgroup
are also symmetries of pV we call the subgroup generated by T1,T2, and ti, hÙu
the symmetry group of MC and denote it by GMC .
Let us now come back to the symmetries of SLI. If we look at the first
trajectory
we see that it is symmetric with respect to any permutation of V. So every
symmetry of pV is also a symmetry of xV and we can use the entire group
GMC of symmetries of pV to generate equally disintegrating partitions. For-
mally, for each g P GMC we have gxV  xV so that migpipxVq  mipipxVq. As
we have seen in Fig. 6.7 combining hÙ P GMC and hÑ P GMC (a time shift
to the right of all indices) generates all the disconnected components of the
poset of D2.
If we look at the other disintegration levels we can see that GMC explains
the occurrence of multiple disconnected components also in D4. It is compati-
ble also with D1 in the sense that for the two partitions in D1 (see Fig. 6.10(a))
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we have gpi  pi for all g P GMC . Similarly we only expect a single compo-
nent in D5 since the minimal partition there, the zero of LpVq, also has g0  0
for all g P GMC .
The only outlier in this hierarchy is D3. We show the poset of partitions
of D3 in Fig. 6.9. It shows two different kinds of disconnected component.
One consisting of seven partitions which occurs nine times and one consisting
of four partitions occurring two times. According to Theorems 25 and 26 we
should not be able to use symmetries to map partitions in the first kind of
component to partitions in the second kind.
Figure 6.9: Hasse diagram of D3 of MC trajectories with visualised partitions. The blocks of a
partition are the cells of equal colour. Note that we can obtain all nine disconnected components
with three horizontal levels by permuting the indices via spatial inversion hÙpj, tq  p|J|   1
j, tq and “individual time slice permutations” permuting indices in one row independent of the
other. However, we cannot obtain the partitions of the two components (at the right edge of both
rows) with two horizontal levels from the partitions of the components with three horizontal
level components. The equality of SLI
This can be seen by noting for example that in most cases the cardinalities
of the blocks of the partitions in the components of the first kind are different
from the cardinalities of the blocks in the components of the second kind. In
case of the first kind the cardinalities are: top layer: t4, 2u and t3, 3u, second
layer: t4, 1, 1u, t3, 2, 1u, t2, 2, 2u, and bottom layer t2, 2, 1, 1u. In the the case
of the second kind: top layer: t4, 1, 1u, bottom layer: t3, 1, 1, 1u. Since all
permutations in ΣV maintain the cardinalities of all blocks only the partitions
with block cardinalities t4, 1, 1u occur in either kind and could be transformed
into each other by an elements of GMC . However, we can observe that this
is impossible as we only have hÙ which exchanges the entire rows and cannot
exchange individual cells in the top row with those in the bottom row.
So the symmetries of pV due to permutations of V do not explain why
the components of the first and second kind occur on the same disintegration
level i.e. why the partitions they contain have the same SLI values. This is
then a kind of degeneracy of the disintegration level D3.
In order to get an overview of only the different components of the posets
in each disintegration level we have drawn them including visualised parti-
tions in Fig. 6.10.
Finally let us look at the second trajectory again
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(a) D1 (b) D2 (c) D3
(d) D4
(e) D5
Figure 6.10: Representatives of the distinct Hasse diagrams within each disintegration level of
MC. Again we visualise the partitions at each vertex with the blocks of a partition of equal
colour. Note that at level D3 (in (c)) there are two distinct Hasse diagrams whereas on the other
levels there is only one per level.
and apply hÙ we get
which is the third trajectory. So hÙ is not a symmetry of the second tra-
jectory and we don’t have hÙxV  xV . This means that the conditions for
Theorem 36.(i) are not satisfied. Nonetheless, as we mentioned before, the
disintegration hierarchies of all four possible trajectories are identical. The
reason for this is Theorem 36.(ii) which asserts that even if gxV  xV we still
have migpipxVq  mipipxVq if for all blocks b P pi we have pbpx
g
bq  pbpxbq. This
is in fact the case here for g P GMC and all partitions on the second and third
trajectories.
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To see this note first that for xV either the second or third possible tra-
jectory any b  V, xgb  pxgpiqqiPb is still a pattern that can occur on at least
one of the four possible trajectories. In other words, it is impossible that xgb is
a pattern that cannot occur. Also keep in mind that xgb concerns exactly the
same random variables in the Bayesian network as xb even if the values it fixes
may differ. Then distinguish two situations. First, let b  pj, Tq i.e. b is part
of a single row indicated by j. Then xgb fixes some of the values in the one of
the rows and xb also fixes some of the values (possibly different) in one of the
rows (possibly the other one). Recall that only four trajectories are possible
and fixing the value (independent of what value) of any random variable in
one of the rows selects two possible trajectories from the four. Then pbpx
g
bq is
a sum of the probabilities of these two trajectories and since their probabilities
are all 1{4 this sum is 1{2 for both pbpx
g
bq and pbpxbq. Second, let bXp1, Tq  H
and bX p2, Tq  H then xgb and also xb fixes the values in both rows so there
is only a single possible trajectory selected whose probability is 1{4 in every
case. So again pbpx
g
bq  pbpxbq.
Figure 6.11: All distinct completely integrated STPs on the first possible trajectory of MC.
The value of complete local integration is indicated above each STP. We display STPs by colour-
ing the cells corresponding to random variables that are not fixed to any value by the STP in
grey. Cells corresponding to random variables that are fixed by the STP are coloured according
to the value i.e. white for 0 and black for 1.
6.3.7 Completely integrated STPs
After having looked at the disintegration hierarchy extensively we now make
use of it by extracting the completely (locally1) integrated STPs of the four tra-
jectories of MC. Recall that due to the disintegration theorem (Theorem 22)
we know that all blocks in partitions that occur in the refinement-free disinte-
gration hierarchy are either singletons or correspond to completely integrated
STPs. If we look at the refinement-free disintegration hierarchy in Fig. 6.8 we
1When it is clear from context that we are talking about complete local integration we drop
“local” for the sake of readability.
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Figure 6.12: All distinct completely integrated STPs on the second possible trajectory of MC.
The value of complete local integration is indicated above each STP.
see that many blocks occur in multiple partitions and across disintegration
levels. We also see that there are multiple blocks that are singletons. If we ig-
nore singletons since they are trivially integrated as they cannot be partitioned
we end up with eight different blocks. Since the disintegration hierarchy is
the same for all possible trajectories these blocks are also the same for each of
them. However, the STPs that result are different due to the different values
within the blocks. We show the eight completely integrated STPs and their
complete local integration (Definition 53) on the first trajectory in Fig. 6.11 and
on the second trajectory in Fig. 6.12.
Since the disintegration hierarchies are the same for the four possible tra-
jectories of MC we get the same refinement-free partitions and therefore the
same blocks containing the completely integrated STPs. This is apparent when
comparing Figs. 6.11 and 6.12 and noting that each STP occurring on the first
trajectory has a corresponding STP on the second trajectory that differs (if at
all) only in the values of the cells it fixes and not in what values it fixes. More
visually speaking, for each STP in Fig. 6.11 there is a corresponding STP in
Fig. 6.11 leaving the same cells grey.
If we are not interested in a particular trajectory we can also look at all
different completely integrated STP on any trajectory. For MC these are
shown in Fig. 6.13 We see that all completely integrated STPs xO have the
same value of complete local integration ιpxOq  1. This can be explained
using the deterministic expression for the SLI of Eq. (4.10) and noting that
for MC if any of the values xj,t is fixed by a STP then pxj,sqsPT  xj,T are
determined since they must be the same value. This means that the number
of trajectories Npxj,Sq in which any pattern xj,S with S  T occurs is either
Npxj,Sq  0, if the pattern is impossible, or Npxj,Sq  2 since there are two
trajectories compatible with it. Note that all blocks xb in any of the completely
integrated STP and all STP xO themselves are of the form xj,S with S  T. Let
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Figure 6.13: All distinct completely integrated STPs on all four possible trajectories of MC.
The value of complete local integration is indicated above each STP.
Npxj,Sq : N and plug this into Eq. (4.10) for an arbitrary partition pi:













To get the complete local integration value we have to minimise this with
respect to pi where |pi| ¥ 2. So for |XV0 |  4 and N  2 we get ιpxOq  1.
Another observation is that the completely integrated STPs are all limited
to one of the two rows. This shows on a simple example that, as we would
expect, completely integrated patterns cannot extend from one independent
process to another.
6.4 Two random variables with small interactions
In this section we look at a system almost identical to that of Section 6.3 but




Figure 6.14: Bayesian network of MCe.
designed to test whether the spatiotemporal patterns maintain integration in
the face of noise.
6.4.1 Definition
We define the time- and space-homogeneous multivariate Markov chain MCe
via the Markov matrix P with entries
Pf px1,t 1,x2,t 1q, f px1,t ,x2,tq  pJ,t 1px1,t 1, x2,t 1|x1,t, x2,tq (6.41)
where we define the function f : t0, 1u2 Ñ r1 : 4s via
f p0, 0q  1, f p0, 1q  2, f p1, 0q  3, f p1, 1q  4. (6.42)
With this convention P is
P 

1 3e e e e
e 1 3e e e
e e 1 3e e
e e e 1 3e
 (6.43)
The initial distribution is again the uniform distribution
pj,0pxj,0q  1{4. (6.44)
Writing this multivariate Markov chain as a Bayesian network is possible but
the conversion is tedious. The Bayesian network one obtains can be seen in
Fig. 6.14. The state of both random variables remains the same with probability
1 3e and transitions into each other possible combination with probability
e. In the following we set e  1{100.
6.4.2 Trajectories
In this system all trajectories are possible trajectories. This means there are
26  64 possible trajectories, since every one of the six random variables can
be in any of its two states. There are three classes of trajectories with equal
probability of occurring. The first class with the highest probability of occur-
ring are the four possible trajectories of MC. Then there are 24 trajectories
that make a single e-transition (i.e. a transition where the next pair is not the
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same as the current one px1,t 1, x2,t 1q  px1,t, x2,tq, these transitions occur
with probability e), and 36 trajectories with two e-transitions. We pick only
one trajectory from each class. The representative trajectories are shown in
Fig. 6.15 and will be denoted x1V , x
2
V , and x
3
V respectively. The probabilities
are pVpx1Vq  0.235225, pVpx
2
Vq  0.0024250, pVpx
3
Vq  0.000025.
(a) x1V  p0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1q (b) x
2
V  p0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0q (c) x
3
V  p0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1q
Figure 6.15: Visualisation of three trajectories of MCe. In each trajectory the time index
increases from left to right. There are two rows corresponding to the two random variables at
each time step and three columns corresponding to the three time-steps we are considering here.
We can see that the first trajectory (in (a)) makes no e-transitions, the second (in (b)) makes
one from t  2 to t  1, and the third (in (c)) makes two.




Figure 6.16: Specific local integrations mipipxVq of one of the four trajectories of MC (mea-
sured w.r.t. the probability distribution of MC), here denoted xMC

V , and the three representa-
tive trajectories xkV , x P t1, 2, 3u of MC
e (measured w.r.t. the probability distribution of MCe)
seen in Fig. 6.15 with respect to all pi P LpVq. The partitions are ordered as in Fig. 6.4 with
increasing cardinality |pi|. Vertical lines indicate partitions where the cardinality |pi| increases
by one. Note that the values of xMC





6.4.3 SLI values of the partitions
Again we calculate the SLI mipipxVq of every trajectory xV with respect to each
partition pi P LpVq. In contrast to MC the SLI values with respect to each
partition of MCe do depend on the trajectories. We plot the values of SLI with
respect to each partition pi P LpVq for the three representative trajectories in
Fig. 6.16.
It turns out that the SLI values of x1V are almost the same as those of MC

in Fig. 6.4 with small deviations due to the noise. This should be expected





negative SLI with respect to some partitions. In particular, x3V has non-positive
SLI values with respect to any partition. This is due to the low probability of
this trajectory compared to its parts. The blocks of any partition have so
much higher probability than the entire trajectory that the product of their
probabilities is still greater or equal to the trajectory probability.
Figure 6.17: All distinct completely integrated STPs on the first trajectory x1V of MC
e. The
value of complete local integration is indicated above each STP. See Fig. 6.11 for colouring
conventions.
168
6.4.4 Completely integrated STPs
In this section we look at the completely integrated STPs for each of the three
representative trajectories xkV , k P t1, 2, 3u. They are visualised together with
their complete local integration values in Figs. 6.17 to 6.19. In contrast to
the situation of MC we now have completely integrated STPs with varying
values of complete local integration.
On the first trajectory x1V we find all the eight STPs that are completely
locally integrated in MC (see Fig. 6.12). These are also more than an order
of magnitude more integrated than the rest of the completely integrated STPs.
Figure 6.18: All distinct completely integrated STPs on the second trajectory x2V of MC
e. The
value of complete local integration is indicated above each STP.
Figure 6.19: All distinct completely integrated STPs on the third trajectory x3V of MC
e. The
value of complete local integration is indicated above each STP.
6.5 Completely locally integrated spatiotemporal pat-
terns as entities
In Section 5.3.5 we have proposed to use the set of completely integrated spa-
tiotemporal patterns to solve the identity problem. This means using the com-
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pletely integrated spatiotemporal patterns as an entity set. There we called
this entity set the ι-entities. In this section we look at the completely inte-
grated spatiotemporal patterns found in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 with regard to
the phenomena and properties of entities described in Section 5.3.
In Section 5.3 we have described three phenomena that should not be pre-
cluded by a formal notion of entities. These are
1. compositionality,
2. degree of freedom traversal, and
3. counterfactual variation.
We show by example that ι-entities can exhibit these three phenomena.
Regarding compositionality we can see in Fig. 6.13 that MC contains ι-
entities that are composed of multiple temporal parts. More precisely MC
contains ι-entities that occupy random variables in multiple time-slices. For
example the ι-entity:
While MC contains no ι-entities that are composed of multiple spatial
parts such ι-entities exist in MCe on all three kinds of trajectories as we can
see in Figs. 6.17 to 6.19. An example would be the ι-entity:
This entity is also temporally composite. These entities still have much lower
ι values than for the entities that occupy only one of the random variables in
multiple time-slices. However, this still shows that there are spatially, tempo-
rally, and spatiotemporally composite ι-entities.
Regarding degree of freedom traversal, we can see that, for example, the
ι-entity
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changes the degrees of freedom that it occupies from the bottom one to the
top one and then to both in the two time-steps. So there are degree of freedom
traversing ι-entities.2
Regarding counterfactual variation, the ι-entities are counterfactual in value
only for MC. For example the following two ι-entities from the first and sec-
ond possible trajectory differ in value on the same set of of occupied random
variables:
But the sets of random variables occupied by the ι-entities of MC are the
same in all trajectories.
In MCe on the other hand we find that the sets of random variables occu-
pied by the ι-entities differ from one trajectory to another. For example the
ι-entities
which occur in x2V and x
3
V respectively occupy sets of random variables that
no entity in the other trajectory occupies. So there the entity set of ι-entities
for MCe is counterfactual in extent.
We only note briefly that there are some counter intuitive ι-entities that
skip the second times-step for both MC and MCe Figs. 6.17 to 6.19. Whether
these are due to the small scale of the system or do occur more generally will
be further investigated in the future.
6.6 Action and perception of ι-entities
In this section we briefly present examples of ι-entities that exhibit actions
and perceptions according to our definitions. We prove by example that
that ι-entities can perform value and extent actions. We also show that non-
interpenetration is not necessarily satisfied by ι-entities as it is not satisfied
in our example systems MC and MCe. This implies that the co-perception
entities are not necessarily mutually exclusive and in fact we find example co-
perception entities that are not mutually exclusive. We can still use a subset
of mutually exclusive entities with common past to extract some perceptions.
These are not uniquely defined however and we also choose a different subset
2Since there are also entities that do not traverse degrees of freedom in the first time-step we
can also not just rename the indices at the second time-step to get rid of all degree of freedom
traversing entities.
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and show it has a slightly different branch-morph as well. We also show that
the same ι-entity can perform an action and perceive something in the same
transition from one step to the next.
6.6.1 Actions of ι-entities in MC and MCe
According to our definition of entity action (Definition 76) there are actions
performed by ι-entities in MC and MCe. For example the ι-entities
are co-action entities at the first time-step and their second time-step time-
slices are co-actions.
• They occur in the different and possible co-action trajectories:
• They occupy the same random variable at the first time-step.
• The environments at the first time-step in the two trajectories are identi-
cal.
• And at the second time-step the two ι-entities differ.
For the environment it is therefore impossible to be sure about the next con-
figuration of the entity that co-occurs at the first time-step.
Since the above spatiotemporal patterns are ι-entities in the shown trajec-
tories in both MC and MCe they are co-action entities in both chains.
Note that the above is a value action. The time-slices at the second time-
step differ only in the value they assign to the top random variable. In MC
there are no extent actions, but in MCe there are. The following two entities





These entities occur in the different and possible co-action trajectories x2V
and x3V :
and also fulfil the other conditions for actions mentioned above. The action
is an extent action since the occupied variable is the bottom variable for the
left entity and the top variable for the right entity. This shows that there are
ι-entities that perform value actions and those that perform extent actions.
The extent action above also reveals a challenge to ι-entities. We argued
in Section 5.4 that the differences at t  1 of two entities with the same envi-
ronments at t should be due to the entity or random. In the above case the
entities (and their environments in the according trajectories) are equal at t so
the differences between the two at t  1 are due to the noise. We suggested
that it is the task of the entity-set to exclude such random parts from entities.
The ι-entities might therefore need further adaptations or the notion of actions
might need to be changed. A third possibility is that due to the “global” con-
struction of entities there are some non-intuitive effects. Another such effect
can be seen are the entities that skip an entire times-step that we mentioned
in Section 6.5.
Finally, we note that there are also more intuitive co-action entities that
perform extent actions. For example the co-action entities
which occur in the co-action trajectories
have different “internal” values at the first time-step which can be interpreted
as the reason for the different extent at the second time-step. In the light of the
previous extent action however this interpretation is questionable and needs
further investigation.
6.6.2 Perceptions of ι-entities in MC and MCe
Regarding perception we first note that the example chains MC and MCe
allow interpenetration of ι-entities. We can see that there are interpenetrating
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ι-entities in all trajectories of the systems considered here. For example the
ι-entities
both occur in each of the three trajectories of MCe. They are not identical
patterns and still both fix partly the same random variables. Yet, as they
occur in the same trajectories the probability that they co-occur is non-zero.
This violates non-interpenetration as defined in Definition 84. Therefore the
dynamics of the systems considered here do not support the definition of
perception proposed in Section 5.5. This implies that by itself the choice of
the ι-entities as an entity set does not necessarily lead to non-interpenetration.
As mentioned before it is not clear at what level non-interpenetration should
be required.
Next, note that in MC there are no co-perception entities for any of its
ι-entities (see Fig. 6.13). For any given entity xA with non-empty time-slices
at t and t  1 there is no other entity yB that has identical past yB¨t  xA¨t
and differs at t   1. This is due to the fact that the future of any entity is
completely determined by its current state regardless of the rest of the system
/ environment.
In MCe we do find co-perception entities. Due to the interpenetration of
entities however we cannot use the full set of co-perception entities. As men-
tioned in Section 5.5.8 we can use a mutually exclusive subset ζpxA, tq of the
co-perception entities as a proxy for the co-perception partition. The simplest
case is to use only two entities, the original entity xA and a co-perception en-
tity yB so that ζpxA, tq  txA, yBu. The co-perception entity yB must be chosen
such that
• PrpXA  xA, XB  yBq  0,
• xAt 1  yBt 1 .
The first condition so that it is mutually exclusive the second so that it is part
of a different branch in the branching partition. This gives us a branching
partition ηpxA, tq  ttxau, tyBuu. An example of such a co-perception pair are
the following ι-entities of MCe:
So here A  tp2, 0q, p1, 1q, p1, 2q, p2, 2qu with xA  p1, 0, 0, 1q and B  A with
yB  p1, 1, 1, 1q. Since xA¨t  yB¨t and A0, A1  H we indeed have two
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co-perception entities yB P SpxA, 0q. The two co-perception entities perceive
the difference between two co-perception environments at the first time-step
t  0. Since every trajectory is possible in MCe every environment at the
first time-step is a co-perception environment so that XSVtzAt  XVtzAt . The
environments that will be classified are then the possible values t0, 1u of the
random variable XVtzAt  X1,0 that is not fixed by the two co-perception enti-
ties.
Each environment x1,0 P X1,0 has an associated branch-morph pp.|x1,0, xA¨tq :
ηpxA, tq Ñ r0, 1s over the two entities. The two morphs turn out to be:
xA yB
pp.|0, xA¨tq 4705{4754 49{4754
pp.|1, xA¨tq 49{4754 4705{4754
(6.45)
We see that they are indeed different such that the branch-morph partitions
piS consists of two blocks containing one co-perception environment each
piS  ttX1,0  0u, tX1,0  1uu. The elements of this partition are then the
perceptions.
Finally, we can see here that the choice of a co-perception entity is not
unique. We can also choose an entity zC  yB to get another co-perception
pair. Another such possibility with the same xA is the following pair:
Here C  tp2, 0q, p1, 1q, p2, 1q, p1, 2q, p2, 2qu and zC  p1, 1, 1, 1, 1q. Note that zC
and yB differ at the second time-slice but are not mutually exclusive:
PrpXB  yB, XC  zCq  4753{20000 ¡ 0. (6.46)
Therefore, they cannot be put into the same branch (because they differ at
t   1) but they also cannot be put into different branches (because they can
occur together). This is possible because they interpenetrate and makes it
difficult to find a unique co-perception partition.
The perceptions of the co-perception pair xA, zC are the same as for xA, yB
but this is due to the limits of our example. The branch morphs are different:
xA zC
pp.|0, xA¨tq 9410{9507 97{9507
pp.|1, xA¨tq 98{9507 9409{9507
(6.47)
This indicates that in general the perceptions of different choices of ζpxA, tq
co-perception entities are also different.
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6.6.3 Action and perception of the same ι-entity at the same
time
In the previous sections we have seen co-action entities and co-perception en-
tities. We only want to emphasise here that an entity can have a co-perception
pair and a (different) co-action pair at the same time t. This means that action
and perception do not preclude each other. An example is the entity xA from
our perception example. It is the entity on the left in
shown together with its co-perception entity for the first time-step. However,
xA also occurs as a co-action at the first time-step of another entity. These
co-actions (with xA on the right) are
So the same ι-entity can perform actions and have perceptions the same time-
step.
6.7 Discussion
In this chapter we presented two very simple multivariate Markov chains
MC and MCe. In Section 6.3 We calculated the disintegration hierarchy
and the refinement free disintegration hierarchy of MC. We explained the
occurrence of multiple identical disconnected components in the partially or-
dered disintegration levels. These are due to the invariance of the specific
local integration as revealed by Theorems 30 and 31. We then presented the
set of completely locally integrated spatiotemporal patterns of MC. This
corresponds to the ι-entities of MC. These exhibit compositionality in time
but not in space and counterfactual variation in value but not in extend. They
do not exhibit degree of freedom traversal as should be expected due to the
independent dynamics. All the entities of MC have the same ι value of 1 bit.
This is due to the four possible trajectories having identical probabilities and
the deterministic dynamics.
In Section 6.4 we extracted the ι-entities of MCe. These exhibit composi-
tionality in time and space, counterfactual variation in value and extend, and
degree of freedom traversal. The ι-entities of MCe also attain various ι values
ranging from 0.014 bit to 0.971 bit.
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In Section 6.6 we turned our attention to entity action and entity perception
of the ι-entities of MC and MCe. There are entity actions in MC but only in
value. For our weak definition of actions this is not surprising since the entities
in MC are self-determining and independent of the rest of the system.
In MCe we also find entity actions in extend. Here we also find an example
of an extent action that suggests that either the entity action requirements are
too weak or the ι-entities do not provide the internal connection between their
parts that we expected. We will discuss this further below.
Concerning perception, we find no perceptions in MC which should be
expected for parts of an independent process. In our formalisation of percep-
tion this leads to an empty set of co-perception entities. For MCe there are
co-perception entities. However, we cannot use the unique construction of a
branching partition due to interpenetration of ι-entities and non-exclusion of
co-perception entities. We therefore used the approach that only relies on a
set ζ of mutually exclusive co-perception entities to define the branch-morph.
This resulted in perception being defined for entities in MCe. We also saw
that another choice of a co-perception entity can lead to a (quantitatively) dif-
ferent perception. This further confirmed that without non-interpenetration
perception is not necessarily uniquely defined.
Finally, we showed that the same ι-entity can perform entity actions and
entity perception at the same time-step t. This is achieved simply by finding
a co-action entity and a (usually different) co-perception entity for the same
original entity at the same time-step. The story of perceptions and actions of
an entity is then defined via the co-action and co-perception entities along its
time-evolution.
The combination of ι-entities with entity action and entity perception then
fulfils quite a few expectations and requirements that we have discussed be-
fore. However, there are also some things that are not easily interpreted. One
thing briefly mentioned before are entities that skip a time-step. Such entities
occur in both systems MC and MCe. A second thing is the extent action that
seemed to be random even though it was part of an entity. This could mean
at least four different things:
1. The entity action definition is too weak and should require explicitly
that the time-slice xAt of the entity at t determines to some degree the
time-slice xAt 1 at t  1. This seems to speak against the idea of starting
from entities in the first place. If actions explicitly require a connection
between them from one step to the next why have an additional notion
of entity? Can we not only define actions (and perceptions) in this case
and either have the entity emerge or ignored it completely? This is a
valid approach and is sometimes discussed 3 but not much in keeping
with the “entity-first” point of view in this thesis.
2. The notion of ι-entity is not strong enough to ensure that there are inter-
nal relations between all parts of the entities. This is possible but would
be surprising. The requirement that all possible partitions have lower
probability than the whole seems like a quite strong condition.
3Personal communication with Nathaniel Virgo.
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3. The situation is not really a problem but is just not intuitive. We have
also mentioned the time-step skipping ι-entities which are not intuitive
in a Markov chain. It may be that the global way that ι-entities are de-
fined connects the parts of entities in subtle ways. Maybe the action
that seemed random above is not that random after all if seen from a
global perspective (here “global” includes the entire Bayesian network,
all time-steps and degrees of freedom). This ,however, still questions our
motivation for our action definition. There we argued that if the envi-
ronments are equal and the next time-slices different then the difference
at the next time-step must originate from the agent (which it does not in
the above example) or is random (which must then be wrong). So there
either must be a third possibility due to some global effects or we have
to accept that randomness is a kind of (proto-)action. A third possibility
seems strange to us but on the other hand there are sometimes strange
effects in probability and information theory.
4. Goal-directedness saves the situation. We expect that goal-directedness
induces a connection between the entity perceptions and the entity ac-
tions. The entity actions have to somehow be adapted to the entity per-
ceptions in order to get goal-directed behaviour. Then the example of an
action above could stay an “action” or proto-action but the according en-
tity could never be an agent since it cannot be goal-directed. This view
still questions our motivation for the entity action definition. Again it
seems we would have to accept random events as actions.
None of these possibilities is unproblematic. So more research is needed.
A third thing concerns non-interpenetration. We have seen that it provides
uniquely defined branch-morphs and perceptions. However the ι-entities do
interpenetrate. This leads to multiple coexisting but different perceptions for
the same entity. There might be ways to define perception in a way similar
to ours that deals with interpenetrating entities in a unique way and there
might be completely different definitions of perception where the problem
does not occur. However, the solution closest to the work in this thesis might
be to get rid of non-interpenetrating entities. There could be well motivated
ways to only use a (non-interpenetrating) subset of all ι-entities as an entity
set. The partitions in the disintegration hierarchy all partition the system into
non-interpenetrating blocks. We have in this thesis considered all blocks of
all partitions together as the ι-entities. It is maybe not too far fetched to select
blocks from only a few partitions or even a single partition as the entity-set.
For example only blocks of partitions that are in some way on the same “scale”
as others e.g. same cardinality, same block size, etc. This is related to the
question of whether only entities on the same “scale” cannot interpenetrate
but those on different “scales” can. We could also try to settle for a single
partition, possibly the one in the refinement-free disintegration hierarchy with
the absolute minimum of SLI. This would lead to non-interpenetration. This
is future research.
There are also further requirements for entities that may be derived from
phenomena associated to living organisms. Examples of such phenomena are
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birth, death, growth, replication, etc. The implications of those will also be
investigated in the future.
On the more technical side we would like to extend our definition of the
branch-morph and try to generalise information theoretic measures for it.
Finally, there is the lack of a definition of entity goal-directedness. Even in
the event that the definitions presented in this thesis turn out to be correct,
entity goal-directedness has to weave the entity actions and entity perceptions
together. So that they make some kind of sense as a sequence. This is essential




The overarching goal of this thesis was to further improve our understanding
of how the notion of agents can be compatible with a lawful universe. For
this we attempted further formalisations of the notions identified in the lit-
erature as constitutive of agents. These are entities, perception, action, and
goal-directedness. We made no contribution to the formalisation of goal-
directedness.
With respect to entities we contributed a novel measure of integration
called complete local integration (CLI). We have proposed this also as possible
basis for a definition of entities. However, we first analysed this notion in the
more general context of Bayesian networks. CLI is based on the specific local
integration (SLI). We proved upper bounds constructively and constructed a
candidate for a lower bound for SLI. We defined the disintegration-hierarchy
and its refinement free version. Using these we revealed a relation between
the finest partitions of global trajectories achieving a certain SLI value and
the CLI of the blocks of these partitions. All blocks of such partitions are
completely locally integrated. Conversely, all completely locally integrated
spatiotemporal patterns are a block in at least one such partition. We expect
that this result can be used to further investigate CLI and SLI formally. We
presented an interpretation of this result from coding theory. This still needs
rigorous analysis but seems promising (Section 5.3.5.3).
We also established the transformation of SLI under permutations of nodes
in Bayesian networks and showed how they can be applied for the explanation
of the disintegration hierarchy in an example Chapter 6. The transformation
properties are also important for future theoretical work.
In Chapter 5 we presented three criteria for formal definitions of enti-
ties. These are compositionality, degree of freedom traversal, and counterfac-
tual variation. Counterfactual variation has two realisations: in value and in
extent. Based on these criteria we concluded that sets of random variables
are not suitable for general agent definitions. We therefore defined general
entity-sets as subsets of the set of all spatiotemporal patterns of a multivariate
Markov chain. This definition turned out to be of considerable conceptual
value. The main reason for this is that the perception-action loop also has an
associated entity-set. By using this entity-set the new notions of entity action
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and entity perception defined for arbitrary entity-sets naturally transform into
notions known from the perception-action loop literature. The perception-
action loop entity set is exhaustive, does not traverse degrees of freedom and
only varies counterfactually in value. The general entity sets can vary coun-
terfactually in extent, traverse degrees of freedom freely, and need not be
exhaustive.
Our entity action definition was shown to imply non-heteronomy, an infor-
mation theoretically defined notion related to autonomy due to Bertschinger
et al. (2008). Entity perception was shown to correspond to a standard con-
cept of perception in the perception-action loop. Entity perception is based
on our construction of the branch-morph. This is a generalisation of the prob-
ability of the next agent state given current agent and environment states.
This conditional probability distribution underlies the standard construction
of perception in the perception-action loop. However, it also occurs in other
concepts defined for the perception-action loop. The generalisation of such
notions should now be feasible. Constructions similar to the branch-morph
for other conditional probability distributions are also thinkable. We hope that
this will lead to a generalised theory of perception and action for entity-sets.
During the construction of the branch-morph it became clear that it is
uniquely defined if the entity-set satisfies non-interpenetration. This notion
therefore seems worth investigating with respect to an axiom for entity sets.
We were also able to show that the assumptions we need to make on the co-
perception environments (which are the environments that can be perceived
or distinguished by an entity) only appear stronger than the assumptions in-
herent in the perception-action loop and are actually equivalent. This is fur-
ther support for our method of generalisation.
We noted that both entity actions and entity perception have multi-time-
step analogues. Similar constructions are also used in perception-action loops.
We also noted in the discussion of related work that our notion of perception
can be seen as a formal generalisation to stochastic settings of the macroper-
turbations of the cognitive domain as defined for the glider in Beer (2014b).
Concerning simulation results we have calculated the disintegration hier-
archies, visualised them and explained their structure using the SLI symmetry
theorems. We also calculated the ι-entities (the completely locally integrated
spatiotemporal patterns) for both example systems. For the example system
with noise term we selected three trajectories. These results support our for-
mal results.
With respect to the usefulness of the ι-entities as an entity-set the results
are insufficient for a final assessment. As expected we found ι-entities that
exhibit compositionality in time and space, counterfactual variation in value
and extend, and degree of freedom traversal. However, we also found counter
intuitive examples of ι-entities that skip a time-step completely. In other words
they disappear for a time-step and reappear again. This could be due to the
small system size but this is not certain and needs more investigation.
Concerning entity action and entity perception of the ι-entities. We found
entity actions in value and extent. However we also find an example of an
extent action that is counter intuitive and questions either our notion of entity
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actions or the ι-entities. A decisive result is still lacking however.
Concerning perception, we found perceptions only where we expected it
i.e. not for an independent process. However we could not define percep-
tions uniquely. A unique construction is guaranteed for non-interpenetrating
entity-sets. However the ι-entities turned out to allow interpenetration. As
expected we then also found non-exclusive co-perception entities. In order to
still get perceptions we used the approach that only relies on a set ζ of mutu-
ally exclusive co-perception entities to define the branch-morph. We obtained
perceptions but we also saw that another choice of a co-perception entity can
lead to a (quantitatively) different perception. This further confirmed that
without non-interpenetration perception is not necessarily uniquely defined.
Finally, we showed that the same ι-entity can perform entity actions and
entity perception at the same time-step t.
All together the ι-entities need further investigation. One interesting next
step is to use only the partition with the lowest SLI value for each trajectory
as a source for entities. Such an entity-set would be non-interpenetrating. The
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